WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 


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•WASHINGTON 
AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

A  CHRONICLE  OF  THE 

RISE  AND  FALL  OF  FEDERALISM 

BY  HENRY  JONES  FORD 


NEW  HAVEN:  YALE   UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

TORONTO:  GLASGOW.  BROOK   &   CO. 

LONDON:  HUMPHREY   MILFORD 

OXFORD   UNIVERSITY   PRESS 

1921 


Copyright,  1918,  by  Yale  University  Press 


CONTENTS 

I.     AN  IMITATION  COURT  Page  1 

II.     GREAT  DECISIONS  "  26 

III.     THE  MASTER  BUILDER  "  64 

IV.     ALARUMS  AND  EXCURSIONS  "  80 

V.     TRIBUTE  TO  THE  ALGERINES  "  104 

VI.     FRENCH  DESIGNS  ON  AMERICA  "  115 

VII.     A  SETTLEMENT  WITH  ENGLAND  "  147 

VIII.     PARTY  VIOLENCE      .  "  164 

IX.     THE  PERSONAL  RULE  OF  JOHN  ADAMS    "  195 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE  "  227 

INDEX  "  231 


460^48 


ILLUSTRATION 

WASHINGTON'S  SECOND  INAUGURA 
TION,  CONGRESS  HALL,  PHILA 
DELPHIA,  1793 

From  the  painting  by  Ferris.  In  the 
Ferris  Collection  of  American  Historical 
Paintings.  Copyright,  J.  L.  G.  Ferris.  Frontispiece 


IX 


WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 
CHAPTER  I 

•* 

AN  IMITATION  COURT 

WASHINGTON  was  glad  to  remain  at  Mount 
Vernon  as  long  as  possible  after  he  had  con 
sented  to  serve  as  President,  enjoying  the  life 
of  a  country  gentleman,  which  was  now  much 
more  suited  to  his  taste  than  official  employment. 
He  was  weary  of  public  duties  and  the  heavy 
demands  upon  his  time  which  had  left  him  with 
little  leisure  for  his  private  life  at  home.  His 
correspondence  during  this  period  gives  ample 
evidence  of  his  extreme  reluctance  to  reassume 
public  responsibilities.  To  bring  the  matter  to 
its  true  proportions,  it  must  be  remembered  that 
to  the  view  of  the  times  the  new  constitution  was 
but  the  latest  attempt  to  tinker  the  federal  scheme, 

l 


2      WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

aw)  ii  was  yet  tc  be  seen  whether  this  endeavor 
would  be  any  more  successful  than  previous 
efforts  had  been.  As  for  the  title  of  President,  it 
had  already  been  borne  by  a  number  of  congres 
sional  politicians  and  had  been  rather  tarnished 
by  the  behavior  of  some  of  them.  Washington 
was  not  at  all  eager  to  move  in  the  matter  before 
he  had  to,  and  he  therefore  remained  on  his  farm 
until  Congress  met,  formally  declared  the  result 
of  the  election,  and  sent  a  committee  to  Mount 
Vernon  to  give  him  official  notice.  It  was  not 
until  April  30,  1789,  that  he  was  formally  installed 
as  President. 

Madison  and  Hamilton  were  meanwhile  going 
ahead  with  their  plans.  This  time  was  perhaps 
the  happiest  in  their  lives.  They  had  stood  to 
gether  in  years  of  struggle  to  start  the  movement 
for  a  new  constitution,  to  steer  it  through  the 
convention,  and  to  force  it  on  the  States.  Al 
though  the  fight  had  been  a  long  and  a  hard  one, 
and  although  they  had  not  won  all  that  they  had 
wanted,  it  was  nevertheless  a  great  satisfaction 
that  they  had  accomplished  so  much,  and  they 
were  now  applying  themselves  with  great  zest  to 
the  organization  of  the  new  government.  Madi 
son  was  a  member  of  Congress;  Hamilton  lived 


AN  IMITATION  COURT  3 

near  the  place  where  Congress  held  its  sittings 
in  New  York  and  his  house  was  a  rendezvous 
for  the  federal  leaders.  Thither  Madison  would 
often  go  to  talk  over  plans  and  prospects.  A  lady 
who  lived  near  by  has  related  how  she  often  saw 
them  walking  and  talking  together,  stopping  some 
times  to  have  fun  with  a  monkey  skipping  about  in 
a  neighbor's  yard. 

At  that  time  Madison  was  thirty-eight;  Ham 
ilton  was  thirty-two.  They  were  little  men,  of 
the  quick,  dapper  type.  Madison  was  five  feet 
six  and  a  quarter  inches  tall,  slim  and  delicate  in 
physique,  with  a  pale  student's  face  lit  up  by 
bright  hazel  eyes.  He  was  as  plain  as  a  Quaker  in 
his  style  of  dress,  and  his  hair,  which  was  light  in 
color,  was  brushed  straight  back  and  gathered  into 
a  small  queue,  tied  with  a  plain  ribbon.  Hamil 
ton  was  of  about  the  same  stature,  but  his  figure 
had  wiry  strength.  His  Scottish  ancestry  was 
manifest  in  his  ruddy  complexion  and  in  the 
modeling  of  his  features.  He  was  more  elegant 
than  Madison  in  his  habitual  attire.  He  had  a 
very  erect,  dignified  bearing;  his  expression  was 
rather  severe  when  his  features  were  in  repose, 
but  he  had  a  smile  of  flashing  radiance  when  he 
was  pleased  and  interested.  Washington*  who 


4      WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

stood  over  six  feet  two  inches  in  his  buckled  shoes, 
had  to  look  down  over  his  nose  when  he  met  the 
young  statesmen  who  had  been  the  wheel  horses 
of  the  federal  movement. 

Soon  after  Washington  arrived  in  New  York  he 
sought  Hamilton's  aid  in  the  management  of  the 
national  finances.  There  was  the  rock  on  which 
the  government  of  the  Confederation  had  found 
ered.  There  the  most  skillful  pilotage  was  re 
quired  if  the  new  government  was  to  make  a  safe 
voyage.  Washington's  first  thought  had  been  to 
get  Robert  Morris  to  take  charge  again  of  the 
department  that  he  had  formerly  managed  with 
conspicuous  ability,  and  wrhile  stopping  in  Phila 
delphia  on  his  way  to  New  York,  he  had  approached 
Morris  on  the  subject.  Morris,  who  was  now  en 
gaged  in  grand  projects  which  were  eventually  to 
bring  him  to  a  debtor's  prison,  declined  the  position 
but  strongly  recommended  Hamilton.  This  sug 
gestion  proved  very  acceptable  to  Washington, 
who  was  well  aware  of  Hamilton's  capacity. 

The  thorny  question  of  etiquette  was  the  next 
matter  to  receive  Washington's  attention.  Per 
sonally  he  favored  the  easy  hospitality  to  which 
he  was  accustomed  in  Virginia,  but  he  knew  quite 
well  that  his  own  taste  ought  not  to  be  decisive. 


AN  IMITATION  COURT  5 

The  forms  that  he  might  adopt  would  become 
precedents,  and  hence  action  should  be  taken 
cautiously.  Washington  was  a  methodical  man. 
He  had  a  well-balanced  nature  which  was  never 
disturbed  by  timidity  of  any  kind  and  rarely  by 
anxiety.  His  anger  was  strong  when  it  was 
excited,  but  his  ordinary  disposition  was  one 
of  massive  equanimity.  He  was  not  imaginative, 
but  he  took  things  as  they  came,  and  did  what 
the  occasion  demanded.  In  crises  that  did  not 
admit  of  deliberation,  his  instinctive  courage 
guided  his  behavior,  but  such  crises  belong  to 
military  experience,  and  in  civil  life  careful  delib 
eration  was  his  rule.  It  was  his  practice  to  read 
important  documents  pen  in  hand  to  note  the 
points.  From  one  of  his  familiar  letters  to  General 
Knox  we  learn  that  on  rising  in  the  morning  he 
would  turn  over  in  his  mind  the  day's  work  and 
would  consider  how  to  deal  with  it.  His  new 
circumstances  soon  apprised  him  that  the  first 
thing  to  be  settled  was  his  deportment  as  President. 
Under  any  form  of  government  the  man  who  is 
head  of  the  state  is  forced,  as  part  of  his  public 
service,  to  submit  to  public  exhibition  and  to  be 
exact  in  social  observance;  but,  unless  precautions 
are  taken,  engagements  will  consume  his  time  and 


6      WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

strength.  Writing  to  a  friend  about  the  situation 
in  which  he  found  himself,  Washington  declared: 
"By  the  time  I  had  done  breakfast,  and  thence 
till  dinner,  and  afterwards  till  bed-time,  I  could 
not  get  relieved  from  the  ceremony  of  one  visit, 
before  I  had  to  attend  to  another.  In  a  word,  I 
had  no  leisure  to  read  or  answer  the  dispatches 
that  were  pouring  in  upon  me  from  all  quarters. " 
The  radical  treatment  which  the  situation 
called  for  was  aided  by  a  general  feeling  in  Con 
gress  that  arrangements  should  be  made  for  the 
President  different  from  those  under  the  Articles  of 
Confederation.  It  had  been  the  practice  for  the 
President  to  keep  open  house.  Of  this  custom 
Washington  remarked  that  it  brought  the  office 
"in  perfect  contempt;  for  the  table  was  considered 
a  public  one,  and  every  person,  who  could  get 
introduced,  conceived  that  he  had  a  right  to  be 
invited  to  it.  This,  although  the  table  was  always 
crowded  (and  with  mixed  company,  and  the 
President  considered  in  no  better  light  than  as  a 
maitre  d' hotel),  was  in  its  nature  impracticable, 
and  as  many  offenses  given  as  if  no  table  had  been 
kept."  It  was  important  to  settle  the  matter 
before  Mrs.  Washington  joined  him  in  New  York. 
Inside  of  ten  days  from  the  time  he  took  the  oath  of 


AN  IMITATION  COURT  7 

office,  he  therefore  drafted  a  set  of  nine  queries, 
copies  of  which  he  sent  to  Jay,  Madison,  Hamil 
ton,  and  John  Adams,  with  these  sensible  remarks : 

"Many  things,  which  appear  of  little  importance 
in  themselves  and  at  the  beginning,  may  have 
great  and  durable  consequences  from  their  having 
been  established  at  the  commencement  of  a  new 
general  government.  It  will  be  much  easier  to  com 
mence  the  Administration  upon  a  well-adjusted 
system,  built  on  tenable  grounds,  than  to  correct 
errors,  or  alter  inconveniences,  after  they  shall 
have  been  confirmed  by  habit.  The  President,  in 
all  matters  of  business  and  etiquette,  can  have 
no  object  but  to  demean  himself  in  his  public 
character  in  such  a  manner  as  to  maintain  the  dig 
nity  of  his  office,  without  subjecting  himself  to 
the  imputation  of  superciliousness  or  unnecessary 
reserve.  Under  these  impressions  he  asks  for 
your  candid  and  undisguised  opinion. " 

Only  the  replies  of  Hamilton  and  Adams  have 
been  preserved.  Hamilton  advised  Washington 
that  while  "the  dignity  of  the  office  should  be 
supported  .  .  .  care  will  be  necessary  to  avoid 
extensive  disgust  or  discontent.  .  .  .  The 
notions  of  equality  are  yet,  in  my  opinion,  too 
general  and  strong  to  admit  of  such  a  distance 


8      WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

being  placed  between  the  President  and  other 
branches  of  the  Government  as  might  even  be 
consistent  with  a  due  proportion."  Hamilton 
then  sketched  a  plan  for  a  weekly  levee:  "The 
President  to  accept  no  invitations,  and  to  give 
formal  entertainments  only  twice  or  four  times  a 
year,  the  anniversaries  of  important  events  of  the 
Revolution."  In  addition,  "the  President  on  levee 
days,  either  by  himself  or  some  gentleman  of  his 
household,  to  give  informal  invitations  to  family 
dinners  .  .  .  not  more  than  six  or  eight  to  be 
invited  at  a  time,  and  the  matter  to  be  confined 
essentially  to  members  of  the  legislature  and  other 
official  characters.  The  President  never  to  remain 
long  at  table. "  Hamilton  observed  that  his  views 
did  not  correspond  with  those  of  other  advisers, 
but  he  urged  the  necessity  of  behaving  so  as  "to 
remove  the  idea  of  too  immense  inequality,  which 
I  fear  would  excite  dissatisfaction  and  cabal." 

This  was  sagacious  advice,  and  Washington 
would  have  benefited  by  conforming  to  it  more 
closely  than  he  did.  The  prevailing  tenor  of  the 
advice  which  he  received  is  probably  reflected 
in  the  communication  from  Adams,  who  was 
in  favor  of  making  the  government  impressive 
through  grand  ceremonial.  "  Chamberlains,  aides- 


AN  IMITATION  COURT  9 

de-camp,  secretaries,  masters  of  ceremonies,  etc., 
will  become  necessary.  .  .  .  Neither  dignity  nor 
authority  can  be  supported  in  human  minds, 
collected  into  nations  or  any  great  numbers,  with 
out  a  splendor  and  majesty  in  some  degree  pro 
portioned  to  them. "  Adams  held  that  in  no  case 
would  it  be  "proper  for  the  President  to  make 
any  formal  public  entertainment,"  but  that  this 
should  be  the  function  of  some  minister  of  state, 
although  "upon  such  occasions  the  President,  in 
his  private  character,  might  honor  with  his  pres 
ence."  The  President  might  invite  to  his  house 
in  small  parties  what  official  characters  or  citizens 
of  distinction  he  pleased,  but  this  invitation 
should  always  be  given  without  formality.  The 
President  should  hold  levees  to  receive  "visits  of 
compliment,"  and  two  days  a  week  might  not  be 
too  many  for  this  purpose.  The  idea  running 
through  Adams's  advice  was  that  in  his  private 
character  the  President  might  live  like  any  other 
private  gentleman  of  means,  but  that  in  his  public 
functions  he  should  adopt  a  grand  style.  This 
advice,  which  Washington  undoubtedly  received 
from  others  as  well  as  Adams,  influenced  Wash 
ington's  behavior,  and  the  consequences  were 
exactly  what  Hamilton  had  predicted.  According 


10    WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

to  Jefferson's  recollection,  many  years  afterward, 
Washington  told  him  that  General  Knox  and 
Colonel  Humphreys  drew  up  the  regulations  and 
that  some  were  proposed  "so  highly  strained 
that  he  absolutely  rejected  them."  Jefferson 
further  related  that,  when  Washington  was 
re-elected,  Hamilton  took  the  position  that  the 
parade  of  the  previous  inauguration  ought  not  to 
be  repeated,  remarking  that  "there  was  too  much 
ceremony  for  the  character  of  our  government." 
It  is  a  well-known  characteristic  of  human 
nature  to  be  touchy  about  such  matters  as  these. 
Popular  feeling  about  Washington's  procedure  was 
inflamed  by  reports  of  the  grand  titles  which 
Congress  was  arranging  to  bestow  upon  the 
President.  That  matter  was,  in  fact,  considered 
by  the  Senate  on  the  very  day  of  Washington's 
arrival  in  New  York  and  before  any  steps  could 
have  been  taken  to  ascertain  his  views.  A  joint 
committee  of  the  two  houses  reported  against 
annexing  "any  style  or  title  to  the  respective 
styles  or  titles  of  office  expressed  in  the  Con 
stitution."  But  a  group  of  Senators  headed  by 
John  Adams  was  unwilling  to  let  the  matter  drop, 
and  another  Senate  committee  was  appointed 
which  recommended  as  a  proper  style  of  address 


AN  IMITATION  COURT  11 

"His  Highness,  the  President  of  the  United  States 
of  America,  and  Protector  of  their  Liberties." 
While  the  Senate  debated,  the  House  acted,  address 
ing  the  President  in  reply  to  his  inaugural  address 
simply  as  "The  President  of  the  United  States." 
The  Senate  now  had  practically  no  choice  but  to 
drop  the  matter,  but  in  so  doing  adopted  a  resolu 
tion  that  because  of  its  desire  that  "a  due  respect 
for  the  majesty  of  the  people  of  the  United  States 
may  not  be  hazarded  by  singularity,"  the  Senate 
was  still  of  the  opinion  "that  it  would  be  proper 
to  annex  a  respectable  title  to  the  office."  Thus 
it  came  about  that  the  President  of  the  United 
States  is  distinguished  by  having  no  title.  A 
governor  may  be  addressed  as  "Your  Excellency," 
a  judge  as  "Your  Honor,"  but  the  chief  magis 
trate  of  the  nation  is  simply  "Mr.  President. "  It 
was  a  relief  to  Washington  when  the  Senate  dis 
continued  its  attempt  to  decorate  him.  He  wrote 
to  a  friend,  "Happily  this  matter  is  now  done  with, 
I  hope  never  to  be  revived." 

Details  of  the  social  entanglements  in  which 
Washington  was  caught  at  the  outset  of  his  ad 
ministration  are  generally  omitted  by  serious 
historians,  but  whatever  illustrates  life  and  manners 
is  not  insignificant,  and  events  of  this  character 


12    WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

had,  moreover,  a  distinct  bearing  on  the  politics  of 
the  times.  The  facts  indicate  that  Washington's 
arrangements  were  somewhat  encumbered  by  the 
civic  ambition  of  New  York.  That  bustling  town 
of  30,000  population  desired  to  be  the  capital  of 
the  nation,  and,  in  the  splendid  exertions  which 
it  made,  it  went  rather  too  far.  Federal  Hall,  de 
signed  as  a  City  Hall,  was  built  in  part  for  the  ac 
commodation  of  Congress,  on  the  site  in  Wall  Street 
now  in  part  occupied  by  the  United  States  Sub- 
Treasury.  The  plans  were  made  by  Major  Pierre 
Charles  TEnfant,  a  French  engineer  who  had 
served  with  distinction  in  the  Continental  Army 
but  whose  clearest  title  to  fame  is  the  work  which 
he  did  in  laying  out  the  city  of  Washington  when 
it  was  made  the  national  capital.  Federal  Hall 
exceeded  in  dignified  proportions  and  in  artistic 
design  any  public  building  then  existing  in  America. 
The  painted  ceilings,  the  crimson  damask  canopies 
and  hangings,  and  the  handsome  furniture  were 
considered  by  many  political  agitators  to  be  a  great 
violation  of  republican  simplicity.  The  architect 
was  first  censured  in  the  public  press  and  then, 
because  of  disputes,  received  no  pay  for  his  time 
and  trouble,  although,  had  he  accepted  a  grant  of 
city  lots  offered  by  the  town  council  he  would  have 


AN  IMITATION  COURT  13 

received  a  compensation  that  would  have  turned 
out  to  be  very  valuable. 

Federal  Hall  had  been  completed  and  presented 
to  Congress  before  Washington  started  for  New 
York.  The  local  arrangements  for  his  reception 
were  upon  a  corresponding  scale  of  magnificence, 
but  with  these  Washington  had  had  nothing  to  do. 
The  barge  in  which  he  was  conveyed  from  the 
Jersey  shore  to  New  York  was  fifty  feet  long,  hung 
with  red  curtains  and  having  an  awning  of  satin. 
It  was  rowed  by  thirteen  oarsmen,  in  white  with 
blue  ribbons.  In  the  inauguration  ceremonies 
Washington's  coach  was  drawn  by  four  horses 
with  gay  trappings  and  hoofs  blackened  and 
polished.  This  became  his  usual  style.  He 
seldom  walked  in  the  street,  for  he  was  so  much  a 
public  show  that  that  might  have  been  attended  by 
annoying  practical  inconvenience;  but  when  he 
rode  out  with  Mrs.  Washington  his  carriage  was 
drawn  by  four  —  sometimes  six  —  horses,  with 
two  outriders,  in  livery,  with  powdered  hair  and 
cockades  in  their  hats.  When  he  rode  on  horse 
back,  which  he  often  did  for  exercise,  he  was 
attended  by  outriders  and  accompanied  by  one  or 
more  of  the  gentlemen  of  his  household.  Toward 
the  end  of  the  year  there  arrived  from  England 


14    WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

the  state  coach  which  he  used  in  formal  visits  to 
Congress  and  for  other  ceremonious  events.  It 
was  a  canary-colored  chariot,  decorated  with 
gilded  nymphs  and  cupids,  and  emblazoned  with 
the  Washington  arms.  His  state  was  simplified 
when  he  went  to  church,  which  he  did  regularly 
every  Sunday;  then  his  coach  was  drawn  by  two 
horses,  with  two  footmen  behind,  and  was  followed 
by  a  post-chaise  carrying  two  gentlemen  of  his 
household.  Washington  was  fond  of  horses  and 
was  in  the  habit  of  keeping  a  fine  stable.  The 
term  "muslin  horses"  was  commonly  used  to 
denote  the  care  taken  in  grooming.  The  head 
groom  would  test  the  work  of  the  stable-boys  by 
applying  a  clean  muslin  handkerchief  to  the  coats 
of  the  animals,  and,  if  any  stain  of  dirt  showed, 
there  was  trouble.  The  night  before  the  white 
horses  which  Washington  used  as  President  were 
to  be  taken  out,  their  coats  were  covered  by  a  paste 
of  whiting,  and  the  animals  were  swathed  in 
wrappings.  In  the  morning  the  paste  was  dry 
and  with  rubbing  gave  a  marble  gloss  to  the 
horses'  coats.  The  hoofs  were  then  blackened  and 
polished,  and  even  the  animals'  teeth  were  scoured. 
Such  arrangements,  however,  were  not  peculiar 
to  Washington's  stable.  This  was  the  usual  way 


AN  IMITATION  COURT  15 

in  which  grooming  for  "the  quality"  was  done  in 
that  period. 

The  first  house  occupied  by  Washington  was  at 
the  corner  of  Pearl  and  Cherry  streets,  then  a 
fashionable  locality.  What  the  New  York  end  of 
the  Brooklyn  Bridge  has  left  of  it  is  now  known  as 
Franklin  Square.  The  house  was  so  small  that 
three  of  his  secretaries  had  to  lodge  in  one  room; 
and  Custis  in  his  Recollections  tells  how  one  of 
them,  who  fancied  he  could  write  poetry,  would 
sometimes  disturb  the  others  by  walking  the  floor 
in  his  nightgown  trying  the  rhythm  of  his  lines  by 
rehearsing  them  with  loud  emphasis.  About  a 
year  later  Washington  removed  to  a  larger  house 
on  the  west  side  of  Broadway  near  Bowling  Green. 
Both  buildings  went  down  at  an  early  date  before 
the  continual  march  of  improvement  in  New  York. 
In  Washington's  time  Wall  Street  was  superseding 
Pearl  Street  as  the  principal*  haunt  of  fashion. 
Here  lived  Alexander  Hamilton  and  other  New 
Yorkers  prominent  in  their  day ;  here  were  fashion 
able  boarding-houses  at  which  lived  the  leading 
members  of  Congress.  When  some  fashionable 
reception  was  taking  place,  the  street  was  gay  with 
coaches  and  sedan-chairs,  and  the  attire  of  the 
people  who  then  gathered  was  as  brilliant  as  a 


16    WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

flight  of  cockatoos.  It  was  a  period  of  spectacular 
dress  and  behavior  for  both  men  and  women,  the 
men  rivaling  the  women  in  their  use  of  lace,  silk, 
and  satin.  Dr.  John  Bard,  the  fashionable 
doctor  of  his  day,  who  attended  Washington 
through  the  severe  illness  which  laid  him  up 
for  six  weeks  early  in  his  administration,  habitu 
ally  wore  a  cocked  hat  and  a  scarlet  coat,  his 
hands  resting  upon  a  massive  cane  as  he  drove 
about  in  a  pony-phaeton.  The  scarlet  waist 
coat  with  large  bright  buttons  which  Jefferson 
wore  on  fine  occasions,  when  he  arrived  on  the 
scene,  showed  that  he  was  not  then  averse  to  gay 
raiment.  Plain  styles  of  dress  were  among  the 
many  social  changes  ushered  in  by  the  French 
Revolution  and  the  war  cycle  that  ensued 
from  it. 

Titles  figured  considerably  in  colonial  society, 
and  the  Revolutionary  War  did  not  destroy  the 
continuity  of  usage.  It  was  quite  in  accord  with 
the  fashion  of  the  times  that  the  courtesy  title  of 
Lady  Washington  was  commonly  employed  in 
talk  about  the  President's  household.  Mrs. 
Washington  arrived  in  New  York  from  Mount 
Vernon  on  May  27,  1789.  She  was  met  by  the 
President  with  his  barge  on  the  Jersey  shore, 


AN  IMITATION  COURT  17 

and  as  the  barge  passed  the  Battery  a  salute  of 
thirteen  cannon  was  fired.  At  the  landing-place 
a  large  company  was  gathered,  and  the  coach  that 
took  her  to  her  home  was  escorted  with  military 
parade.  The  questions  of  etiquette  had  been 
settled  by  that  time,  and  she  performed  her  social 
duties  with  the  ease  of  a  Virginia  gentlewoman 
always  used  to  good  society.  She  found  them 
irksome,  however,  as  such  things  had  long  since 
lost  their  novelty.  Writing  to  a  friend  she  said, 
"I  think  I  am  more  like  a  state  prisoner  than  any 
thing  else. "  She  was  then  a  grandmother  through 
her  children  by  her  first  husband.  Although  she 
preferred  plain  attire,  she  is  described  on  one 
occasion  as  wearing  a-  velvet  gown  over  a  white 
satin  petticoat,  her  hair  smoothed  back  over  a 
moderately  high  cushion.  It  was  the  fashion 
of  the  times  for  the  ladies  to  tent  their  hair  up  to 
a  great  height.  At  one  of  Mrs.  Washington's 
receptions,  Miss  Mclvers,  a  New  York  belle,  had 
such  a  towering  coiffure  that  the  feathers  which 
surmounted  it  brushed  a  lighted  chandelier  and 
caught  fire.  The  consequences  might  have  been 
serious  had  the  fire  spread  to  the  pomatumed 
structure  below,  but  one  of  the  President's  aides 
sprang  to  the  rescue  and  smothered  the  burning 


18    WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

plumes  between  the  palms  of  his  hands  before  any 
harm  came  to  the  young  lady. 

Every  Tuesday  while  Congress  was  in  session 
Washington  received  visitors  from  three  to  four 
o'clock.  These  receptions  were  known  as  his 
levees.  He  is  described  as  clad  in  black  velvet; 
his  hair  was  powdered  and  gathered  behind  in  a  silk 
bag;  he  wore  knee  and  shoe  buckles  and  yellow 
gloves;  he  held  a  cocked  hat  with  a  cockade  and 
a  black  feather  edging;  and  he  carried  a  long  sword 
in  a  scabbard  of  white  polished  leather.  As 
visitors  were  presented  to  him  by  an  aide,  Wash 
ington  made  a  bow.  To  a  candid  friend  who 
reported  to  him  that  his  bows  were  considered  to 
be  too  stiff,  he  replied:  "Would  it  not  have  been 
better  to  throw  the  veil  of  charity  over  them, 
ascribing  their  stiffness  to  the  effects  of  age,  or  to 
the  unskillfulness  of  my  teacher,  rather  than  to 
pride  and  dignity  of  office,  which  God  knows  has 
no  charm  for  me?"  Washington  bore  with 
remarkable  humility  the  criticisms  of  his  man 
ners  that  occasionally  reached  him. 

On  Friday  evenings  Mrs.  Washington  received, 
and  these  affairs  were  known  as  her  "drawing- 
rooms."  They  were  over  by  nine  o'clock  which 
was  bed-time  in  the  Washington  household;  for 


AN  IMITATION  COURT  19 

Washington  was  an  early  riser,  often  getting  up  at 
four  in  the  morning  to  start  the  day's  work  betimes. 
The  "  drawing-rooms "  were  more  cheery  affairs 
than  the  levees,  as  Mrs.  Washington  had  simple 
unaffected  manners,  and  the  General  had  made 
it  known  that  on  these  occasions  he  desired  to 
be  regarded  not  as  the  President  but  simply  as  a 
private  gentleman.  This  gave  him  an  opportunity 
such  as  he  did  not  have  at  the  levees  to  un 
bend  and  to  enjoy  himself.  Besides  these  receptions 
a  series  of  formal  dinners  was  given  to  diplo 
matic  representatives,  high  officers  of  government, 
and  members  of  Congress.  Senator  Maclay  of 
Pennsylvania  recorded  in  the  diary  he  kept  during 
the  First  Congress  that  Washington  would  drink 
wine  with  every  one  in  the  company,  addressing 
each  in  turn  by  name.  Maclay  thought  it  of  suffi 
cient  interest  to  record  that  on  one  occasion  a  trifle 
was  served  which  had  been  made  with  rancid  cream. 
All  the  ladies  watched  to  see  what  Mrs.  Washington 
would  do  with  her  portion;  and  next  day  there  were 
tittering  remarks  all  through  the  fashionable  part 
of  the  town  over  the  fact  that  she  had  martyred 
herself  and  swallowed  the  dose.  Incidentally 
Maclay,  who  was  in  nearly  everything  a  vehe 
ment  opponent  of  the  policy  of  the  Administration, 


20    WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

bore  witness  to  Washington's  perfect  courtesy. 
Maclay  noted  that  in  spite  of  his  antagonistic 
attitude  Washington  invited  him  to  dinner  and 
paid  him  "marked  attention,"  although  "he 
knows  enough  to  satisfy  him  that  I  will  not  be 
Senator  after  the  3d  of  March,  and  to  the  score  of 
his  good  nature  must  I  place  these  attentions. " 

In  his  relations  with  Congress,  Washington 
followed  precedents  derived  from  the  English 
constitutional  system  under  which  he  had  been 
educated.  No  question  was  raised  by  anybody 
at  first  as  to  the  propriety  of  a  course  with  which 
the  public  men  of  the  day  were  familiar.  He 
opened  the  session  with  an  address  to  Congress 
couched  somewhat  in  the  style  of  the  speech  from 
the  throne.  At  the  first  session  there  was  talk  of 
providing  some  sort  of  throne  for  him;  but  the 
proposal  came  to  nothing.  He  spoke  from  the 
Vice-President's  chair,  and  the  Representatives 
went  into  the  Senate  chamber  to  hear  him,  as 
the  Commons  proceed  to  the  House  of  Lords 
on  such  occasions.  Congress,  too,  conformed  to 
English  precedents  by  voting  addresses  in  reply, 
and  then  the  members  repaired  to  the  President's 
"audience  chamber, "  where  the  presiding  officers 
of  the  two  houses  delivered  their  addresses  and 


AN  IMITATION  COURT  21 

received  the  President's  acknowledgments.  These 
were  disagreeable  duties  for  Washington,  although 
he  discharged  them  conscientiously.  Maclay  has 
recorded  in  his  diary  the  fact  that  when  Washing 
ton  made  his  first  address  to  Congress  he  was 
"agitated  and  embarrassed  more  than  ever  he  was 
by  the  leveled  cannon  or  pointed  musket. " 

It  was  not  until  June  8  that  Washington 
settled  these  delicate  affairs  of  official  etiquette 
sufficiently  to  enable  him  to  attend  to  details  of 
administration.  The  government,  although  bank 
rupt,  was  in  active  operation,  and  the  several 
executive  departments  were  under  secretaries 
appointed  by  the  old  Congress.  The  distinguished 
New  York  jurist,  John  Jay,  now  forty-four  years 
old,  had  been  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs  since 

1784.  He  had  long  possessed  Washington's  con 
fidence,  and  now  retained  his  Secretaryship  until 
the  government  was  organized,  whereupon  he  left 
that  post  to  become  the  first  chief-justice  of  the 
United  States.     Henry  Knox  of  Massachusetts, 
aged  thirty-nine,  had  been  Secretary  of  War  since 

1785,  a  position  to  which  Washington  helped  him. 
They  were  old  friends,  for  Knox  had  served  through 
the  war  with  Washington   in  special  charge  of 
artillery.       The     Postmaster-General,     Ebenezer 


22    WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

Hazard,  was  not  in  Washington's  favor.  Wliile 
the  struggle  over  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution 
was  going  on  Hazard  put  a  stop  to  the  customary 
practice  by  which  newspaper  publishers  were 
allowed  to  exchange  copies  by  mail.  Washing 
ton  wrote  an  indignant  letter  to  John  Jay  about 
this  action  which  was  doing  mischief  by  "inducing 
a  belief  that  the  suppression  of  intelligence  at  that 
critical  juncture  was  a  wicked  trick  of  policy 
contrived  by  an  aristocratic  junto."  As  soon 
as  Washington  could  move  in  the  matter,  Hazard 
was  superseded  by  Samuel  Osgood,  who  as  a  mem 
ber  of  the  old  Congress  had  served  on  a  committee 
to  examine  the  post-office  accounts.  There  was  no 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury  at  that  time,  but  the 
affairs  of  that  department  were  in  the  hands  of  a 
board  of  commissioners, — this  same  Samuel  Os 
good,  together  with  Walter  Livingston  and  Arthur 
Lee.  To  all  these  officials  Washington  now  ap 
plied  for  a  written  account  of  "the  real  situation" 
of  their  departments. 

Several  months  elapsed  before  he  was  in  a  posi 
tion  to  make  new  arrangements.  The  salary  bill 
was  approved  September  2,  1789,  and  on  the  same 
day  Washington  commissioned  Hamilton  as  Secre 
tary  of  the  Treasury,  —  the  first  of  the  new 


AN  IMITATION  COURT  23 

appointments,  although  in  the  creative  enact 
ments  the  Treasury  Department  came  last.  Next 
came  Henry  Knox,  Secretary  of  War  and  of  the 
Navy,  on  September  12;  Thomas  Jefferson, 
Secretary  of  State;  and  Edmund  Randolph, 
Attorney-General,  on  September  26,  on  which  date 
Osgood  was  also  appointed.  What  may  be 
said  to  be  Washington's  Cabinet  was  thus  estab 
lished,  but  the  term  itself  did  not  come  into  use 
until  1793.  At  the  outset  no  more  was  decided 
than  that  the  new  government  should  have  ex 
ecutive  departments,  and  in  superficial  appearance 
these  were  much  like  those  of  the  old  government. 
The  Constitution  made  no  distinct  provision 
for  a  cabinet,  and  the  only  clause  referring 
to  the  subject  is  the  provision  authorizing  the 
President  to  "require  the  opinion,  in  writing, 
of  the  principal  officer  in  each  of  the  executive 
departments,  upon  any  subject  relating  to  the 
duties  of  their  respective  offices. "  This  provision 
does  not  contemplate  a  body  that  should  be 
consultative  by  its  normal  character.  The  pre 
vailing  opinion  at  the  time  the  Constitution  was 
framed  was  that  the  consultative  function  would 
be  exercised  by  the  Senate,  which  together  with  the 
President  would  form  the  Administration.  Upon 


24    WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

this  ground,  Mason  of  Virginia  refused  to  sign 
the  report  of  the  constitutional  convention.  It 
was  owing  to  practical  experience  and  not  to  the 
language  of  the  Constitution  that  the  President 
was  soon  repelled  from  using  the  Senate  as  his 
privy  council  and  was  thrown  back  upon  the  aid 
of  the  heads  of  the  executive  departments,  who 
were  thus  drawn  close  to  him  as  his  Cabinet. J 

The  inchoate  character  of  the  Cabinet  for  a  con 
siderable  period  explains  what  might  otherwise 
seem  to  be  an  anomaly,  —  the  delay  of  Jefferson 
in  occupying  his  post.  He  did  not  arrive  until 
March  21,  1790,  when  Washington  had  been  in 
office  nearly  a  year.  But  this  situation  occasioned 
no  remark.  The  notion  that  the  heads  of  the 
departments  formed  a  cabinet,  taking  office  with 
the  President  and  reflecting  his  personal  choice  as 
his  advisers,  was  not  developed  until  long  after 
Washington's  administration,  although  the  Cabi 
net  itself,  as  a  distinct  feature  of  the  system  of 
government,  dates  from  his  first  term.  The 
importance  which  the  Cabinet  soon  acquired  is 

1  In  this  formative  process  the  Postmaster-General  was  left  outside 
in  Washington's  time,  since  his  functions  were  purely  of  a  business 
nature,  not  directly  affected  by  the  issues  on  which  Washington 
desired  advice.  The  Postmaster-General  did  not  become  a  member 
of  the  Cabinet  until  1829. 


AN  IMITATION  COURT  25 

evidence  that,  even  under  a  written  constitution, 
institutions  owe  more  to  circumstances  than  to 
intentions.  The  Constitution  of  the  United  States 
is  no  exception  to  the  rule  that  the  true  constitu 
tion  of  a  country  is  the  actual  distribution  of  power, 
written  provisions  being  efficacious  only  in  the 
way  and  to  the  extent  that  they  affect  such  distribu 
tion  in  practice.  Hence  results  may  differ  widely 
from  the  expectations  with  which  those  provi 
sions  are  introduced.  A  constitution  is  essentially 
a  growth  and  never  merely  a  contrivance. 


CHAPTER  II 

« 

GREAT  DECISIONS 

WHILE  Washington  was  bearing  with  military 
fortitude  the  rigors  and  annoyances  of  the  imita 
tion  court  in  which  he  was  confined,  Congress 
reached  decisions  that  had  a  vast  effect  in  de 
termining  the  actual  character  of  the  govern 
ment.  The  first  business  in  order  of  course  was 
the  raising  of  revenue,  for  the  treasury  was  empty, 
and  payments  of  interest  due  on^the  French 
and  Spanish  loans  were  years  behind.  Madison 
attacked  this  problem  before  Washington  ar 
rived  in  New  York  to  take  the  oath  of  office.  On 
April  8  he  introduced  in  the  House  a  resolu 
tion  which  aimed  only  at  giving  immediate  effect 
to  a  scheme  of  duties  and  imposts  that  had  been 
approved  generally  by  the  States  in  1783.  On  the 
very  next  day  debate  upon  this  resolution  began  in 
the  committee  of  the  whole,  for  there  was  then  no 
system  of  standing  committees  to  intervene  be- 

26 


GREAT  DECISIONS  27 

tween  the  House  and  its  business.  The  debate 
soon  broadened  out  far  beyond  the  lines  of  the 
original  scheme,  and  in  it  the  student  finds  lucidly 
presented  the  issues  of  public  policy  that  have 
accompanied  tariff  debates  ever  since. 

Madison  laid  down  the  general  principle  that 
"commerce  ought  to  be  free,  and  labor  and  indus 
try  left  at  large  to  find  its  proper  object,"  but 
suggested  that  it  would  be  unwise  to  apply  this 
principle  without  regard  to  particular  circum 
stances,  "Although  interest  will,  in  general, 
operate  effectually  to  produce  political  good, 
yet  there  are  causes  in  which  certain  factitious 
circumstances  may  divert  it  from  its  natural  chan 
nel,  or  throw  or  retain  it  in  an  artificial  one. "  In 
language  which  now  reads  like  prophecy  he  referred 
to  cases  "where  cities,  companies,  or  opulent 
individuals  engross  the  business  from  others,  by 
having  had  an  uninterrupted  possession  of  it,  or  by 
the  extent  of. their  capitals  being  able  to  destroy 
a  competition. "  The  same  situation  could  occur 
between  nations,  and  had  to  be  considered.  There 
was  some  truth,  he  also  thought,  in  the  opinion 
"that  each  nation  should  have  within  itself  the 
means  of  defense,  independent  of  foreign  supplies, " 
but  he  considered  that  this  argument  had  been 


28    WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

urged  beyond  reason,  as  "there  is  good  reason  to 
believe  that,  when  it  becomes  necessary,  we  may 
obtain  supplies  abroad  as  readily  as  any  other 
nation  whatsoever."  He  instanced  as  a  cogent 
reason  in  favor  of  protective  duties  that,  as  the 
States  had  formerly  the  power  of  making  regu 
lations  of  trade  to  cherish  their  domestic  interests, 
it  must  be  presumed  that,  when  they  put  the 
exercise  of  this  power  into  other  hands  by  adopting 
the  Constitution,  "they  must  have  done  this  with 
the  expectation  that  those  interests  would  not  be 
neglected"  by  Congress. 

Actuated  by  such  views,  and  doubtless  also 
influenced  by  the  great  need  for  revenue,  Madison 
was  on  the  whole  favorable  to  amendments 
extending  the  list  of  dutiable  articles.  Though 
there  were  conflicts  between  members  from  manu 
facturing  districts  and  those  from  agricultural 
constituencies,  and  though  the  salt  protectionists 
of  New  York  had  some  difficulty  in  carrying  their 
point,  the  contention  did  not  follow  sectional  lines. 
Coal  was  added  to  the  list  on  the  motion  of  a  mem 
ber  from  Virginia.  The  duties  levied  were,  how 
ever,  very  moderate,  ranging  from  five  to  twelve 
and  one-half  per  cent,  with  an  exception  in  the  case 
of  one  article  that  might  be  considered  a  luxury. 


GREAT  DECISIONS  29 

The  bill  as  it  passed  the  House  discriminated 
in  favor  of  nations  with  which  the  United  States 
had  commercial  treaties.  That  is  to  say,  it 
favored  France  and  Holland  as  against  Great 
Britain,  which  had  the  bulk  of  America's  foreign 
trade.  Though  Madison  insisted  on  this  provi 
sion  and  was  supported  by  a  large  majority  of  the 
House,  the  Senate  would  not  agree  to  it-.  During 
the  early  sessions  of  Congress  the  Senate  met 
behind  closed  doors,  a  practice  which  it  did  Jnot 
abandon  until  five  years  later.  From  the  accounts 
of  the  discussion  preserved  in  Maclay's  diary  it 
appears  that  there  was  much  wrangling.  Maclay 
relates  that  on  one  occasion  when  Pennsylvania's 
demands  were  sharply  attacked,  his  colleague, 
Robert  Morris,  was  so  incensed  that  Maclay 
"could  see  his  nostrils  widen  and  his  nose  flatten 
like  the  head  of  a  viper. "  Pierce  Butler  of  South 
Carolina  "flamed  away  and  threatened  a  dissolu 
tion  of  the  Union,  with  regard  to  his  State,  as  sure 
as  God  was  in  the  firmament. "  Thus  began  a  line 
of  argument  that  was  frequently  pursued  there 
after  until  it  was  ended  by  wager  of  battle.  On 
several  occasions  the  division  was  so  close  that 
Vice-President  Adams  gave  the  casting  vote. 
Although  there  was  much  railing  in  the  Senate 


30    WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

against  imposts  as  a  burden  to  the  agricultural 
sections,  yet  some  who  opposed  duties  in  the 
abstract  thought  of  particulars  that  ought  not  to 
be  neglected  if  the  principle  of  protection  were 
admitted.  Duties  on  hemp  and  cotton  therefore 
found  their  way  into  the  bill  through  amendments 
voted  by  the  Senate.  Adjustment  of  the  differ 
ences  between  the  two  houses  was  hindered  by 
the  resentment  of  the^jBEouse  at  the  removal  of 
the  treaty  discrimination  feature,  but  t£e  Senate 
with  characteristic  address  evaded  the  issue  by 
promising  to  deal  with  it  as  a  separate  measure 
and  ended  by  thwarting  the  House  on  that 
point. 

On  the  whole,  in  view  of  the  sharp  differences  of 
opinion,  the  action  taken  on  the  tariff  was  remark 
ably  expeditious.  The  bill,  which  passed  the 
House  on  May  16,  was  passed  by  the  Senate  on 
June  2,  and  although  delay  now  ensued  because 
of  the  conflict  over  the  discrimination  issue,  the 
bill  became  law  by  the  President's  approval  on 
July  4.  This  prompt  conclusion  in  spite  of  closely- 
balanced  factions  becomes  more  intelligible  when 
it  is  observed  that  the  rules  of  the  Senate  then 
provided  that,  "in  case  of  a  debate  becoming 
tedious,  four  Senators  may  call  for  the  question. '* 


GREAT  DECISIONS  31 

Brief  as  was  the  period  of  consideration  as  com 
pared  with  the  practice  since  that  day,  Maclay 
noted  indignantly  that  the  merchants  had  "al 
ready  added  the  amount  of  the  duties  to  the  price 
of  their  goods-"  so  that- a  burden  fell  upon  the 
consumers  without  advantage  to  the  Treasury. 
Such  consequence  is  evidence  of  defect  in  pro 
cedure  which  the  experience  of  other  nations  has 
led  them  to  correct,  but  which  has  continued  to 
increase  in  the  United  States  until  it  has  attained 
monstrous  proportions.  Under  the  English  bud 
get  system  new  imposts  now  take  effect  as  soon 
as  they  are  proposed  by  the  government,  the 
contingency  of  alteration  in  the  course  of  en 
actment  being  provided  for  by  return  of  pay 
ments  made  in  error.  The  general  tendency  of 
civilized  government  is  now  strongly  in  favor  of 
attaching  the  process  of  deliberation  upon  finan 
cial  measures  to  the  period  of  their  adminis 
trative  incubation,  and  of  shortening  the  period  of 
formal  legislative  consideration. 

One  of  the  tasks  of  Congress  in  its  first  session 
was  to  draught  amendments  to  the  Constitution. 
The  reasons  for  such  action  were  stated  by  Madi 
son  to  be  a  desire  to  propitiate  those  who  desired  a 
bill  of  rights,  and  an  effort  to  secure  acceptance 


m    WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

of  the  Constitution  in  Rhode  Island  and  North 
Carolina.  Promises  had  been  made,  in  the  course 
of  the  struggle  for  adoption,  that  this  matter  would 
be  taken  up,  and  there  was  a  general  willingness  to 
proceed  with  it.  Under  the  leadership  of  Madi 
son,  the  House  adopted  seventeen  amendments, 
which  were  reduced  by  the  Senate  to  twelve. 
Of  these,  ten  were  eventually  ratified  and  formed 
what  is  commonly  known  as  the  Bill  of  Rights. 

Apart  from  this  matter,  the  session,  which 
lasted  until  September  29,  was  almost  wholly 
occupied  with  measures  to  organize  the  new  gov 
ernment.  To  understand  the  significance  of  the 
action  taken,  it  should  be  remembered  that  the 
passions  excited  by  the  struggle  over  the  new 
Constitution  were  still  turbulent.  Fisher  Ames 
of  Massachusetts,  a  member  without  previous 
national  experience,  who  watched  the  proceedings 
with  keen  observation,  early  noticed  the  presence 
of  a  group  of  objectors  whose  motives  he  regarded 
as  partly  factious  and  partly  temperamental.  Writ 
ing,  to  a  friend  about  the  character  of  the  House, 
he  remarked:  "Three  sorts  of  people  are  often 
troublesome:  the  anti-federals,  who  alone  are 
weak  and  some  of  them  well  disposed;  the  dupes 
of  local  prejudices,  who  fear  eastern  influence, 


GREAT  DECISIONS  33 

monopolies,  and  navigation  acts;  and  lastly 
the  violent  republicans,  as  they  think  fit  to  style 
themselves,  who  are  new  lights  in  politics,  who  are 
more  solicitous  to  establish,  or  rather  to  expatiate 
upon,  some  sounding  principle  of  republicanism, 
than  to  protect  property,  cement  the  union, 
and  perpetuate  liberty. "  The  spirit  of  opposition 
had  from  the  first  an  experienced  leader  in  Elbridge 
Gerry^  of  Massachusetts.  He  had  seen  many 
years  of  service  in  the  Continental  Congress  which 
he  first  entered  in  1776.  He  was  a  delegate  to  the 
Philadelphia  convention,  in  whose  sessions  he 
showed  a  contentious  temper,  and  in  the  end  re 
fused  to  subscribe  to  the  new  Constitution.  In 
the  convention  debates  he  had  strongly  declared 
himself  "against  letting  the  heads  of  the  depart 
ments,  particularly  of  finance,  have  anything  to 
do  with  business  connected  with  legislation." 
Defeated  in  the  convention,  Gerry  was  now  bent 
upon  making  his  ideas  prevail  in  the  organization 
of  the  government. 

On  May  19,  the  matter  of  the  executive  depart 
ments  was  brought  up  in  committee  of  the  whole 
by  Boudinot  of  New  Jersey.  At  this  time  it  was 
the  practice  of  Congress  to  take  up  matters  first 
in  committee  of  the  whole,  and,  after  general 


34   WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

conclusions  had  been  reached,  to  appoint  a  com 
mittee  to  prepare  and  bring  in  a  bill.  A  warm 
discussion  ensued  on  the  question  whether  the 
heads  of  the  departments  should  be  removable  by 
the  President.  Gerry,  who  did  not  take  a  promi 
nent  part  in  the  debate,  spoke  with  a  mildness 
that  was  in  marked  contrast  with  the  excitement 
shown  by  some  of  the  speakers.  He  was  in  favor 
of  supporting  the  President  to  the  utmost  and  of 
making  him  as  responsible  as  possible,  but  since 
Congress  had  obviously  no  right  to  confer  a  power 
not  authorized  by  the  Constitution,  and  since  the 
Constitution  had  conditioned  appointments  on  the 
consent  of  the  Senate,  it  followed  that  removals 
must  be  subject  to  the  same  condition.  He  spoke 
briefly  and  only  once,  although  the  debate  became 
long  and  impassioned.  But  he  was  merely  reserv 
ing  his  fire,  as  subsequent  developments  soon 
showed.  Without  a  call  for  the  ayes  and  nays, 
the  question  was  decided  in  favor  of  declaring  the 
power  of  removal  to  be  in  the  President.  The 
committee  then  proceeded  to  the  consideration  of 
the  Treasury  Department.  Gerry  at  once  made  a 
plea  for  delay.  "He  thought  they  were  hurrying 
on  business  too  rapidly.  Gentlemen  had  already 
committed  themselves  on  one  very  important 


GREAT  DECISIONS  35 

point."  He  "knew  nothing  of  the  system  which 
gentlemen  proposed  to  adopt  in  arranging  the 
Treasury  Department,"  but  the  fact  was  worth 
considering  that  "the  late  Congress  had,  on  long 
experience,  thought  proper  to  organize  the  Trea 
sury  Department,  in  a  mode  different  from  that 
now  proposed. "  He  "  would  be  glad  to  know  what 
the  reasons  were  that  would  induce  the  committee 
to  adopt  a  different  system  from  that  which  had 
been  found  most  beneficial  to  the  United  States. " 
What  Gerry  had  in  view  was  the  retention  of  the 
then  existing  system  of  Treasury  management  by 
a  Board  of  Commissioners.  In  1781  the  Con 
tinental  Congress  had  been  forced  to  let  the 
Treasury  pass  out  of  its  own  hands  into  those  of  a 
Superintendent  of  Finance,  through  sheer  inability 
to  get  any  funds  unless  the  change  was  made. 
Robert  Morris,  who  held  the  position,  had  resigned 
in  January,  1783,  because  of  the  behavior  of  Con 
gress,  but  the  attitude  of  the  army  had  become 
so  menacing  that  he  was  implored  to  remain  in 
office  and  attend  to  the  arrears  of  military  pay. 
He  had  managed  to  effect  a  settlement,  and  at 
length  retired  from  office  on  November  1,  1784. 
Congress  then  put  the  Treasury  in  the  hands  of 
three  commissioners  appointed  and  supervised  by 


36    WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

t  s/ 

it.     Gerry    was    now    striving    to    continue    this 

arrangement  with  as  little  change  as  possible. 

When  debate  was  resumed  the  next  day,  Gerry 
made  a  long,  smooth  speech  on  the  many  superior 
advantages  of  the  Board  system.  The  extent 
and  variety  of  the  functions  of  the  office  would  be 
a  trial  to  any  one  man's  integrity.  "Admit  these 
innumerable  opportunities  for  defrauding  the 
revenue,  without  check  or  control,  and  it  is  next  to 
impossible  he  should  remain  unsullied  in  reputa 
tion,  or  innoxious  with  respect  to  misapplying  his 
trust."  The  situation  would  be  "very  disagree 
able  to  the  person  appointed,  provided  he  is  an 
honest,  upright  man;  it  will  be  disagreeable  also  to 
the  people  of  the  Union,  who  will  always  have 
reason  to  suspect"  misconduct.  "We  have  had  a 
Board  of  Treasury  and  we  have  had  a  Financier. 
Have  not  express  charges,  as  well  as  vague  rumors, 
been  brought  against  him  at  the  bar  of  the  public? 
They  may  be  unfounded,  it  is  true;  but  it  shows 
that  a  man  cannot  serve  in  such  a  station  without 
exciting  popular  clamor.  It  is  very  well  known, 
I  dare  say,  to  many  gentlemen  in  this  House,  that 
the  noise  and  commotion  were  such  as  obliged  Con 
gress  once  more  to  alter  their  Treasury  Department, 
and  place  it  under  the  management  of  a  Board  of 


GREAT  DECISIONS  37 

Commissioners."  He  descanted  upon  the  perils  to 
liberty  involved  in  the  course  they  were  pursuing. 
Surround  the  President  with  Ministers  of  State 
and  "the  President  will  be  induced  to  place  more 
confidence  in  them  than  in  the  Senate.  .  .  .  An 
oligarchy  will  be  confirmed  upon  the  ruin  of  the 
democracy;  a  government  most  hateful  will 
descend  to  our  posterity  and  all  our  exertions  in 
the  glorious  cause  of  freedom  will  be  frustrated. " 

Gerry's  speech  as  a  whole  was  tactful  and  per 
suasive,  but  he  made  a  blunder  when  he  appealed 
to  the  recollections  of  the  old  members,  men  who 
had  been  in  the  Continental  Congress,  or  else  in 
some  position  where  they  could  view  its  springs  of 
action.  Their  recollections  now  came  forward  to 
his  discomfiture.  "My  official  duty,"  said  Wads- 
worth  of  Connecticut,  "has  led  me  often  to  attend 
at  the  Treasury  of  the  United  States,  and,  from 
my  experience,  I  venture  to  pronounce  that  a 
Board  of  Treasury  is  the  worst  of  all  institutions. 
They  have  doubled  our  national  debt."  He 
contrasted  the  order  and  clearness  of  accounts 
while  the  Superintendent  of  Finance  was  in  charge 
with  the  situation  since  then.  If  the  committee 
had  before  them  the  transactions  of  the  Treasury 
Board,  "instead  of  system  and  responsibility  they 


38    WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

would  find  nothing  but  confusion  and  disorder, 
without  a  possibility  of  checking  their  accounts." 
Boudinot  of  New  Jersey  said  he  "would  state  a 
circumstance  which  might  give  the  committee 
some  small  idea  of  what  the  savings  under  the 
Superintendent  were.  The  expenditure  of  hay  at 
a  certain  post  was  one  hundred  and  forty  tons; 
such  was  the  estimate  laid  before  him;  yet  twelve 
tons  carried  the  post  through  the  year,  and  the 
supply  was  abundant,  and  the  post  was  as  fully 
and  usefully  occupied  as  it  had  ever  been  before. " 
Of  course  there  was  an  outcry  against  the  Super 
intendent  of  Finance;  "he  rather  wondered  that 
the  clamor  was  not  more  loud  and  tremendous." 
He  remembered  that  "one  hundred  and  forty-six 
supernumerary  officers  were  brushed  off  in  one  day, 
who  had  long  been  sucking  the  vital  blood  and 
spirit  of  the  nation.  Was  it  to  be  wondered  at,  if 
this  swarm  should  raise  a  buzz  about  him?  "  Gerry 
fought  on  almost  singlehanded,  but  he  could  not 
refute  the  evidence  that  he  had  invited.  He  lost 
his  temper  and  resorted  to  sarcasm.  If  a  single 
head  of  the  Treasury  was  so  desirable,  why  not 
"have  a  single  legislator;  one  man  to  make  all 
the  laws,  the  revenue  laws  particularly,  because 
among  many  there  is  less  responsibility,  system, 


GREAT  DECISIONS  39 

and  energy;  consequently  a  numerous  represen 
tation  in  this  House  is  an  odious  institution. " 

The  case  for  the  Treasury  Board  was  so  hope 
less  that  nothing  more  was  heard  of  it;  but  the 
battle  over  the  removal  question  was  renewed 
with  added  violence,  when  the  bill  for  establish 
ing  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs  came  up 
for  consideration.  White  of  Virginia  now  led 
the  attack.  He  had  been  a  member  of  the  Con 
tinental  Congress  from  1786  to  1788,  and  a  member 
of  the  ratifying  convention  of  his  State.  Although 
he  voted  for  a  provisional  acceptance  of  the 
Constitution,  he  had  supported  an  amendment 
requiring  Congress  to  collect  direct  taxes  or  excises 
through  State  agency,  which  would  have  been  in 
effect  a  return  to  the  plan  of  requisitions  —  the 
bane  of  the  Confederation.  In  an  elaborate  speech 
he  attacked  the  clause  giving  the  President  power 
to  remove  from  .office,  as  an  attempt  to  impart 
an  autlK>rity  not  conferred  by  the  Constitution, 
and  inconsistent  with  the  requirement  that  appoint 
ments  should  be  made  with  the  advice  and  consent 
of  the  Senate.  The  debate  soon  became  heated. 
"Let  us  look  around  at  this  moment,"  said  Jack 
son  of  Georgia,  "and  see  the  progress  we  are  mak 
ing  toward  venality  and  corruption.  We  already 


40    WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

hear  the  sounding  title  of  Highness  and  Most  Honor 
able  trumpeted  in  our  ears,  which,  ten  years  since, 
would  have  exalted  a  man  to  a  station  as  high  as 
Hainan's  gibbet."  Page  of  Virginia  was  ablaze 
with  indignation.  "Good  God!"  he  exclaimed. 
"What,  authorize  in  a  free  republic,  by  law,  too, 
by  your  first  act,  the  exertion  of  a  dangerous  royal 
prerogative  in  your  Chief  Magistrate!"  Gerry, 
in  remarks  whose  oblique  criticism  upon  arrange 
ments  at  the  President's  house  was  perfectly  well 
understood,  dwelt  upon  the  possibility  that  the 
President  might  be  guided  by  some  other  criterion 
than  discharge  of  duty  as  the  law  directs.  "Per 
haps  the  officer  is  not  good  natured  enough;  he 
makes  an  ungraceful  bow,  or  does  it  left  leg  fore 
most;  this  is  unbecoming  in  a  great  officer  at  the 
President's  levee.  Now,  because  he  is  so  unfortu 
nate  as  not  to  be  so  good  a  dancer  as  he  is  a  worthy 
officer,  he  must  be  removed."  These  rhetorical 
flourishes,  which  are  significant  of  the  undercur 
rent  of  sentiment,  hardly  do  justice  to  the  general 
quality  of  the  debate  which  was  marked  by  legal 
acuteness  on  both  sides.  Madison  pressed  home 
the  sensible  argument  that  the  President  could 
not  be  held  to  responsibility  unless  he  could  control 
his  subordinates.  "And  if  it  should  happen  that 


GREAT  DECISIONS  41 

the  officers  connect  themselves  with  the  Senate, 
they  may  mutually  support  each  other,  and  for 
want  of  efficacy  reduce  the  power  of  the  President 
to  a  mere  vapor;  in  which  case,  his  responsibility 
would  be  annihilated  and  the  expectation  of  it 
unjust. " 

The  debate  lasted  for  several  days,  but  Madison 
won  by  a  vote  of  34  to  20  in  committee,  in  favor  of 
retaining  the  clause.  On  second  thought,  how 
ever,  and  probably  after  consultation  with  the  little 
group  of  constructive  statesmen  who  stood  behind 
the  scenes,  he  decided  that  it  might  be  dangerous 
to  allow  the  President's  power  of  removal  to  rest 
upon  a  legislative  grant  that  might  be  revoked. 
When  the  report  from  the  committee  of  the  whole 
was  taken  up  in  the  House,  a  few  days  later, 
Benson  of  New  York  proposed  that  the  disputed 
clause  should  be  omitted  and  the  language  of  the 
bill  should  be  worded  so  as  to  imply  that  the 
power  of  removal  was  in  the  President.  Madison 
accepted  the  suggestion,  and  the  matter  was  thus 
settled.  The  point  was  covered  by  providing  that 
the  chief  clerk  of  the  Department  should  take 
charge  "whenever  the  principal  officer  shall  be 
removed  from  office  by  the  President."  The 
clause  got  through  the  Senate  by  the  casting  vote 


42    WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

of  the  Vice-President,  and  a  similar  provision  was 
inserted,  without  further  contest,  in  all  the  acts 
creating  the  executive  departments.  It  is  rather 
striking  evidence  of  the  Utopian  expectations 
which  could  then  be  indulged  that  Daniel  Carroll 
of  Maryland  was  persistent  in  urging  that  the 
existence  of  the  office  should  be  limited  to  a  few 
years,  "under  a  hope  that  a  time  would  come  when 
the  United  States  would  be  disengaged  from  the 
necessity  of  supporting  a  Secretary  of  Foreign 
Affairs."  Although  Gerry  and  others  expressed 
sympathy  with  the  motion  it  was  voted  down 
without  a  division. 

When  the  bill  establishing  the  Treasury  Depart 
ment  was  taken  up,  Page  of  Virginia  made  a  violent 
attack  upon  the  clause  authorizing  the  Secretary 
to  "digest  and  report  plans. "  He  denounced  it  as 
"an  attempt  to  create  an  undue  influence"  in  the 
House.  "Nor  would  the  mischief  stop  here;  it 
would  establish  a  precedent  which  might  be 
extended  until  we  admitted  all  the  Ministers  of  the 
government  on  the  floor,  to  explain  and  support  the 
plans  they  have  digested  and  reported;  thus  laying 
the  foundation  for  an  aristocracy  or  a  detestable 
monarchy."  As  a  matter  of  fact,  a  precedent  in 
favor  of  access  to  Congress  already  existed.  The 


GREAT  DECISIONS  43 

old  Superintendent  of  Finance  and  the  Board 
which  succeeded  him  had  the  power  now  proposed 
for  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury.  Livermore  of 
New  Hampshire,  who  had  been  a  member  of  the 
Continental  Congress,  admitted  this  fact,  but  held 
that  such  power  was  not  dangerous  at  that  time 
since  Congress  then  possessed  both  legislative 
and  executive  authority.  They  could  abolish  his 
plans  and  his  office  together,  if  they  thought  pro 
per;  "but  we  are  restrained  by  a  Senate  and 
by  the  negative  of  the  President."  Gerry  de 
clared  his  assent  to  the  views  expressed  by  Page. 
"If  the  doctrine  of  having  prime  and  great 
ministers  of  state  was  once  well  established,  he 
did  not  doubt  but  that  we  should  soon  see  them 
distinguished  by  a  green  or  red  ribbon,  or  other 
insignia  of  court  favor  and  patronage." 

The  strongest  argument  in  favor  of  retaining  the 
clause  referred  to  was  made  by  Fisher  Ames, 
who  had  begun  to  display  the  powers  of  clear  state 
ment  and  of  convincing  argument  that  soon  estab 
lished  his  supremacy  in  debate.  He  brought  the 
debate  at  once  to  its  proper  bearings  by  pointing 
out  that  there  were  really  only  two  matters  to  be 
considered:  whether  the  proposed  arrangement 
was  useful,  and  whether  it  could  be  safely  guarded 


44    WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

from  abuse.  "The  Secretary  is  presumed  to 
acquire  the  best  knowledge  of  the  subject  of 
finance  of  any  member  of  the  community.  Now, 
if  this  House  is  to  act  on  the  best  knowledge 
of  circumstances,  it  seems  to  follow  logically 
that  the  House  must  obtain  the  evidence  from 
that  officer;  the  best  way  of  doing  this  will  be 
publicly  from  the  officer  himself,  by  making  it 
his  duty  to  furnish  us  with  it. "  In  one  of  those 
eloquent  passages  which  brighten  the  records  of 
debate  whenever  Ames  spoke  at  any  length, 
he  pictured  the  difficulties  that  had  to  be  sur 
mounted.  "If  we  consider  the  present  situation 
of  our  finances,  owing  to  a  variety  of  causes, 
we  shall  no  doubt  perceive  a  great,  although 
unavoidable  confusion  throughout  the  whole 
scene;  it  presents  to  the  imagination  a  deep,  dark, 
and  dreary  chaos;  impossible  to  be  reduced  to 
order  without  the  mind  of  the  architect  is  clear 
and  capacious,  and  his  power  commensurate  to  the 
occasion. "  He  asked,  "  What  improper  influ 
ence  could  a  plan  reported  openly  and  officially 
have  on  the  mind  of  any  member,  more  than  if  the 
scheme  and  information  were  given  privately 
at  the  Secretary's  office?"  Merely  to  call  for 
information  would  not  be  advantageous  to  the 


GREAT  DECISIONS  45 

House.  "It  will  be  no  mark  of  inattention  or 
neglect,  if  he  take  time  to  consider  the  questions 
you  propound;  but  if  you  make  it  his  duty  to  fur 
nish  you  plans  .  .  .  and  he  neglect  to  perform  it, 
his  conduct  or  capacity  is  virtually  impeached. 
This  will  be  furnishing  an  additional  check. " 

Sedgwick  of  Massachusetts  made  a  strong  speech 
to  the  same  effect.  "Make  your  officer  respon 
sible,"  he  said  with  prophetic  vision,  "and  the 
presumption  is,  that  plans  and  information  are 
properly  digested;  but  if  he  can  secrete  himself 
behind  the  curtain,  he  might  create  a  noxious 
influence,  and  not  be  answerable  for  the  inform 
ation  he  gives. " 

The  weight  of  the  argument  was  heavily  on  the 
side  of  the  supporters  of  the  clause,  and  it  looked 
as  though  the  group  of  objectors  would  again  be 
beaten.  But  now  a  curious  thing  happened.  Fitz- 
simmons  remarked  that,  if  he  understood  the  objec 
tion  made  to  the  clause,  "it  was  a  jealousy  arising 
from  the  power  given  the  Secretary  to  report 
plans  of  revenue  to  the  House."  He  suggested 
that  "harmony  might  be  restored  by  changing 
the  word  'report'  into  'prepare'."  Fitzsimmons 
was  esteemed  by  the  House  because  of  his  zealous 
support  of  the  War  of  Independence  and  also 


46    WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

because  he  stood  high  as  a  successful  Philadelphia 
merchant,  but  he  did  not,  however,  rank  as  a 
leader.  Early  in  the  session  Ames  described  him 
as  a  man  who  "is  supposed  to  understand  trade, 
and  he  assumes  some  weight  in  such  matters. 
He  is  plausible,  though  not  over  civil;  is  artful, 
has  a  glaring  eye,  a  down  look,  speaks  low,  and 
with  apparent  candor  and  coolness."  He  was 
hardly  the  man  to  guide  the  House  on  a  matter 
pertaining  to  the  organization  of  public  authority. 
While  the  removal  issue  was  before  the  House, 
Madison  had  been  prominent  in  debate,  and  had 
spoken  with  great  power  and  earnestness;  but  up 
to  this  time  he  had  said  nothing  on  the  issue  now 
pending.  He  now  remarked  that  he  did  not  be 
lieve  that  the  danger  apprehended  by  some  really 
existed,  but  twice  in  his  speech  he  admitted  that 
"there  is  a  small  possibility,  though  it  is  but  small, 
that  an  officer  may  derive  a  weight  from  this 
circumstance,  and  have  some  degree  of  influence 
upon  the  deliberations  of  the  legislature. "  In  its 
practical  effect  the  speech  favored  the  compromise 
which  Fitzsimmons  had  just  proposed;  in  fact, 
the  only  opposition  to  the  change  of  phrasing 
now  came  from  a  few  extremists  who  still  clamored 
for  the  omission  of  the  entire  clause.  The  decisive 


GREAT  DECISIONS  47 

effect  of  Madison's  intervention  was  a  natural 
consequence  of  the  leadership  he  had  held  in  the 
movement  for  the  new  Constitution  and  of  his 
standing  as  the  representative  of  the  new  Adminis 
tration,  of  his  possessing  Washington's  confidence 
and  acting  as  his  adviser.  Washington,  then 
being  without  a  cabinet,  had  turned  to  Madison 
for  help  in  discharging  the  duties  of  his  office,  and 
at  Washington's  written  request  Madison  had 
drafted  for  him  his  replies  to  the  addresses  of  the 
House  and  the  Senate  at  the  opening  of  the  session. 
It  was  a  matter  of  course  in  such  circumstances 
that  the  House  accepted  Fitzsimmons'  amend 
ment,  —  "by  a  great  majority,"  according  to  the 
record,  —  and  thus  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
was  shut  out  of  the  House  and  was  condemned  to 
work  in  the  lobby. 

The  consequences  of  this  decision  have  been  so 
vast  that  it  is  worth  while  making  an  inquiry 
into  motive,  although  the  materials  upon  which 
judgment  must  rest  are  scant.  No  one  can  read 
the  record  of  this  discussion  without  noting  that 
Madison's  approval  of  the  original  clause  was  luke 
warm  as  compared  with  the  ardor  he  had  shown 
when  the  question  was  whether  Washington  should 
be  allowed  to  remove  his  subordinates.  This 


48    WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

contrast  suggests  that  Madison's  behavior  was 
affected  by  fear  of  Hamilton's  influence.  Would  it 
be  prudent  for  him  to  give  Hamilton  the  advantage 
of  being  able  to  appear  in  person  before  the  House, 
and  probably  to  supplant  Madison  himself  as  the 
spokesman  of  the  Administration?  Divergence 
between  the  two  men  had  already  begun  in  details. 
At  the  time  the  vote  on  the  powers  of  the  Secre 
tary  of  the  Treasury  was  taken,  the  tariff  bill  and 
the  tonnage  bill  were  still  pending,  and  Hamilton's 
influence  operated  against  Madison's  views  on 
some  points.  Moreover,  the  question  of  the 
permanent  residence  of  the  federal  government/ 
was  coming  forward  and  was  apparently  over 
shadowing  everything  else  in  the  minds  of  mem 
bers.  Ames  several  times  in  his  correspondence 
at  this  period  remarks  upon  Madison's  timidity, 
which  was  due  to  his  concern  about  Virginia  State 
politics.  Any  arrangement  that  might  enable 
Hamilton  to  cross  swords  with  an  opponent  on 
the  floor  of  the  House  could  not  be  attractive  to 
Madison,  who  was  a  lucid  reasoner  but  not  an 
impressive  speaker.  Hamilton  was  both  of  these, 
and  he  possessed  an  intellectual  brilliancy  which 
Madison  lacked.  Ames,  who  respected  Madi 
son's  abilities  and  who  regarded  him  as  the  leading 


GREAT  DECISIONS  49 

member  of  the  House,  wrote  that  "he  speaks 
low,  his  person  is  little  and  ordinary;  he  speaks  de 
cently  as  to  manner,  and  no  more;  his  language  is 
very  pure,  perspicuous,  and  to  the  point. "  Why 
Fitzsimmons  should  be  opposed  to  the  appearance 
of  the  Secretary  in  person  in  the  House,  as  had  been 
Robert  Morris's  practice  when  he  was  Superintend 
ent  of  Finance,  is  plain  enough.  Maclay's  diary 
has  many  references  to  Fitzsimmons's  negotiations 
with  members  on  tariff  rates.  It  was  not  to  the 
advantage  of  private  diplomacy  to  allow  the 
Secretary  to  shape  and  define  issues  on  the  floor 
of  the  House.  But  Fitzsimmons  could  not  have 
had  his  way  about  the  matter  without  Madison's 
help. 

Gibbon  remarks  that  the  greatest  of  theological 
controversies  which  racked  the  Roman  Empire 
and  affected  the  peace  of  millions  turned  on  the 
question  whether  a  certain  word  should  be  spelled 
with  one  diphthong  or  another.  A  like  dispropor 
tion  between  the  vastness  of  results  and  the  min 
uteness  of  verbal  distinction  is  exhibited  in  this 
decision  by  the  House.  The  change  of  "report" 
into  "prepare"  threw  up  a  ridge  in  the  field  of 
constitutional  development  that  has  affected  the 
trend  of  American  politics  ever  since.  This  is  the 


50    WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

explanation  of  a  problem  of  comparative  politics 
that  has  often  excited  much  wondering  notice :  why 
it  is  that  alone  among  modern  representative 
assemblies  the  American  House  of  Representatives 
tends  to  decline  in  prestige  and  authority.  The 
original  expectation  was  that  the  House  of  Repre 
sentatives  would  take  a  dominant  position  like 
that  of  the  House  of  Commons,  but  its  degradation 
began  so  soon  that  Fisher  Ames  noted  it  as  early  as 
1797.  Writing  to  Hamilton  he  observed: 

"The  heads  of  departments  are  chief  clerks. 
Instead  of  being  the  ministry,  the  organs  of  the 
executive  power,  and  imparting  a  kind  of  momen 
tum  to  the  operation  of  the  laws,  they  are  pre 
cluded  even  from  communicating  with  the  House 

by  reports Committees  already  are  the 

Ministers  and  while  the  House  indulges  a  jeal 
ousy  of  encroachment  in  its  functions,  which 
are  properly  deliberative,  it  does  not  perceive 
that  these  are  impaired  and  nullified  by  the  mon 
opoly  as  well  as  the  perversion  of  information 
by  these  committees." 

Justice  Story,  who  entered  Congress  in  1808  as  a 
Jeffersonian  Republican,  noted  the  process  of  de 
gradation,  and  in  his  Commentaries  he  pointed  out 
the  cause:  "The  Executive  is  compelled  to  resort  to 


GREAT  DECISIONS  51 

secret  and  unseen  influences,  to  private  interviews 
and  private  arrangements  to  accomplish  its  own 
appropriate  purposes,  instead  of  proposing  and 
sustaining  its  own  duties  and  measures  by  a  bold 
and  manly  appeal  to  the  nation  in  the  face  of 
its  representatives." 

The  last  of  the  organic  acts  of  the  session  was 
the  one  establishing  the  judiciary.  The  student 
will  be  disappointed  if  he  examines  the  record  to 
note  whether  there  was  any  vision  of  the  ascend 
ancy  which  the  judiciary  was  to  obtain  in  the 
development  of  the  American  constitutional  sys 
tem.  The  debates  were  almost  wholly  about 
the  possibilities  of  conflict  between  the  state 
and  the  federal  courts.  Although  Maclay's  diary 
gives  a  one-sided  and  distorted  account  of  the 
proceedings  in  the  Senate,  the  course  of  the  debate 
is  clear.  Ellsworth  of  Connecticut  had  principal 
charge  of  the  bill.  At  the  outset  Lee  and  Gray- 
son  of  Virginia  made  an  ineffectual  effort  to  con 
fine  the  original  jurisdiction  of  the  federal  courts  to 
cases,  of  admiralty  and  maritime  jurisdiction,  and 
argued  that  jurisdiction  over  other  cases  involving 
federal  law  might  be  conferred  upon  state  courts. 
This  was  a  point  on  which  there  had  been  some 
difference  of  opinion  between  Hamilton  and  Madi- 


52    WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

son.  The  former  held  that  it  was  within  the  com 
petency  of  Congress,  when  instituting  tribunals 
inferior  to  the  Supreme  Court,  to  adopt  the  state 
courts  for  that  purpose.  Madison  held  that 
nothing  less  than  a  system  of  federal  courts  quite 
distinct  from  the  state  courts  would  satisfy  the 
requirements  of  the  Constitution.  When  the 
bill  was  taken  up  in  the  House,  there  was  along 
debate  over  this  matter.  The  costly  duplication  of 
judicial  establishments  that  has  ever  since  existed 
in  the  United  States  is  certainly  not  necessary  to 
a  federal  system,  but  is  an  American  peculiarity. 
The  advocates  of  a  unified  system  were  hampered 
by  the  fact  that  this  view  was  pressed  by  some  in  a 
spirit  of  hostility  to  the  Constitution.  The  decisive 
argument  was  the  untrustworthiness  of  the  state 
courts.  Madison  urged  this  fact  with  great  force 
and  pointed  out  that  in  some  of  the  States  the 
courts  "are  so  dependent  on  the  state  legis 
latures,  that  to  make  the  federal  laws  dependent 
on  them,  would  throw  us  back  into  all  the  em 
barrassments  which  characterized  our  former 
situation. "  Such  was  the  low  repute  of  the  state 
legislatures  that  the  only  way  in  which  this  argu 
ment  could  be  met  was  to  argue  that  "Congress 
shall  have  power,  in  its  fullest  extent,  to  correct. 


GREAT  DECISIONS  53 

reverse,  or  affirm,  any  decree  of  a  state  court." 
This  high  assertion  of  federal  authority  was  made 
by  Jackson  of  Georgia  in  the  course  of  a  long  legal 
argument.  The  debate  did  not  follow  sectional 
lines,  and  in  general  it  was  not  unfairly  described 
by  Maclay  as  a  lawyer's  wrangle.  The  bill  was 
put  into  shape  by  the  Senate,  and  reached  the 
House  toward  the  close  of  the  session  when  the 
struggle  over  the  site  of  the  national  capital 
was  overshadowing  everything  else.  It  was  so 
generally  believed  that  nothing  important  could 
be  gained  by  attempts  at  amendment  that,  after 
an  airing  of  opinions,  the  House  accepted  the 
measure  just  as  it  had  come  from  the  Senate. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE    MASTER    BUILDER 

THE  subject  of  national  finance  had  long  inter 
ested  Hamilton.  His  ideas  had  been  matured 
by  a  diligent  and  minute  study  of  English 
precedents,  and  now  that  his  opportunity  had 
come  he  was  ready  to  grasp  it.  Soon  after  he 
took  office,  the  House  resolved  that  "an  adequate 
provision  for  the  support  of  the  public  credit" 
should  be  made,  and  it  directed  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  "to  prepare  a  plan  for  that  purpose  and 
to  report  the  same  to  the  House  at  its  next  meet 
ing."  This  was,  in  effect,  a  postponement  until 
the  second  session  of  the  First  Congress,  which 
began  in  January,  1790.  In  his  opening  address 
to  Congress,  Washington  pointedly  referred  to  the 
public  credit  resolution  which  he  had  noted  "with 
peculiar  pleasure."  On  the  next  day  a  letter 
from  Hamilton  was  read  in  the  House  stating  that 
he  had  prepared  his  plan  and  was  ready  to  report 

54 


THE  MASTER  BUILDER  55 

the  same  to  the  House  when  they  should  be  pleased 
to  receive  it. 

This  announcement  brought  up  anew  the  ques 
tion  in  what  manner  the  Secretary  should  make 
his  report.  Gerry  was  on  his  feet  at  once  with  a 
motion  that  it  should  be  made  in  writing.  Boudi- 
not  "hoped  that  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
might  be  permitted  to  make  his  report  in  person, 
in  order  to  answer  such  inquiries  as  the  members 
might  be  disposed  to  make,  for  it  was  a  justifiable 
surmise  that  gentlemen  would  not  be  able  clearly 
to  comprehend  so  intricate  a  subject  without  oral 
illustration. "  The  allusion  to  the  intricacy  of  the 
subject  had  the  effect  of  turning  against  the 
plan  of  oral  communication  some  who  had  favored 
giving  the  Secretary  the  same  direct  access  to 
Congress  that  the  Superintendent  of  Finance  had 
formerly  enjoyed.  Ames,  for  instance,  now  de 
sired  that  the  Secretary's  communications  should 
be  in  writing  since  "in  this  shape  they  would  obtain 
a  degree  of  permanency. favorable  to  the  responsi 
bility  of  the  officer,  wlSle,  at  the  same  time,  they 
would  be  less  liable  to  be  misunderstood."  Ben 
son  suggested  that  'slKce  the  resolution  of  Congress 
had  directed  the  Secretary  to  make  a  report,  it  was 
left  to  his  discretion  to  "make  it  in  the  manner  for 


56    WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

which  he  is  prepared. "  Gerry  adroitly  countered 
by  saying  that  the  resolution  provided  for  a  report. 
That  done,  it  would  be  time  enough  "to  give  him 
the  right  to  lay  before  them  his  explanations,  if 
he  thinks  explanations  necessary."  The  debate 
was  brief  and  one-sided;  the  motion  for  receiving 
the  report  in  writing  was  adopted  without  a  divi 
sion.  Five  days  later  the  written  report  was  laid 
before  the  House,  but  the  Secretary  was  never 
accorded  an  opportunity  to  offer  any  personal 
explanations. 

This  masterly  report,  which  is  justly  regarded  as 
the  corner-stone  of  American  public  credit,  excites 
the  admiration  of  the  reader  by  the  clearness  of  its 
analysis,  the  cogency  of  its  argument,  and  the 
broad  range  of  its  vision.  The  principles  of  action 
that  it  embodied,  however,  were  few  and  simple, 
chief  among  them  being  exact  and  punctual  ful 
fillment  of  contract.  "States,  like  individuals, 
who  observe  their  engagements,  are  respected  and 
trusted;  while  the  reverse  is  the  fate  of  those  who 
pursue  an  opposite  conduct."  To  discharge 
the  principal  of  the  public  debt  was  of  course 
impracticable;  nor  was  it  desirable,  as  the  creditors 
would  be  well  pleased  to  leave  it  at  interest.  *  In 
cidentally  the  funding  of  the  debt  would  provide 


THE  MASTER  BUILDER  57 

securities  that  would  serve  trade  as  a  species  of 
currency,  and  would  set  in  motion  a  long  train  of 
benefits  that  would  extend  throughout  the  com 
munity.  In  the  funding  operation  the  debts  con 
tracted  by  the  States  should  be  included.  As  to 
this  Hamilton  remarked:  "The  general  princi 
ple  of  it  seems  to  be  equitable,  for  it  seems 
difficult  to  conceive  a  good  reason  why  the  ex 
penses  for  the  particular  defense  of  a  part  in  a 
common  war  should  not  be  a  common  charge,  as 
well  as  those  incurred  professedly  for  the  gen 
eral  defense.  The  defense  of  each  part  is  that 
of  the  whole;  and  unless  the  expenditures  are 
brought  into  a  common  mass,  the  tendency  must  be 
to  add  to  the  calamities  suffered  by  being  the  most 
exposed  to  the  ravages  of  war  and  increase  of 
burthens."  / 

Hamilton  computed  the  amount  of  the  foreign 
debt,  principal  and  arrears,  at  $11,710,378.62; 
the  domestic  debt,  including  that  of  the  States, 
at  $42,414,085.94,  —  a  total  of  over  fifty-four 
millions  with  an  annual  interest  charge  at  existing 
rates  amounting  to  $4,587,444.81,  —  a  staggering 
total  for  a  nation  whose  revenue  was  then  insuffi 
cient  to  meet  its  current  expenses.  Nevertheless 
Hamilton  refused  to  admit  that  "such  a  provision 


58    WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

would  exceed  the  abilities  of  the  country,"  but 
he  was  "clearly  of  the  opinion  that  to  make  it 
would  require  the  extension  of  taxation  to  a  degree 
and  to  objects  which  the  true  interest  of  the  public 
creditor  forbids."  He  therefore  favored  a  com 
position,  in  arranging  which  there  would  be  strict 
adherence  to  the  principle  "that  no  change  in  the 
rights  of  creditors  ought  to  be  attempted  without 
their  voluntary  consent;  and  that  this  consent 
ought  to  be  voluntary  in  fact  as  well  as  in  name." 
It  followed  that  "every  proposal  of  a  change  ought 
to  be  in  the  shape  of  an  appeal  to  their  interests; 
but  not  to  their  necessities. "  Hamilton  then  went 
into  details  of  a  funding  loan,  in  which  various 
options  were  offered  to  the  creditors,  including 
land  grants  in  part  payment,  and  conversion  in 
whole  or  in  part  into  annuities,  several  sorts  of 
which  were  offered.  He  submitted  estimates  of 
how  the  various  plans  would  work  out  in  practice, 
and  he  concluded  that  the  annual  revenue  which 
would  be  required  to  enable  the  government  to 
meet  its  obligations  under  the  scheme  and  also 
to  maintain  its  current  service  would  amount  to 
$2,239,163.09,  a  sum  that  could  be  readily  pro 
vided. 

There   could   not  have  been   a  more  striking 


THE  MASTER  BUILDER  59 

contrast  than  there  was  between  the  humiliat 
ing  conditions  which  actually  existed  and  the 
grand  results  which  Hamilton  designed  and  con 
fidently  expected.  The  ardent  and  hopeful  tone 
of  his  plan,  conceived  in  apparently  desperate 
circumstances,  is  very  marked.  He  declared: 
"It  cannot  but  merit  particular  attention  that 
among  ourselves  the  most  enlightened  friends 
of  good  government  are  those  whose  expecta 
tions  are  the  highest.  To  justify  and  preserve 
their  confidence;  to  promote  the  increasing 
respectability  of  the  American  name;  to  answer 
the  calls  of  justice;  to  restore  landed  property 
to  its  due  value;  to  furnish  new  resources  both 
to  agriculture  and  commerce;  to  cement  more 
closely  the  union  of  the  States;  to  add  to  their 
security  against  foreign  attack;  to  establish  pub 
lic  order  on  the  basis  of  a  liberal  and  upright 
policy  —  these  are  the  great  and  invaluable  ends 
to  be  secured  by  a  proper  and  adequate  pro 
vision  at  the  present  period  for  the  support  of 
public  credit. " 

All  these  great  objects  were  indeed  attained, 
but  Hamilton's  anticipation  of  them  was  at  the 
time  regarded  as  either  a  pretext  made  to  cajole 
Congress  or  else  merely  an  ebullition  from  his  own 


60    WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

sanguine  nature  not  to  be  taken  too  seriously  by 
sensible  people.  Senator  Maclay  of  Pennsylvania 
regarded  Hamilton's  plans  as  wildly  extravagant 
in  their  conception  and  iniquitous  in  their  practical 
effect.  In  his  opinion,  Hamilton  had  "a  very  boy 
ish,  giddy  manner,  and  Scotch-Irish  people  could 
well  call  him  a  'skite."  Jackson  of  Georgia 
exposed  to  the  House  the  folly  of  Hamilton's  pro 
posals  by  pointing  out  that  a  funded  debt  meant 
national  decay.  He  mentioned  England  as  "a 
melancholy  instance  of  the  ruin  attending  such 
engagements."  To  such  a  pitch  had  the  "spirit 
of  funding  and  borrowing  been  carried  in  that 
country"  that  its  national  debt  was  now  "a 
burthen  which  the  most  sanguine  mind  can  never 
contemplate  they  will  ever  be  relieved  from." 
France  also  was  "considerably  enfeebled  and 
languishes  under  a  heavy  load  of  debt."  He 
argued  that  by  funding  the  debt  in  America  "the 
same  effect  must  be  produced  that  has  taken  place 
in  other  nations;  it  must  either  bring  on  national 
bankruptcy,  or  annihilate  her  existence  as  an 
independent  empire. "  y 

Such  dismal  prognostications  on  the  very  eve  of 
the  Napoleonic  era,  with  its  tremendous  revelations 
of  national  power,  were  quite  common  at  that  time. 


THE  MASTER  BUILDER  61 

The  long  rambling  debate  that  took  place  in  the 
House  when  Hamilton's  report  was  taken  up  for 
consideration  abounds  with  similar  instances  of 
shortsightedness.  Many  members  did  not  scruple 
to  advise  repudiation,  in  whole  or  in  part.  Liver- 
more  of  New  Hampshire  admitted  that  the  foreign 
debt  should  be  provided  for,  since  it  was  "lent  to 
the  United  States  in  real  coin,  by  disinterested 
persons,  not  concerned  or  benefited  by  the  revo 
lution,"  but  that  the  domestic  debt  was  "for 
depreciated  paper,  or  services  done  at  exorbitant 
rates,  or  for  goods  or  provisions  supplied  at  more 
than  their  real  worth,  by  those  who  received  all  the 
benefits  arising  from  our  change  of  condition." 
True,  Congress  had  pledged  its  faith  to  the  redemp 
tion  of  issues  at  their  face  value,  "but  this  was 
done  on  a  principle  of  policy,  in  order  to  prevent 
the  rapid  depreciation  which  was  taking  place." 
He  argued  that  "money  lent  in  this  depreciated 
and  depreciating  state  can  hardly  be  said  to  be 
lent  from  a  spirit  of  patriotism;  it  was  a  mere 
speculation  in  public  securities. " 

The  distinction  between  the  foreign  debt  and 
the  domestic  was  seized  by  many  members  as 
providing  a  just  basis  for  discrimination.  Page  of 
Virginia  observed  that  "our  citizens  were  deeply 


62    WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

interested,  and,  I  believe,  if  they  were  never  to  get 
a  farthing  for  what  is  owing  to  them  for  their 
services,  they  would  be  well  paid;  they  have  gained 
what  they  aimed  at;  they  have  secured  their 
liberties  and  their  laws;  they  will  be  satisfied  that 
this  House  has  pledged  itself  to  pay  foreigners 
the  generous  loans  they  advanced  to  us  in  the  day 
of  distress. "  In  the  course  of  the  debate  the  power 
to  do  was  so  often  mentioned  as  implying  the  right 
to  do  that  Ames  was  moved  to  remark:  "I  have 
heard  that  in  the  East  Indies  the  stock  of  the 
labor  and  the  property  of  the  empire  is  the  pro 
perty  of  the  Prince;  that  it  is  held  at  his  will  and 
pleasure;  but  this  is  a  slavish  doctrine,  which  I 
hope  we  are  not  prepared  to  adopt  here."  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  there  had  already  been  extensive 
scaling  of  the  debt,  and  the  note  emissions  had 
been  pretty  nearly  wiped  out.  To  save  the  public 
credit  from  complete  collapse,  the  Continental 
Congress  had  entered  into  definite  contracts  under 
the  most  solemn  pledges,  and  it  was  upon  this 
select  class  of  securities  that  it  was  now  proposed 
to  start  anew  the  process  of  repudiation.  But 
public  opinion  displayed  itself  so  hostile  to  such 
perfidy  that  the  party  of  repudiation  in  Congress 
soon  dwindled  to  insignificance  and  the  struggle 


THE  MASTER  BUILDER  63 

finally  settled  upon  two  issues,  discrimination  and 
assumption. 

Weeks  of  debate  ensued,  and  the  deepest  impres 
sion  made  by  a  careful  perusal  of  the  record  is  the 
inability  of  members  to  appreciate  the  importance 
of  the  issues.  Much  of  the  tedious  and  pointless 
character  of  their  speeches  may  be  ascribed  to  the 
lack  of  the  personal  presence  of  the  Secretary. 
There  being  nothing  to  focus  the  debate  and 
exclude  the  fictitious  and  irrelevant,  it  rambled 
in  any  direction  a  speaker's  fancy  might  suggest. 
Moreover,  its  quality  was  impaired  because  any 
consideration  of  motive  was  of  the  nature  of  talk 
ing  about  a  man  behind  his  back  and  this,  every 
one  knows,  is  very  different  from  saying  things  to 
his  face.  Assertions  and  innuendos  which  would 
hardly  have  been  hazarded  had  Hamilton  been 
present,  or  which,  had  they  been  made,  would  have 
been  forthwith  met  and  refuted,  were  indulged 
in  without  restraint.  Although  one  of  the  reasons 
given  for  requiring  a  written  report  was  that  the 
House  would  be  the  better  informed,  the  debate 
does  not  indicate  that  the  arguments  by  which 
Hamilton  had  vindicated  his  proposals  had  really 
been  apprehended. 

The  question  whether  or  not  any  discrimination 


64    WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

could  be  made  between  original  holders  of  the 
public  securities  and  those  who  had  acquired  them 
by  purchase  was  considered  at  length  by  Hamilton 
in  his  report.  The  ^ftic  securities  had  been  at 
such  a  heavy  discount  mat  now,  if  they  were  to  be 
met  at  face  value,  speculators  would  reap  large 
profits.  Hamilton  put  the  case  of  the  opposition 
as  strongly  as  possible.  It  might  be  urged  that  it 
was  unreasonable  "to  pay  twenty  shillings  in  the 
pound  to  one  who  had  not  given  more  for  it  than 
three  or  four;  and  it  is  added  that  it  would  be 
hard  to  aggravate  the  misfortune  of  the  first  owner, 
who,  probably  through  necessity,  parted  with  his 
property  at  so  great  a  loss,  by  obliging  him  to 
contribute  to  the  profit  of  the  person  who  had 
speculated  on  his  distresses. "  Nevertheless,  Ham 
ilton  submitted  considerations  showing  that  dis 
crimination  would  be  "equally  unjust  and 
impolitic,  as  highly  injurious  even  to  the  original 
holders  of  public  securities,  as  ruinous  to  public 
credit."  It  is  unnecessary  to  repeat  the  lucid 
argument  by  which  Hamilton  demonstrated  the 
soundness  of  his  position,  for  security  of  transfer 
is  now  well  understood  to  be  an  essential  element 
of  public  credit;  but  the  special  point  of  interest 
is  that  the  debate  simply  ignored  Hamilton's 


THE  MASTER  BUILDER  65 

argument  and  rambled  along  over  the  superficial 
aspects  of  the  case,  dwelling  upon  the  sorrows 
of  those  who  had  parted  with  their  holdings,  and 
exhibiting  their  situation  as  the  most  important 
matter  to  be  considered. 

Madison  was  most  active  in  making  that  branch 
of  the  case  the  leading  issue,  and  in  a  series  of 
elaborate  speeches  which  cannot  now  be  read 
without  regret,  he  urged  that  the  present  holders 
should  be  allowed  only  the  highest  market  price 
previously  recorded,  and  that  the  residue  should 
go  to  the  original  holders.  Boudinot  at  once 
pointed  out  that  there  was  nothing  on  record  to 
show  who  might  be  an  original  bona  fide  holder. 
Great  quantities  of  the  certificates  of  indebtedness 
had,  as  a  mere  matter  of  convenience,  been  issued 
to  government  clerks  who  afterwards  distributed 
them  among  those  who  furnished  supplies  to  the 
government  or  who  performed  services  entitling 
them  to  pay.  He  mentioned  that  he  himself 
appeared  on  the  record  as  original  holder  in  cases 
wherein  he  had  really  acted  in  behalf  of  his  neigh 
bors  to  relieve  them  of  the  trouble  of  personal 
appearance.  Madison's  proposition  would  there 
fore  invest  him  with  a  legal  title  to  property  which 
really  belonged  to  others.  But  this  and  other 


66    WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

evidence  of  the  real  effect  of  Madison's  proposal 
failed  to  move  him,  further  than  to  cause  him  to 
declare  that  "all  that  he  wished  was  that  the  claims 
of  the  original  holders,  not  less  than  those  of  the 
actual  holders,  should  be  fairly  examined  and 
justly  decided."  Finally  Benson  of  New  York 
gave  him  a  shrewd  home  thrust  that  plainly 
embarrassed  him.  He  put  the  question  whether, 
if  he  had  purchased  a  certificate  from  Madison, 
and  the  Treasury  withheld  part  of  the  amount  for 
Madison  as  the  original  holder,  Madison  would 
keep  the  money?  "I  ask, "  said  Benson,  "whether 
he  would  take  advantage  of  the  law  against  me, 
and  refuse  to  give  me  authority  to  take  it  up 
in  his  name?"  Madison  evaded  the  query  by 
saying  that  everything  would  depend  upon  the 
circumstances  of  any  particular  case,  and  that 
circumstances  were  conceivable  in  which  the 
most  tender  conscience  need  not  refrain  from 
taking  the  benefit  of  what  the  government  had 
determined. 

The  debate  on  Madison's  discrimination  amend 
ment  lasted  from  the  eleventh  to  the  twenty-second 
day  of  February  —  Washington's  birthday.  The 
House  did  honor  to  the  day  when  it  rejected 
Madison's  motion  by  the  crushing  vote  of  36 


THE  MASTER  BUILDER  67 

to  13.     With  that,  his  pretensions  to  the  leader 
ship  of  the  House  quite  disappeared. 

The^assump tion_of^state_debts^ was  the  subject 
of  a  debate  in  committee  of  the  whole  which  lasted 
from  the  twenty-third  of  February  to  the  second 
of  March.  New  factional  lines  now  revealed  a 
supposed  diversity  of  interest  of  the  several  States. 
The  false  notions  of  finance  then  current  were 
illustrated  by  an  argument  that  was  in  continual 
use,  either  on  the  floor  or  in  the  lobby.  Members 
would  figure  how  much  their  States  would  have  to 
pay  as  their  share  of  the  debt  that  would  be  as 
sumed,  and  on  that  basis  would  reach  conclusions 
as  to  how  their  States  stood  to  win  or  lose  by  the 
transaction.  By  this  reckoning,  of  course,  the 
great  gainer  would  appear  to  be  the  State  upon 
whom  the  chances  of  war  had  piled  the  largest 
debt.  This  calculation  made  Burke  of  South 
Carolina,  usually  an  opponent  of  anything  coming 
from  Hamilton,  a  strong  advocate  of  assumption. 
He  told  the  House  that  "if  the  present  question 
was  lost,  he  was  almost  certain  it  would  end  in  her 
bankruptcy,  for  she  [South  Carolina]  was  no  more 
able  to  grapple  with  her  enormous  debt  than  a  boy 
of  twelve  years  of  age  is  able  to  grapple  with  a 
giant."  Livermore,  representing  a  State  never 


68    WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

within  the  actual  field  of  military  operations,  at 
once  replied:  "I  conceive  that  the  debt  of  South 
Carolina,  or  Massachusetts,  or  of  an  individual,  has 
nothing  to  do  with  our  deliberations.  If  they  have 
involved  themselves  in  debt,  it  is  their  misfortune, 
and  they  must  extricate  themselves  as  well  as 
they  can."  On  a  later  occasion  Stone  of  Mary 
land,  another  State  that  lay  outside  the  track  of 
war,  gave  the  leading  war-debt  States  an  admoni 
tion  of  the  kind  that  adds  insult  to  injury,  saying 
"however  inconvenient  it  may  be  to  Massachusetts 
or  South  Carolina  to  make  a  bold  exertion,  and 
nobly  bear  the  burthens  of  their  present  debt,  I 
believe  in  the  end  it  would  be  found  to  conduce 
greatly  to  their  advantage."  Burke  made  a 
crushing  rejoinder.  "Was  Maryland  like  South 
Carolina  constantly  grappling  with  the  enemy  dur 
ing  the  whole  war?  There  is  not  a  road  in  the 
State  but  has  witnessed  the  ravages  of  war;  plan 
tations  were  destroyed,  and  the  skeletons  of  houses, 
to  this  day,  point  out  to  the  traveler  the  route 
of  the  British  army;  her  citizens  were  exposed  to 
every  violence,  their  capital  taken,  and  their 
country  almost  overrun  by  the  enemy;  men, 
women,  and  children  murdered  by  the  Indians  and 
Tories;  all  the  personal  property  consumed,  and 


THE  MASTER  BUILDER  69 

now  is  it  to  be  wondered  at  that  she  is  not  able  to 
make  exertions  equal  with  other  States,  who  have 
been  generally  in  an  undisturbed  condition?" 

The  argument  pressed  by  the  advocates  of 
assumption  was  that  the  state  debts  contracted 
during  the  Revolutionary  War  were  for  the  com 
mon  defense,  and  that,  unless  these  were  assumed 
by  the  general  government,  the  adoption  of  the 
new  Constitution  would  do  injury  by  withdrawing 
revenue  resources  which  the  States  had  formerly 
possessed.  This  position  at  the  present  day  seems 
reasonable  enough,  but  it  is  certain  that  at  that 
time  people  worked  themselves  into  a  genuine  rage 
over  the  matter  and  were  able  to  persuade  them 
selves  into  a  sincere  belief  that  it  was  outrageous 
the  unfortunate  States  should  expect  the  others 
to  bear  their  troubles,  and  that  Hamilton  was  a 
great  rogue  for  proposing  such  a  scheme.  Writing 
in  his  private  diary,  Maclay  characterized  the  plan 
as  "a  monument  of  political  absurdity,"  and 
he  was  in  the  habit  of  referring  to  Hamilton's 
supporters  as  his  "gladiators"  and  as  a  "corrupt 
squadron.  *] 

j  ^On  the  whole  the  records  make  painful  reading. 
The  prevailing  tone  of  public  life  was  one  of  dull 
and  narrow  provincialism,  at  times  thickening 


70  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

into  stupidity,  at  times  sharpening  into  spite, 
although  ordinarily  made  respectable  by  a  serious 
attitude  to  life  and  by  a  stolid  fortitude  in  facing 
whatever  the  distracted  times  might  present.  It 
was  the  influence  of  a  few  great  men  that  made 
America  a  nation.  If  one  is  not  subject  to  the 
spirit  of  ancestor  worship  that  has  long  ruled 
American  history,  one  is  bound  to  say  that/ — 
apart  from  some  forceful  pamphleteering  of 
transient  purpose — the  voluminous  political  lit- 
v  erature  of  the  formative  period  displays  much 
A) 'pedantic  erudition  but  has  little  that  goes  really 
Y  deep.  )The  Federalist,  the  artillery  of  a  hard 
fought  battle,  is  a  striking  exception.  So,  too,  is 
the  series  of  reports  by  Hamilton.  But  his  plans 
could  not  prevail  by  force  of  reason  against  the 
general  spirit  of  selfish  particularism.  Although 
on  March  2  a  motion  adverse  to  assumption  in 
committee  of  the  whole  was  defeated  by  a  vote  of 
28  to  22,  it  was  then  known  that  a  majority  could 
not  be  procured  for  enactment,  and  on  April  12 
the  assumption  bill  was  defeated  outright  in  the 
House,  31  to  29.  Maclay,  who  went  over  to  the 
House  from  the  Senate  to  witness  the  event,  gloated 
over  the  defeat  in  his  diary: 

"Sedgwick,  from  Boston,  pronounced  a  funeral 


THE  MASTER  BUILDER  71 

oration  over  it.  He  was  called  to  order;  some 
confusion  ensued;  he  took  his  hat  and  went  out. 
When  he  returned,  his  visage  bore  the  visible 
marks  of  weeping.  Fitzsimmons  reddened  like 
scarlet;  his  eyes  were  brimful.  Clymer's  color, 
always  pale,  now  merged  to  a  deadly  white;  his  lips 
quivered,  and  his  nether  jaw  shook  with  convulsive 
motions;  his  head,  neck,  and  breast  contracted 
with  gesticulations  resembling  those  of  a  turkey  or 
goose  nearly  strangled  in  the  act  of  deglutition. 
Benson  bungled  like  a  shoemaker  who  has  lost  his 
end.  .  .  .  Wads  worth  hid  his  grief  under  the  rim 
of  a  round  hat.  Boudinot's  wrinkles  rose  in 
ridges  and  the  angles  of  his  mouth  were  depressed 
and  assumed  a  curve  resembling  a  horse's  shoe." 
The  defeat  did  not  discourage  Hamilton.  He 
had  successfully  handled  a  more  difficult  situation 
in  getting  New  York  to  ratify  the  Constitution, 
and,  resorting  now  to  the  same  means  he  had  then 
employed,  he  used  pressure  of  interest  to  move 
those  who  could  not  be  stirred  by  reason.  The 
intense  concern  felt  by  members  in  the  choice 
of  the  site  of  the  national  capital  supplied  him 
with,  the  leverage  which  he  brought  to  bear  on  the 
situation.  Most  of  the  members  were  more 
stirred  by  that  question  than  by  any  other  before 


72    WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

Congress.  It  was  a  prominent  topic  in  Madison's 
correspondence  from  the  time  the  Constitution 
was  adopted.  Maclay's  diary  abounds  with 
references  to  the  subject.  Some  of  his  bitterest 
sentences  are  penned  about  the  conduct  of  those 
who  preferred  some  other  site  to  that  on  the 
Susquehanna  River  which  he  knew  to  be  the  best 
because  he  lived  there  himself.  Bargaining  among 
the  members  as  to  the  selection  had  been  going  on 
almost  from  the  first.  As  early  as  April  26, 1789, 
before  Washington  had  been  installed  in  his  office, 
Maclay  mentions  a  meeting  "to  concert  some 
measures  for  the  removal  of  Congress. "  There-, 
after  notices  of  pending  deals  appear  frequently 
in  his  diary.  After  the  defeat  of  the  assumption 
bill,  the  diary  notes  the  activity  of  Hamilton  in 
this  matter.  An  entry  of  June  14,  1790,  ascribes 
to  Robert  Morris  the  statement  that  "Hamilton 
said  he  wanted  one  vote  in  the  Senate  and  five  in 
the  House  of  Representatives;  that  he  was  willing 
and  would  agree  to  place  the  permanent  residence 
of  Congress  at  Germantown  or  Falls  of  the  Dela 
ware  (Trenton),  if  he  would  procure  him  those 
votes."  Although  definite  knowledge  is  un 
attainable,  one  gets  the  impression,  in  following 
the  devious  course  of  these  intrigues,  that  had 


THE  MASTER  BUILDER  73 

Pennsylvania  interests  been  united  they  could 
have  decided  the  site  of  the  national  capital;  but 
the  delegation  was  divided  over  the  relative  merits 
of  the  Delaware  and  the  Susquehanna  as  well  as 
on  the  question  of  assumption.  Hamilton's  efforts 
in  this  quarter  were  ineffectual,  and  the  winning 
combination  was  finally  arranged  elsewhere  and 
otherwise  by  the  aid  of  Jefferson. 

Thomas  Jefferson  was  at  this  time  forty-seven 
years  old,  and  owing  both  to  seniority  and  to  the 
distinguished  positions  he  had  held,  he  ranked  as 
the  most  illustrious  member  of  the  Administration. 
His  correspondence  at  this  period  shows  that  he 
was  fully  aware  of  the  importance  of  the  crisis, 
and  he  did  not  overrate  it  when  he  wrote  to  James 
Monroe,  June  20,  1790,  that,  unless  the  measures 
of  the  Administration  were  successful,  "our  credit 
will  burst  and  vanish,  and  the  States  separate  to 
take  care  everyone  of  itself."  In  this  letter 
Jefferson  outlined  the  compromise  that  was  actu 
ally  adopted  by  Congress.  The  strongest  opposi 
tion  to  the  assumption  bill  had  come  from  Virginia,, 
although  Maryland,  Georgia,  and  New  Hamp 
shire  also  opposed  it,  and  the  Middle  States  were 
divided.  Jefferson  was  able  to  get  enough  South 
ern  votes  to  carry  assumption  in  return  for  enough 


74    WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

votes  from  Hamilton's  adherents  to  carry  the 
Potomac  site.  An  agreement  was  reached  at  a 
dinner  given  by  Jefferson  to  which  he  invited  Ham 
ilton  and  Madison.  According  to  this  arrange 
ment,  the  capital  was  to  remain  in  Philadelphia  for 
ten  years  and  after  that  to  be  on  the  Potomac  River 
in  a  district  ten  miles  square  to  be  selected  by  the 
President.  The  residence  act  was  approved  July 
16,  1790;  the  funding  and  assumption  measures, 
now  combined  in  one  bill,  became  law  on  Au 
gust  4u 

After  Jefferson  turned  against  the  Administra 
tion,  his  participation  in  the  passage  of  the 
assumption  bill  was  such  an  awkward  circum 
stance  that  he  discredited  his  own  intelligence 
by  professing  that  he  "was  most  ignorantly  and 
innocently  made  to  hold  the  candle"  to  Hamil 
ton's  "game."  In_ reality  the  public  service 
Jefferson  then  performed  was  the  most  useful  in  all 
his  long  and  fruitful  career.  But  for  this  action, 
the  Declaration  of  Independence,  to  the  drafting  of 
which  he  owes  his  greatest  fame,  might  now  be 
figuring  among  the  historical  documents  of  lost 
causes,  like  similar  elaborate  statements  of  princi 
ple  made  during  the  Commonwealth  period  in  Eng 
land.  Had  the  national  forces  failed  at  the  critical 


THE  MASTER  BUILDER  75 

period  of  financial  organization,  and  the  States, 
bankrupt  by  the  revolutionary  struggle,  been  left 
in  the  lurch,  the  republic  would  have  followed  the 
usual  course  of  disintegration  displayed  by  feder 
ations  from  the  time  of  the  Greek  amphictyonies 
down  to  that  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire. 

The  charge  was  made  soon  after  Hamilton's 
victory  that  it  was  largely  due  to  the  influence  of 
speculators.  The  advance  in  the  market  value  of 
securities  produced  by  Hamilton's  measures  cer 
tainly  gave  an  opportunity  to  speculators  of  which 
they  availed  themselves  with  the  unscrupulous 
activity  characteristic  of  the  sordid  tribe.  Jeffer 
son  has  left  an  account  of  "the  base  scramble." 
"Couriers  and  relay  horses  by  land,  and  swift 
sailing  pilot  boats  by  sea,  were  flying  in  all  direc 
tions.  Active  partners  and  agents  were  associated 
and  employed  in  every  state,  town,  and  country 
neighborhood,  and  this  paper  was  bought  up  at 
five  shillings,  and  even  as  low  as  two  shillings  in  the 
pound,  before  the  holder  knew  that  Congress  had 
already  provided  for  its  assumption  at  par.  Im 
mense  sums  were  thus  filched  from  the  poor  and 
ignorant,  and  fortunes  accumulated  by  those  who 
had  themselves  been  poor  enough  before. " 

This  account  is  highly  colored.     The  struggle 


76    WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

was  too  close,  and  the  issue  was  long  too  doubtful, 
to  admit  of  speculative  preparations  extending  to 
every  "town  and  country  neighborhood."  If 
speculation  took  place  on  such  a  large  scale,  it  must 
have  been  also  taking  risks  on  a  large  scale,  for 
assumption  was  not  assured  until  Jefferson 
himself  put  his  shoulder  to  the  wheel.  The  lack 
of  means  for  prompt  diffusion  of  intelligence 
naturally  provided  large  opportunity  for  specula 
tion  by  those  in  a  position  to  keep  well-informed, 
and  undoubtedly  large  profits  were  made;  but  the 
circumstances  were  such  tjiat  it  seems  most  prob 
able  that  profits  were  less  than  market  opportu 
nities  would  have  allowed  had  not  the  issue  been 
so  long  in  doubt.  Nevertheless  there  was  much 
speculative  activity,  and  the  charge  was  soon  made 
that  it  extended  into  Congress. x 

1  This  charge  was  put  forth  by  John  Taylor  in  pamphlets  printed  in 
1793  and  1794,  in  which  he  reviewed  the  financial  policy  of  the  Adminis 
tration  and  gave  a  list  of  Congressmen  who  had  invested  in  the  public 
funds.  The  facts  on  which  this  charge  rests  have  been  collected  and 
examined  by  Professor  Beard  in  his  Economic  Origins  of  Jeffersonian 
Democracy.  His  analysis  shows  that  out  of  sixty-four  members  of  the 
House,  twenty-nine  were  security  holders,  and  of  these  twenty-one 
voted  for  and  eight  voted  against  assumption.  But  the  facts  dis 
closed  do  not  sustain  his  theory  that  the  issue  was  essentially  a  con 
flict  between  capitalism  and  agrarianism.  The  assumption  bill  was 
lifted  to  its  place  on  the  statute  book  through  the  leverage  exerted  by 
Hamilton  and  Jefferson,  with  Washington's  prestige  as  their  fulcrum. 
The  characters  of  these  three  men  resist  schemes  of  classification 


THE  MASTER  BUILDER  77 

The  passage  of  assumption  was  the  turning  point. 
Other  important  measures  followed,  but  none  of 
them  met  with  difficulties  which  the  Administra 
tion  could  not  overcome  by  ordinary  methods  of 
persuasion  and  appeal.  A  national  bank  was 
authorized  by  an  act  approved  on  February  25, 
1791.  Hamilton's  famous  report  on  manu 
factures,  a  masterly  analysis  of  the  sources  of 
national  wealth  and  of  the  means  of  improving 
them,  was  sent  to  Congress  on  December  5,  1791. 
Upon  his  recommendation  Congress  established 
the  mint,  the  only  point,  which  excited  controversy 
being  Hamilton's  proposal  that  the  coins  should  be 
stamped  with  the  head  of  the  President  in  whose 
administration  they  were  issued.  This  suggestion 
was  rejected  on  the  ground  that  it  smacked  too 
much  of  the  practice  of  monarchies.  The  queer 
totemistic  designs  of  American  coinage  are  a 
consequence  of  this  decision. 

The  formation  of  national  government  by 
voluntary  agreement  is  a  unique  event.  The 

according  to  economic  interest.  The  principal  value  of  analysis  of 
the  economic  elements  of  the  struggle  is  to  protect  from  undervalu 
ation  the  motives  that  actuated  the  opposition  to  Hamilton's  meas 
ures.  The  historian  has  the  advantage  of  a  perspective  denied  to 
participants  in  events,  and  this  fact  is  apt  to  turn  unduly  to  the 
discredit  of  lost  causes. 


78    WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

explanation  of  this  peculiar  result  in  the  case  of 
America  is  the  unifying  influence  of  Hamilton's 
measures.  They  interested  in  the  support  of  the 
government  economic  forces  strong  enough  to 
counteract  the  separatist  tendencies  that  had 
always  before  broken  up  states  unless  they  were 
held  together  by  sheer  might  of  power  in  their 
rulers.  The  means  employed  have  been  cited  as 
evidence  in  support  of  the  economic  interpretation 
of  history  now  in  fashion.  Government,  it  is 
true,  like  every  other  form  of  life,  must  meet  the 
fundamental  needs  of  subsistence  and  defense, 
but  this  truism  supplies  no  explanation  of  the 
particular  mode  of  doing  so  that  may  be  adopted. 
Those  needs  account  for  motion  but  not  for  direc-. 
tion.  Human  will,  discernment,  and  purpose  enter 
and  complicate  the  situation  in  a  way  that  makes 
theories  of  determinism  appear  absurd.  No  one 
has  ever  contended  that  Hamilton  was  prompted 
by  an  economic  motive  in  giving  up  his  law  prac 
tice  to  accept  public  office.  He  did  so  against  the 
remonstrances  of  his  friends,  whose  predictions 
that  what  he  would  get  out  of  it  for  himself  would 
be  calumny,  persecution,  and  loss  of  fortune,  were 
all  fully  verified;  but  he  possessed  a  nature  which 
found  its  happiness  in  bringing  high  ideals  to  grand 


THE  MASTER  BUILDER  79 

fulfillment,  and  in  applying  his  powers  to  that 
object  he  let  everything  else  go.  Hamilton's 
career  is  one  of  the  greatest  of  those  facts  that 
baffle  attempts  to  reduce  history  to  an  exhibition 
of  the  play  of  economic  forces. 


CHAPTER  IV 

ALARUMS  AND  EXCURSIONS 

THE  Shakespearian  stage  direction  which  heads 
this  chapter  appropriately  describes  the  course 
of  administrative  experience  while  Washington 
was  trying  to  get  from  Congress  the  means  of 
sustaining  the  responsibilities  with  which  he  was 
charged  by  his  office.  Events  did  not  stand  still 
because  for  a  time  anything  like  national  govern 
ment  had  ceased.  Before  Washington  left  Mount 
Vernon  he  had  been  disquieted  by  reports  of  Indian 
troubles  in  the  West,  and  of  intrigues  by  Great 
Britain  —  which  still  retained  posts  that  according 
to  the  treaty  of  peace  belonged  to  the  United 
States,  —  and  by  Spain  which  held  the  lower 
Mississippi.  Washington  applied  himself  to  these 
matters  as  soon  as  he  was  well  in  office,  but  he  was 
much  hindered  in  his  arrangements  by  apathy  or 
indifference  in  Congress.  He  noted  in  his  diary 
for  May  1,  1790,  communications  made  to  him  of  a 

80' 


ALARUMS  AND  EXCURSIONS  81 

disposition  among  members  of  Congress  "to  pay 
little  attention  to  the  Western  country  because 
they  were  of  the  opinion  it  would  soon  shake  off  its 
dependence  on  this,  and  in  the  meantime  would  be 
burdensome  to  it. "  From  a  letter  of  Gen.  Rufus 
Putnam,  one  of  the  organizers  of  the  Ohio  com 
pany,  it  appears  that  in  July,  1789,  Ames  of 
Massachusetts  put  these  queries  to  him:  "Can 
we  retain  the  western  country  with  the  govern 
ment  of  the  United  States?  And  if  we  can,  what 
use  will  it  be  to  them?"  Putnam  wrote  a  labored 
article  to  the  effect  that  it  was  both  feasible  and 
desirable  to  hold  the  West,  but  the  character  of 
his  arguments  shows  that  there  was  then  a  poor 
prospect  of  success.  At  that  time  no  one  could 
have  anticipated  the  Napoleonic  wars  which  ended 
all  European  competition  for  the  possession  of  the 
Mississippi  valley,  and,  as  it  were*  tossed  that 
region  into  the  hands  of  the  United  States.  There 
was  strong  opposition  in  Congress  to  pursuing 
any  course  that  would  require  maintenance  of  an 
army  or  navy.  Some  held  that  it  was  a  great  mis 
take  to  have  a  war  department,  and  that  there 
would  be  time  enough  to  create  one  in  case  war 
should  actually  arrive.  f  , 

In  a  message  to  the  Senate,  August  7,  1789, 


82    WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

Washington  had  urged  the  importance  of  "some 
uniform  and  effective  system  for  the  militia  of  the 
United  States,"  saying  that  he  was  "particularly 
anxious"  it  should  receive  early  attention.  On 
January  18,  1790,  General  Knox  submitted  to 
Congress  a  plan  to  which  there  are  frequent  refer 
ences  in  Washington's  diary,  showing  the  special 
interest  he  took  in  the  subject.  The  report  laid 
down  principles  which  have  long  since  been  em 
braced  by  European  nations,  but  which  have  just 
recently  been  recognized  by  the  United  States.  It 
asserts:  "That  it  is  the  indispensable  duty  of  every 
nation  to  establish  all  necessary  institutions  for  its 
protection  and  defense;  that  it  is  a  capital  security 
to  a  free  state  for  the  great  body  of  the  people  to 
possess  a  competent  knowledge  of  the  military  art; 
that  every  man  of  the  proper  age  and  ability  of 
body  is  firmly  bound  by  the  social  compact  to 
perform,  personally,  his  proportion  of  military  duty 
for  the  defense  of  the  State;  that  all  men  of  the 
legal  military  age  should  be  armed,  enrolled,  and 
held  responsible  for  different  degrees  of  military 
service."  In  furtherance  of  these  principles  a 
scheme  was  submitted  providing  for  military  service 
by  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  beginning  at 
eighteen  years  of  age  and  terminating  at  sixty. 


ALARUMS  AND  EXCURSIONS  83 

The  response  of  Congress  was  the  Act  of  April 
30,  1790,  authorizing  a  military  establishment 
"to  the  number  of  one  thousand  two  hundred  and 
sixteen  non-commissioned  officers,  privates,  and 
musicians,"  with  permission  to  the  President  to 
call  State  Militia  into  service  if  need  be,  "in  protect 
ing  the  inhabitants  of  the  frontiers."  Washing 
ton,  in  noting  in  his  diary  his  approval  of  the 
act,  observed  that  it  was  not  "adequate  to  the 
exigencies  of  the  government  and  the  protection  it 
is  intended  to  afford. " 

The  Indian  troubles  in  the  Southwest  were  made 
particularly  serious  by  the  ability  of  the  head-chief 
of  the  Creek  nation,  Alexander  McGillivray, 
the  authentic  facts  of  whose  career  might  seem  too 
wildly  improbable  even  for  the  uses  of  melodrama. 
His  grandmother  was  a  full-blooded  Creek  of  high 
standing  in  the  nation.  She  had  a  daughter  by 
Captain  Marchand,  a  French  officer.  This  daugh 
ter,  who  is  described  as  a  bewitching  beauty, 
was  taken  to  wife  by  Lachland  McGillivray,  a 
Scotchman  engaged  in  the  Indian  trade.  A  son 
was  born  who,  at  the  age  of  ten,  was  sent  by  his 
father  to  Charleston  to  be  educated,  where  he 
remained  nearly  seven  years  receiving  instruction 
both  in  English  and  Latin.  This  son,  Alexander, 


84    WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

was  intended  by  his  father  for  civilized  life,  and 
when  he  was  seventeen  he  was  placed  with  a  busi 
ness  house  in  Savannah.  During  the  Revolution 
ary  War  the  father  took  the  Tory  side  and  his 
property  was  confiscated.  The  son  took  refuge 
with  his  Indian  kinsfolk,  and  acquired  in  their 
councils  an  ascendancy  which  also  extended  to  the 
Seniinole  tribe.  His  position  and  influence  made 
his  favor  an  important  object  with  all  powers 
having  American  interests.  During  the  war  the 
British  conferred  upon  him  the  rank  and  pay  of  a 
colonel.  In  1784,  as  the  representative  of  the 
Creek  and  Seminole  nations,  he  formed  a  treaty 
of  alliance  with  Spain,  by  the  terms  of  which  he 
became  a  Spanish  commissary  with  the  rank  and 
pay  of  a  colonel. 

Against  the  State  of  Georgia,  the  Creek  nation 
had  grievances  which  McGillivray  was  able  to 
voice  with  a  vigor  and  an  eloquence  that  compelled 
attention.  It  was  the  old  story,  so  often  repeated 
in  American  history,  of  encroachments  upon 
Indian  territory.  Attempts  at  negotiation  had 
been  made  by  the  old  government,  and  these  were 
now  renewed  by  Washington  with  no  better  result. 
McGillivray  met  the  commissioners,  but  left  on 
finding  that  they  had  no  intention  of  restoring  the 


ALARUMS  AND  EXCURSIONS  85 

Indian  lands  that  had  been  taken.  A  formidable 
Indian  war  seemed  imminent,  but  Washington, 
whose  own  frontier  experience  made  him  well 
versed  in  Indian  affairs,  judged  correctly  that  the 
way  to  handle  the  situation  was  to  induce  McGilli- 
vray  to  come  to  New  York,  though,  as  he  noted  in 
his  diary,  the  matter  must  be  so  managed  that 
the  "government  might  not  appear  to  be  an  agent 
in  it,  or  suffer  in  its  dignity  if  the  attempt  to  get 
him  here  should  not  succeed. "  With  his  habitual 
caution,  Washington  considered  the  point  whether 
he  could  send  out  an  agent  without  consulting  the 
Senate  on  the  appointment,  and  he  instructed 
General  Knox  "to  take  the  opinion  of  the  Chief 
Justice  of  the  United  States  and  the  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury."  The  assurances  obtained  were 
such  that  Washington  selected  an  experienced 
frontier  commander,  Colonel  Marinus  Willett  of 
Xew  York,  and  impressed  upon  him  the  im 
portance  of  bringing  the  Indian  chiefs  to  Xew 
York,  pointing  out  "the  arguments  justifiable  for 
him  to  use  to  effect  this,  with  such  lures  as  re 
spected  McGillivray  personally,  and  might  be  held 
out  to  them. " 

Colonel  Willett  was  altogether  successful,  though 
the  inducements  he  offered  were  probably  aided 


86    WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

by  McGillivray's  desire  to  visit  New  York 
and  meet  General  Washington.  Other  chiefs 
accompanied  him,  and  on  their  way  they  received 
many  official  attentions.  An  incident  which 
occurred  at  Guilford  Court  House,  South  Carolina, 
displays  McGillivray's  character  in  a  kindly  light. 
A  woman  whose  husband  had  been  killed  by  Creek 
Indians  and  who  with  her  children  had  been  made 
captive,  visited  McGillivray  to  thank  him  for  effect 
ing  their  release,  and  it  was  disclosed  that  he  had 
since  that  time  been  contributing  to  the  support  of 
the  family.  At  New  York,  the  recently  organized 
Tammany  Society  turned  out  in  costumes  sup 
posed  to  represent  Indian  attire  and  escorted  the 
visiting  chiefs  to  Federal  Hall.  Eventually  Wash 
ington  himself  went  to  Federal  Hall  in  his  coach 
of  state  and  in  all  the  trappings  of  official  dignity, 
to  sign  the  treaty  concluded  with  the  Indians. 
The  treaty,  which  laid  down  the  pattern  subse 
quently  followed  by  the  government  in  its  dealings 
with  the  Indians,  recognized  the  claims  of  the 
Creek  nation  to  part  of  the  territory  it  claimed, 
and  gave  compensation  for  the  part  it  relinquished 
by  an  annuity  of  fifteen  hundred  dollars  for  the 
tribe,  and  an  annuity  of  one  hundred  dollars  for 
each  of  the  principal  chiefs. 


ALARUMS  AND  EXCURSIONS  87 

For  his  part  in  the  transaction  McGillivray  was 
commissioned  an  agent  of  the  United  States  with 
the  rank  of  brigadier-general,  a  position  which  he 
sustained  with  dignity.  He  was  six  feet  tall,  spare 
in  frame,  erect  in  carriage.  His  eyes  were  large, 
dark,  and  piercing;  his  forehead,  wider  at  the  top 
than  just  above  the  eyes,  was  so  high  and  broad 
as  to  be  almost  bulging.  When  he  was  a  British 
colonel,  he  wore  the  uniform  of  that  rank;  when  in 
the  Spanish  service,  he  wore  the  military  dress  of 
that  country;  and  after  Washington  appointed  him 
a  brigadier-general  he  sometimes  wore  the  uniform 
of  the  American  army,  but  never  in  the  presence  of 
Spaniards.  In  different  parts  of  his  dominions 
he  had  good  houses  where  he  practised  generous 
hospitality.  His  influence  was  shaken  by  his 
various  political  alliances,  and  before  he  died  in 
1793  he  had  lost  much  of  his  authority. 

In  the  course  of  these  negotiations  Washington 
had  an  experience  with  the  Senate  which  there 
after  affected  his  official  behavior.  The  debates 
of  the  constitutional  convention  indicated  an  ex 
pectation  that  the  Senate  would  act  as  a  privy 
council  to  the  President;  and  Washington  — 
intent  above  all  things  on  doing  his  duty  —  tried 
to  treat  it  as  such.  In  company  with  General 


88    WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

Knox  he  went  to  the  Senate  chamber,  prepared 
to  explain  his  negotiations  with  the  Indian 
chiefs,  but  he  forthwith  experienced  the  truth 
of  the  proverb  that  although  you  may  lead  a 
horse  to  water  you  cannot  make  him  drink.  In 
his  diary  for  August  22,  1789,  Maclay  gave  a 
characteristic  account  of  the  scene.  Washington 
presided,  taking  the  Vice-President's  chair.  "He 
rose  and  told  us  bluntly  that  he  had  called  on  us 
for  our  advice  and  consent  to  some  propositions 
respecting  the  treaty  to  be  held  with  the  Southern 
Indians.  Said  he  had  brought  General  Knox 
with  him  who  was  well  acquainted  with  the  busi 
ness."  A  statement  was  read  giving  a  schedule 
of  the  propositions  on  which  the  advice  of  the 
Senate  was  asked.  Maclay  relates  that  he  called 
for  the  reading  of  the  treaties  and  other  documents 
referred  to  in  the  statement.  "I  cast  an  eye 
at  the  President  of  the  United  States.  I  saw  he 
wore  an  aspect  of  stern  displeasure. "  There  was  a 
manifest  reluctance  of  the  Senate  to  proceed  with 
the  matter  in  the  President's  presence,  and  finally 
a  motion  was  made  to  refer  the  business  to  a  com 
mittee  of  five.  A  sharp  debate  followed  in  which 
"the  President  of  the  United  States  started  up  in 
a  violent  fret.  'This  defeats  every  purpose  of  my 


ALARUMS  AND  EXCURSIONS  91 

coming  here'  were  the  first  words  that  he  Sc.f 
He  then  went  on  to  say  that  he  had  brought  his 
Secretary  of  War  with  him  to  give  any  necessary 
information;  that  the  Secretary  knew  all  about  the 
business,  and  yet  he  was  delayed  and  could  not 
go  on  with  the  matter. "  The  situation  evidently 
became  strained.  Maclay  relates:  "A  pause  for 
some  time  ensued.  We  waited  for  him  to  with 
draw.  He  did  so  with  a  discontented  air. " 

The  privy  council  function  of  the  Senate  was 
thus  in  effect  abolished  by  its  own  action.  There 
after  the  President  had  practically  no  choice 
save  to  conclude  matters  subject  to  subsequent 
ratification  by  the  Senate.  It  soon  became  the 
practice  of  the  Senate  to  restrict  the  President's 
power  of  appointment  by  conditioning  it  upon  the 
approval  of  the  Senators  from  the  State  in  which  an 
appointment  was  made.  The  clause  providing  for 
the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate  was  among 
the  changes  made  in  the  original  draft  to  con 
ciliate  the  small  States^  but  it  was  not  supposed 
that  the  practical  effect  would  be  to  allow  Senators 
to  dictate  appointments.  It  was  observed  in  the 
Federalist's^  "there  will  be  no  exertion  of  choice 
on  the  part  of  Senators. "  Nevertheless  there  was 
some  uneasiness  on  the  point.  In  a  letter  of  May 


88    WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

Kn^  1789,  Ames  remarked  that  "the  meddling  of 
the  Senate  in  appointments  is  one  of  the  least 
defensible  parts  of  the  Constitution,"  and  with 
prophetic  insight  he  foretold  that  "the  number 
of  the  Senators,  the  secrecy  of  their  doings,  would 
shelter  them,  and  a  corrupt  connection  between 
those  who  appoint  to  office  and  the  officers  them 
selves  would  be  created. " 

Washington  had  to  submit  to  senatorial  dic 
tation  almost  at  the  outset  of  his  administration, 
the  Senate  refusing  to  confirm  his  nomination  of 
Benjamin  Fishbourn  for  the  place  of  naval  officer 
at  Savannah.  The  only  details  to  be  had  about 
this  affair  are  those  given  in  a  special  message 
of  August  6,  1789,  from  which  it  appears  that 
Washington  was  not  notified  of  the  grounds  of  the 
Senate's  objection.  He  defended  his  selection  on 
the  ground  that  Fishbourn  had  a  meritorious 
record  as  an  army  officer,  had  held  distinguished 
positions  in  the  state  government  of  Georgia 
which  testified  public  confidence,  and  moreover 
was  actually  holding,  by  virtue  of  state  appoint 
ment,  an  office  similar  to  that  to  which  Washington 
desired  to  appoint  him.  The  appointment  was, 
in  fact,  no  more  than  the  transfer  to  the  federal 
service  of  an  official  of  approved  administrative 


ALARUMS  AND  EXCURSIONS  91 

experience,  and  was  of  such  manifest  propriety 
that  it  seems  most  likely  that  the  rejection  was 
due  to  local  political  intrigue  using  the  Georgia 
Senators  as  its  tool.  The  office  went  to  Lachlan 
Mclntosh,  who  was  a  prominent  Georgia  politician. 
Over  ten  years  before  he  had  killed  in  a  duel  Button 
Gwinnett,  a  signer  of  the  Declaration  of  Indepen 
dence.  Gwinnett  was  the  challenger  and  Mc 
lntosh  was  badly  wounded  in  the  duel,  but  the 
affair  caused  a  feud  that  long  disturbed  Georgia 
politics,  and  through  the  agency  of  the  Senate  it 
was  able  to  reach  and  annoy  the  President  of 
the  United  States. 

At  the  time  when  Washington  was  inaugurated 
both  North  Carolina  and  Rhode  Island  were  out 
side  the  Union.  The  national  government  was 
a  new  and  doubtful  enterprise,  remote  from  and 
unfamiliar  to  the  mass  of  the  people.  To  turn 
their  thoughts  toward  the  new  Administration  it 
seemed  to  be  good  policy  for  Washington  to  make 
tours.  The  notes  made  by  Washington  in  his 
diary  indicate  that  the  project  was  his  own  notion, 
but  both  Hamilton  and  Knox  cordially  approved 
it  and  Madison  "saw  no  impropriety"  in  it. 
Therefore,  shortly  after  the  recess  of  the  first 
session  of  Congress,  Washington  started  on  a 


)2    WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

trip  through  the  Northern  States,  pointedly  avoid 
ing  Rhode  Island,  then  a  foreign  country.  It  was 
during  this  tour  that  a  question  of  etiquette 
occurred  about  which  there  was  a  great  stir  at  the 
time.  John  Hancock,  then  Governor  of  Massa 
chusetts,  did  not  call  upon  Washington  but  wrote 
inviting  Washington  to  stay  at  his  house,  and 
when  this  invitation  was  declined,  he  wrote  again 
inviting  the  President  to  dinner  en  famille.  Wash 
ington  again  declined,  and  this  time  the  failure  of 
the  Governor  to  pay  his  respects  to  the  President 
of  the  United  States  was  the  talk  of  the  town. 
Some  of  Hancock's  aides  now  called  with  excuses 
on  the  score  of  his  illness.  Washington  noted 
in  his  diary,  "I  informed  them  in  explicit  terms 
that  I  should  not  see  the  Governor  unless  it  was 
at  my  own  lodgings./'  This  incident  occurred  on 
Saturday  evening,  and  the  effect  was  such  that 
Governor  Hancock  called  in  person  on  Sunday. 
The  affair  was  the  subject  of  much  comment  not 
to  Governor  Hancock's  advantage.  Washington's 
church-going  habits  on  this  trip  afford  no  small 
evidence  of  the  patient  consideration  which  he 
paid  to  every  .point  of  duty.  In  New  York,  he 
attended  Episcopal  church  service  regularly  once 
every  Sunday.  On  his  northern  tour  he  went 


ALARUMS  AND  EXCURSIONS  93 

to  the  Episcopal  church  in  the  ijiorning,  and 
then  showed  his  respect  for  the  dominant  religious 
system  of  New  England  by  attending  the  Congre 
gational  church  in  the  afternoon.  His  northern 
tour  lasted  from  October  15  to  November  13, 1789, 
and  was  attended  by  popular  manifestations  that 
must  have  promoted  the  spread  of  national  senti 
ment.  On  November  21,  1789,  North  Carolina 
came  into  the  Union,  and  Rhode  Island  followed 
on  May  29,  1790.  Washington  started  on  a  tour 
of  the  Southern  States  on  March  21, 1791,  in  which 
he  covered  more  than  seventeen  hundred  miles 
in  sixty-six  days,  and  was  received  with  grand 
demonstrations  at  all  the  towns  he  visited. 

While  he  was  making  these  tours,  which  in  the 
days  before  the  railroad  and  the  telegraph  were 
practically  the  only  efficacious  means  of  establish 
ing  the  new  government  in  the  thoughts  and  feel 
ings  of  the  people,  he  was  much  -concerned  about 
frontier  troubles,  and  with  good  reason,  as  he  well 
knew  the  deficiency  of  the  means  that  Congress  had 
allowed.  The  tiny  army  of  the  United  States 
was  under  the  command  of  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Josiah  Harmar,  with  the  brevet  rank  of  general. 
In  October,  1790,  Harmar  led  his  troops,  nearly 
four-fifths  of  which  were  new  levies  of  militia, 


94    WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

against  the  Indians  who  had  been  disturbing  the 
western  frontier.  The  expedition  was  a  succession 
of  blunders  and  failures  which  were  due  more  to 
the  rude  and  undisciplined  character  of  the 
material  that  Harmar  had  to  work  with  than  to 
his  personal  incapacity.  Harmar  did  succeed 
in  destroying  five  Indian  villages  with  their 
stores  of  corn,  but  their  inhabitants  had  warning 
enough  to  escape  and  were  able  to  take  prompt 
vengeance.  A  detachment  of  troops  was  am 
bushed  and  badly  cut  up.  The  design  had  been 
to  push  on  to  the  upper  course  of  the  Wabash,  but 
so  many  horses  had  been  stolen  by  the  Indians 
that  the  expedition  was  crippled.  As  a  result, 
Harmar  marched  his  troops  back  again,  professing 
to  believe  that  punishment  had  been  inflicted 
upon  the  Indians  that  would  be  a  severe  lesson  to 
them.  What  really  happened  was  that  the  In 
dians  were  encouraged  to  think  that  they  were 
more  than  a  match  for  any  army  which  the 
settlers  could  send  against  them,  and  before 
long  news  came  of  the  destruction  of  settlements 
and  the  massacre  of  their  inhabitants.  "Unless," 
wrote  Rufus  Putnam  to  Washington," Government 
speedily  sends  a  body  of  troops  for  our  protection, 
we  are  a  ruined  people. " 


ALARUMS  AND  EXCURSIONS  95 

Washington  did  what  he  could.  He  sent  to 
Congress  Putnam's  letter  and  other  frontier 
communications,  but  Congress,  which  was  stub 
bornly  opposed  to  creating  a  national  army, 
replied,  when  the  need  was  demonstrated,  that 
the  militia  of  the  several  States  were  available. 
The  Government  was  without  means  of  protecting 
the  Indians  against  abuse  and  injustice  or  of  pro 
tecting  the  settlers  against  the  savage  retaliations 
that  naturally  followed.  The  dilemma  was  stated 
with  sharp  distinctness  in  correspondence  which 
passed  between  Washington  and  Hamilton  in  April, 
1791.  Washington  wrote  that  it  was  a  hopeless 
undertaking  to  keep  peace  on  the  frontier  "whilst 
land- jobbing  and  the  disorderly  conduct  of  our 
borderers  are  suffered  with  impunity;  and  while 
the  States  individually  are  omitting  no  occasion  to 
intermeddle  in  matters  which  belong  to  the  general 
Government."  Hamilton  in  reply  went  to  the 
root  of  the  matter.  "Our  system  is  such  as  still 
to  leave  the  public  peace  of  the  Union  at  the 
mercy  of  each  state  government. "  He  proceeded 
to  give  a  concrete  instance:  "For  example,  a  party 
comes  from  a  county  of  Virginia  into  Pennsylvania, 
and  wantonly  murders  some  friendly  Indians. 
The  national  Government,  instead  of  having 


96    WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

power  to  apprehend  the  murderers  and  bring  them 
to  justice,  is  obliged  to  make  a  representation 
to  that  of  Pennsylvania;  that  of  Pennsylvania, 
again,  is  to  make  a  requisition  of  that  of  Virginia. 
And  whether  the  murderers  shall  be  brought  to 
justice  at  all  must  depend  upon  the  particular 
policy,  and  energy,  and  good  disposition  of  two 
state  governments,  and  the  efficacy  of  the  pro 
visions  of  their  respective  laws.  And  security  of 
other  States  and  the  money  of  all  are  at  the  dis 
cretion  of  one.  These  things  require  a  remedy; 
but  when  that  will  come,  God  knows." 

Toward  the  close  of  its  last  session,  the  First 
Congress  was  induced  to  pass  an  act  "for  raising 
and  adding  another  regiment  to  the  military 
establishment  of  the  United  States  and  for  making 
further  provision  for  the  protection  of  the  fron 
tiers."  The  further  provision  authorized  the 
President  to  employ  "troops  enlisted  under  the 
denomination  of  levies"  for  a  term  not  exceeding 
six  months  and  in  number  not  exceeding  two  thou 
sand.  The  law  thus  made  it  compulsory  that 
the  troops  should  move  while  still  raw  and  un 
trained.  Congress  had  fixed  the  pay  of  the 
privates  at  three  dollars  a  month,  from  which 
ninety  cents  were  deducted,  and  it  had  been 


ALARUMS  AND  EXCURSIONS  97 

necessary  to  scrape  the  streets  and  even  the  prisons 
of  the  seaboard  cities  for  men  willing  to  enlist 
upon  such  terms.  Washington  gave  the  command 
to  General  Arthur  St.  Clair,  whose  military  experi 
ence  should  have  made  him  a  capable  commander, 
but  he  was  then  in  bad  health  and  unable  to  handle 
the  situation  under  the  conditions  imposed  upon 
him.  General  Harmar,  enlightened  by  his  own 
experience,  predicted  that  such  an  army  would 
certainly  be  defeated/ 

The  campaign  was  intended  as  an  expedition 
to  chastise  the  Indians  so  that  they  would  be 
deterred  from  molesting  the  settlers,  but  it  resulted 
in  a  disaster  that  greatly  encouraged  Indian 
depredations.  As  the  army  approached  the  In 
dian  towns,  a  body  of  the  militia  deserted,  and 
it  was  reported  to  St.  Clair  that  they  intended 
to  plunder  the  supplies.  He  sent  one  of  his 
regular  regiments  after  them,  thus  reducing 
his  available  force  to  about  fourteen  hundred 
men.  On  November  3,  1791,  this  force  camped 
on  the  eastern  fork  of  Wabash.  Before  daybreak 
the  next  morning  the  Indians  made  a  sudden  attack, 
taking  the  troops  by  surprise  and  throwing  them 
into  disorder.  It  was  the  story  of  Braddock's 
defeat  over  again.  The  troops  were  surrounded 


98    WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

by  foes  that  they  could  not  see  and  could  not  reach. 
Indian  marksmen  picked  off  the  gunners  until  the 
artillery  was  silenced;  then  the  Indians  rushed  in 
and  seized  the  guns.  In  the  combat  there  were 
both  conspicuous  exploits  of  valor  and  disgraceful 
scenes  of  cowardice.  In  that  dark  hour  St.  Clair 
showed  undaunted  courage.  He  was  in  the  front 
of  the  fight,  and  several  times  he  headed  charges. 
He  seemed  to  have  a  charmed  life,  for  although 
eight  bullets  pierced  his  clothes,  one  cutting  away  a 
lock  of  the  thick  gray  hair  that  flowed  from  under 
his  three-cornered  hat,  he  escaped  without  a 
wound.  Finally  defeat  became  a  rout  which  St. 
Clair  was  powerless  to  check.  Pushed  aside  in 
the  rush  of  fugitives,  he  was  left  in  a  position  of 
great  peril.  If  the  Indian  pursuit  had  been  per 
sistent,  few  might  have  escaped,  but  the  Indians 
stopped  to  plunder  the  camp.  Nevertheless  six 
hundred  and  thirty  men  were  killed  and  over  two 
hundred  and  eighty  wounded,  with  small  loss  to  the 
Indians. 

Washington's  reception  of  the  news  illustrates 
both  his  iron  composure  and  the  gusts  of  passion 
under  which  it  sometimes  gave  way.  The  details 
are  unquestionably  authentic,  as  they  were  com 
municated  by  Washington's  secretary  who  wit- 


ALARUMS  AND  EXCURSIONS  99 

nessed  the  scene.  Washington  was  having  a  dinner 
party  when  an  officer  arrived  at  the  door  and  sent 
word  that  he  was  the  bearer  of  dispatches  from  the 
Western  army.  The  secretary  went  out  to  him, 
but  the  officer  said  his  instructions  were  to  deliver 
the  dispatches  to  the  President  in  person.  Wash 
ington  then  went  to  the  officer  and  received  the 
terrible  news.  He  returned  to  the  table  as  though 
nothing  had  happened,  and  everything  went  on  as 
usual.  After  dinner  there  was  a  reception  in  Mrs. 
Washington's  drawing-room  and  the  President, 
as  was  his  custom,  spoke  courteously  to  every  lady 
in  the  room.  By  ten  o'clock  all  the  visitors  had 
gone  and  Washington  began  to  pace  the  floor  at 
first  without  any  change  of  manner,  but  soon  he 
began  to  show  emotional  excitement  and  he 
broke  out  suddenly:  "It's  all  over!  St.  Clair  is 
defeated  — ;  routed,  —  the  officers  nearly  all  killed 

—  the  men  by  wholesale,  —  the    rout    complete, 

—  too  shocking  to  think  of, —  and  a  surprise  into 
the  bargain!" 

When  near  the  door  in  his  agitated  march  about 
the  room,  he  stopped  and  burst  forth,  "Yes,  here 
on  this  very  spot  I  took  leave  of  him;  I  wished  him 
success  and  honor;  'You  have  your  instructions/  I 
said,  'from  the  Secretary  of  War;  I  had  a  strict 


100  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

eye  to  them,  and  will  add  one  word  —  Beware  of  a 
surprise!  You  know  how  the  Indians  fight  us!' 
He  went  off  with  that  as  my  last  solemn  warning 
thrown  into  his  ears.  And  yet,  to  suffer  that  army 
to  be  cut  to  pieces  —  hacked,  butchered,  toma 
hawked  —  by  a  surprise !  O  God,  O  God,  he's 
worse  than  a  murderer!  How  can  he  answer  it  to 
his  country!  The  blood  of  the  slain  is  upon  him 
—  the  curse  of  the  widows  and  orphans  —  the 
curse  of  Heaven ! " 

The  secretary  relates  that  this  torrent  of  passion 
burst  forth  in  appalling  tones.  The  President's 
frame  shook.  "More  than  once  he  threw  his 
hands  up  as  he  hurled  imprecations  upon  St. 
Clair. "  But  at  length  he  got  his  feelings  under 
control,  and  after  a  pause  he  remarked,  "I  will 
hear  him  without  prejudice.  He  shall  have  full 
justice."  St.  Clair  was,  indeed,  treated  with 
marked  leniency.  A  committee  of  the  House  re 
ported  that  the  failure  of  the  expedition  could  not 
"be  imputed  to  his  conduct,  either  at  any  time  be 
fore  or  during  the  action. "  St.  Clair  was  continued 
in  his  position  as  Governor  of  the  Northwest 
Territory  and  remained  there  until  1802. 

Notwithstanding  the  dire  results  of  relying  on 
casual  levies,  Congress  was  still  stubbornly  opposed 


ALARUMS  AND  EXCURSIONS          101 

to  creating  an  effective  force  under  national 
control,  and  in  this  attitude  to  some  extent 
reflected  even  frontier  sentiment.  Ames  in  a 
letter  of  January  13,  1792,  wrote  that  "even  the 
views  of  the  western  people,  whose  defense  has  been 
undertaken  by  government,  have  been  unfriendly 
to  the  Secretary  of  War  and  to  the  popularity 
of  the  Government.  They  wish  to  be  hired  as 
volunteers,  at  two-thirds  of  a  dollar  a  day  to  fight 
the  Indians.  They  are  averse  to  the  regulars." 
By  the  Act  of  March  5,  1792,  Congress  authorized 
three  additional  regiments,  with  the  proviso,  how 
ever,  that  they  "shall  be  discharged  as  soon  as 
the  United  States  shall  be  at  peace  with  the  Indian 
tribes. "  This  legislation,  nevertheless,  was  a  great 
practical  improvement  on  the  previous  act.  Gen 
eral  Wayne,  who  now  took  command,  was  fortu 
nately  circumstanced  in  that  he  was  under  no 
pressure  to  move  against  the  Indians.  Public 
opinion  favored  a  return  to  negotiation,  so  that 
he  had  time'" to  get  his  troops  under  good  dis 
cipline.  He  did  not  move  the  main  body  of  his 
troops  until  the  summer  of  1794,  and  on  August 
20,  he  inflicted  a  smashing  defeat  on  the  Indians, 
at  a  place  known  as  the  Fallen  Timbers,  followed 
up  the  victory  by  punitive  expeditions  to  the 


102  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

Indian  towns,  and  burned  their  houses  and  crops. 
The  campaign  was  a  complete  success.  The 
Indians  were  so  humbled  by  their  losses  that  they 
sued  for  peace,  and  negotiations  began  which  were 
concluded  in  the  summer  of  1795  by  the  treaty  of 
Greenville,  under  which  the  Northwestern  tribes 
ceded  an  extensive  territory  to  the  United  States. 
It  was  notorious  that  the  trouble  which  the 
American  authorities  had  experienced  with  the 
Indians  had  been  largely  due  to  the  activity  of 
British  agents.  In  his  report  Wayne  noted  that 
the  destruction  effected  by  his  troops  included 
"the  houses,  stores,  and  property  of  Colonel  Mc- 
Kee,  the  British  agent,  and  principal  stimulator  of 
the  war  now  existing  between  the  United  States  and 
the  savages. "  A  sharp  correspondence  took  place 
between  Wayne  and  Major  William  Campbell, 
commanding  a  British  post  on  the  Miami.  Camp 
bell  protested  against  the  approach  of  Wayne's 
army,  "no  war  existing  between  Great  Britain  and 
America."  Wayne  assented  to  this  statement, 
and  then  asked  what  he  meant  "by  taking  post  far 
within  the  well  known  arid  acknowledged  limits  of 
the  United  States."  Campbell  rejoined  that  he 
had  acted  under  orders  and  as  to  his  right,  that  was 
a  matter  which  were  best  left  to  "the  ambassadors 


ALARUMS  AND  EXCURSIONS  103 

of  our  different  nations."  Campbell  refused  to 
obey  Wayne's  demand  to  withdraw,  and  Wayne 
ignored  Campbell's  threat  to  fire  if  he  were  ap 
proached  too  close.  Wayne  reported  that  the  only 
notice  he  took  of  this  threat  was  "by  immediately 
setting  fire  to  and  destroying  everything  within 
view  of  the  fort,  and  even  under  the  muzzles  of  the 
guns."  "Had  Mr.  Campbell  carried  his  threats 
into  execution,"  added  Wayne,  "it  is  more  than 
probable  he  would  have  experienced  a  storm." 
No  collision  actually  took  place  at  that  time  but 
there  was  created  a  situation  which,  unless  it 
were  removed  by  diplomacy,  must  have  eventually 
brought  on  war. 


CHAPTER  V 

TRIBUTE  TO  THE  ALGERINES 

AT  the  time  when  Washington  took  office,  the 
captains  and  crews  of  two  American  vessels,  which 
had  been  seized  by  Algerine  Corsairs  in  1785,  still 
remained  in  captivity.  The  Continental  Congress 
had  made  some  efforts  in  their  behalf  which 
were  contemptuously  received.  The  Dey  of 
Algiers  did  not  wish  any  treaty  with  the  United 
States;  but  he  did  want  $59,496.00  for  the  twenty- 
one  captives  whom  he  then  held^  Farther  than 
that  negotiation  had  not  progressed.  Agents  of 
the  United  States  were  advised  that,  if  such  a  high 
amount  were  paid,  the  Corsairs  would  pursue 
American  vessels  in  preference  to  those  of  any 
other  nation,  and  that  the  shrewd  thing  would  be 
to  pretend  indifference  to  the  fate  of  the  captives. 
This  advice  was  acted  upon  even  to  the  extent  of 
cutting 'off  the  supplies  which  had  been  forwarded 
to  the  captives  through  the  Spanish  consul  at 

104 


TRIBUTE  TO  THE  ALGERINES         105 

Algiers.  The  summary  method  which  was  pur 
sued  was  that  of  dishonoring  bills  drawn  by  him  to 
cover  his  expenditures^ 

Jefferson,  who  while  Minister  to  France  had 
been  closely  connected  with  these  proceedings,  was 
called  upon  by  Congress  for  a  report  upon  them, 
not  long  after  he  took  office  as  Secretary  of  State. 
This  report,  December  28,  1790,  set  forth  the 
fact  that  the  Mediterranean  trade,  which  had 
employed  from  eighty  to  one  hundred  ships  with 
about  twelve  hundred  seamen,  had  been  almost 
destroyed.  In  the  interest  of  the  negotiations,  it 
had  been  necessary  "to  suffer  the  captives  and 
their  friends  to  believe  for  a  while,  that  no  atten 
tion  was  paid  to  them,  no  notice  taken  of  their 
letters, "  .and  they  were  "still  under  this  impres 
sion."  Jefferson  contented  himself  with  sub 
mitting  the  facts  in  the  case,  remarking  that 
"upon  the  whole  it  rests  with  Congress  to  decide 
between  war,  tribute,  and  ransom.  If  war,  they 
will  consider  how  far  our  own  resources  shall  be 
called  forth,  and  how  far  they  will  enable  the 
Executive  to  engage,  in  the  forms  of  the  Con 
stitution,  the  cooperation  of  other  Powers.  If 
tribute  or  ransom,  it  will  rest  with  them  to 
limit  and  provide  the  amount;  and  with  the 


106  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

Executive,  observing  the  same  constitutional 
forms,  to  make  arrangements  for  employing  it  to 
the  best  advantage. " 

The  problem  which  Jefferson  thus  put  before 
Congress  was  a  singularly  difficult  one.  Among 
the  captives  was  Captain  Richard  O'Brien,  whose 
ship,  the  Dauphin  of  Philadelphia,  was  taken 
July  30,  1785.  He  had  a  ready  pen  and,  appar 
ently,  had  unrestricted  access  to  the  mails. 
His  letters  were  those  of  a  shrewd  observer  and 
depicted  a  situation  that  bristled  with  perplexity. 
The  Algerines  had  about  a  dozen  vessels,  their 
armament  ranging  from  ten  to  thirty-six  guns, 
but  of  these  vessels  only  two  belonged  to  the 
Government,  the  others  being  private  ventures. 
Though  they  preyed  on  merchantmen,  they 
avoided  engagements,  and  did  not  come  out  at  all 
if  there  were  vessels  cruising  for  them.  A  block 
ade  was  effective  only  while  it  lasted.  Whenevef 
it  was  raised,  out  came  the  Corsairs  again.  An 
occasional  bombardment  of  their  port  did  not  cow 
them  and  had  no  permanent  effect.  A  French 
official  described  it  as  being  "like  breaking  glass 
windows  with  guineas."  The  Algerines  made 
treaties  with  some  Powers  in  consideration  of 
tribute  but  refused  peace  to  others  on  any  terms, 


TRIBUTE  TO  THE  ALGERINES         107 

as  they  did  not  desire  to  shut  out  all  opportunity 
for  their  time-honored  sport  of  piracy. 

Congress  was  slow  to  take  action  of  any  kind. 
In  January,  1791,  Maclay  noted  that  a  committee 
had  decided  that  the  Mediterranean  trade  could 
not  be  preserved  without  an  armed  force  to 
protect  it,  and  that  a  navy  should  be  established 
as  soon  as  the  Treasury  was  in  a  position  to  bear 
the  expense.  Meanwhile  the  President  began  fresh 
negotiations,  which  were  attended  by  singular 
fatality.  ThomasJBarcJay,  who  had  some  diplo 
matic  experience,  was  commissioned  to  go  to  the 
Emperor  of  Morocco.  When  Barclay^reached 
GibralJtajrJhe^JK^^  and,  after  being  re 

moved  to  Lisbon,  he  died.  Admiral  John  Paul 
Jones  was  then  appointegLspecial  commissioner  to 
arrange^  for  the  ransom  of  the  captives.  As  he 
had  then  left  the  Russian  service  and  was  living 
in  Paris,  it  was  supposed  that  his  services  would 
be  available,  but  he  died  before  the  commission 
could  reach  him.  The  delay  caused  by  these  events 
was  made  so  much  worse  by  the  slow  transmission 
of  intelligence  that  two  years  elapsed  before  a  fresh 
start  was  made  by  placing  the  conduct  of  matters 
in  the  hands  of 


enjyjimsteF-tQ  Portugal.      Humphreys  had  gone 


108  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

as  far  as  Gibraltar  on  his  mission  when  he  learned 
that  a  truce  had  been  suddenly  arranged  between 
Portugal  ano!^  Algiers.  This  was  alarming  news, 
since  it  meant  that  the  Algerines  could  now  pass 
into  the  Atlantic  from  which  they  had  been  ex 
cluded  by  Portuguese  war-vessels  stationed  in  the 
strait  of  Gibraltar.  "I  have  not  slept  since  the 
receipt  of  the  news  of  this  the  hellish  plot, "  wrote 
Edward  Church,  the  United  States  consul  at 
Lisbon.  Church  was  energetic  in  spreading  the 
intelligence,  which  fortunately  reached  some  Amer 
ican  shipmasters  in  time  to  save  them.  In  October, 
1793,  as  thirteen  American  vessels  were  in  the  port 
of  Lisbon  afraid  to  venture  out,  Church  pleaded 
their  case  so  vigorously  that  the  Portuguese  govern 
ment  agreed  to  give  them  an  armed  convoy. 
Nevertheless  the  Algerines  found  plenty  of  game 
among  American  ships  then  at  sea,  for  they  cap 
tured  ten  vessels  and  added  one  hundred  and  five 
more  Americans  to  the  stock  of  slaves  in  Algiers. 
"They  are  in  a  distressed  and  naked  situation," 
wrote  Captain  O'Brien,  who  had  himself  then  been 
eight  years  in  captivity. 

Humphreys  made  arrangements  by  which  they 
received  clothing  and  a  money  allowance  ranging 
from  twelve  cents  a  day  for  a  seaman  up  to  eight 


TRIBUTE  TO  THE  ALGERINES         109 

dollars  a  month  for  a  captain.  Nothing,  however, 
could  be  done  in  the  way  of  peace  negotiations. 
One  of  Humphreys'  agents  reported  that  the  Dey 
could  not  make  peace  even  if  he  really  wanted  to 
do  so.  "He  declared  to  me  that  his  interest  does 
not  permit  him  to  accept  your  offers,  Sir,  even 
were  you  to  lavish  millions  upon  him,  'because,' 
said  he, '  if  I  were  to  make  peace  with  everybody, 
what  should  I  do  with  my  Corsairs?  What  should 
I  do  with  my  soldiers?  They  would  take  off  my 
head,  for  want  of  other  prizes. ' ' 

This  was  an  honest  disclosure  of  the  situation. 
Humphreys  wrote  Jefferson  that  "no  choice  is  left 
for  the  United  States  but  to  prepare  a  naval 
force  for  the  protection  of  their  trade."  Captain 
O'Brien  wrote,  "By  all  means  urge  Congress  to 
fit  out  some  remarkably  fast  sailing  cruisers,  well 
appointed  and  manned."  In  January,  1794, 
accordingly,  a  committee  of  the  House  brought  in  a 
resolution  for  building  four  ships  of  44  guns  and 
two  of  20  guns  each.  The  debate  began  on  Febru 
ary  6,  and  for  some  time  was  altogether  one-sided, 
with  one  speaker  after  another  opposing  the 
creation  of  a  navy.  Madison,  as  was  now  his  habit, 
had  doubts  as  to  the  propriety  of  the  measure.  He 
fancied  that  peace  "might  be  purchased  for  less 


110  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

money  than  this  armament  would  cost."  Clark 
of  New  Jersey  had  "an  objection  to  the  establish 
ment  of  a  fleet,  because,  when  once  it  had  been 
commenced,  there  would  be  no  end  to  it. "  He  had 
"a  scheme  which  he  judged  would  be  less  expen 
sive  and  more  effectual.  This  was  to  hire  the 
Portuguese  to  cruise  against  the  Algerines." 
Baldwin  of  Georgia  thought  that  "bribery  alone 
could  purchase  security  from  the  Algerines." 
Nicholas  of  Virginia  "feared  that  we  were  not  a 
match  for  the  Algerines. " 

Smith  of  Maryland  and  Fitzsimmons  of  Penn 
sylvania  championed  the  resolution,  and  Fisher 
Ames  made  some  remarks  on  Madison's  lack  of 
spirit  that  caused  Madison  to  define  his  position. 
He  proposed  as  a  substitute  for  the  pending  meas 
ure  that  money  should  "be  employed  in  such  a 
manner  as  should  be  found  most  effectual  for 
obtaining  a  peace  with  the  Regency  of  Algiers; 
and  failing  of  this,  that  the  sum  should  be  applied 
to  the  end  of  obtaining  protection  from  some  of  the 
European  Powers. "  This  motion  warmed  up  the 
debate.  Giles  of  Virginia  came  to  Madison's 
support  in  a  style  that  was  not  helpful.  He 
"considered  navies  altogether  as  very  foolish 
things.  An  immense  quantity  of  property  was 


TRIBUTE  TO  THE  ALGERINES         111 

spread  on  the  water  for  no  purpose  whatever,  which 
might  have  been  employed  by  land  to  the  best 
purpose. "  The  suggestion  that  the  United  States 
should  be  a  hermit  nation  was  an  indiscreet 
exposure  of  the  logical  significance  of  Madison's 
plan,  and  it  perhaps  turned  the  scale  in  favor  of 
employing  force. 

The  bill  came  up  in  the  House  for  final  passage 
on  March  10, 1794.  Its  opponents  now  sparred  for 
time,  but  a  motion  to  recommit  in  order  to  give 
opportunity  for  further  consideration  was  defeated 
by  48  to  41.  Giles  made  a  final  effort,  by  a  long 
and  elaborate  address,  in  which  he  argued  that  the 
effect  of  fitting  out  a  navy  would  be  to  involve 
the  United  States  in  war  with  all  the  European 
Powers.  Moreover,  a  navy  would  be  dangerous 
to  American  liberty.  "A  navy  is  the  most  expen 
sive  of  all  means  of  defense,  and  the  tyranny  of 
governments  consists  in  the  expensiveness  of  their 
machinery. "  He  pointed  to  the  results  of  British 
naval  policy.  "The  government  is  not  yet  de 
stroyed,  but  the  people  are  oppressed,  liberty  is 
banished."  The  French  monarchy  had  been 
ruined  by  its  navy.  He  was  "astonished,  with 
these  fatal  examples  before  our  eyes,  that  there 
should  be  gentlemen  who  would  wish  to  enter  upon 


112  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

this  fashionable  system  of  politics. "  In  discussing 
the  expense  of  maintaining  a  navy,  he  expressed 
his  fear  that  it  would  eventually  bring  back  the 
miseries  of  feudalism. 

William  Smith  of  South  Carolina  made  a  reply 
in  which  he  defined  the  issue  as  being  between 
defense  and  tribute;  but  Giles  had  the  last  word. 
He  wanted  to  know  whether  it  was  maintained 
that  the  frigates  it  was  proposed  to  build  would 
"boldly  march  upon  land  and  break  the  chains  of 
the  prisoners?"  He  begged  Congress  not  to  do 
what  "would  irritate  the  barbarians  and  furnish 
additional  misery  to  the  unfortunate  prisoners." 
In  this  closing  struggle  over  the  bill  Giles  fought 
single-handed.  When  he  had  quite  finished,  the 
bill  was  passed  by  50  yeas  to  39  nays,  a  result 
which  showed  a  decided  gain  in  strength  from  the 
discussion. 

The  debates  in  the  Senate  have  not  been  pre 
served,  but  the  Senate  was  so  evenly  divided  that  it 
took  the  casting  vote  of  the  Vice-President  to 
pass  the  bill,  which  became  law  March  27, 1794. 
In  order  to  get  it  passed  at  all,  a  proviso  had  been 
tacked  on  that,  if  peace  terms  could  be  arranged, 
"no  farther  proceeding  be  had  under  this  Act." 
In  September,  1795,  a  treaty  of  peace  with  Algiers 


TRIBUTE  TO  THE  ALGERINES         113 

was  finally  concluded,  after  negotiations  had  been 
facilitated  by  a  contingent  fee  of  $18,000  paid  to 
"Bacri  the  Jew,  who  has  as  much  art  in  this  sort 
of  management  as  any  man  we  ever  knew,"  the 
American  agents  reported.  It  was  a  keen  bargain, 
as  Bacri  had  to  propitiate  court  officials  at  his  own 
risk,  and  had  to  look  for  both  reimbursement  and 
personal  profit,  too,  out  of  the  lump  sum  he  was  to 
receive  in  event  of  his  success.  It  can  hardly  be 
doubted  that  he  had  the  situation  securely  in  hand 
before  making  the  bargain.  The  money  paid  in 
Algiers  for  the  ransom  of  the  captives,  for  trib 
ute  and  for  presents  to  officials  amounted  to 
$£42,500.00.  But  in  addition  the  United  States 
agreed  to  build  a  frigate  for  the  Algerine  navy  and 
also  supply  naval  stores,  which  with  incidental  ex 
penses  brought  the  total  cost  of  the  peace  treaty 
up  to  $99gJ£3.25.  Moreover,  the  United  States 
agreed  to  pay  an  annual  tribute  of  12,000  sequins, 
— about  $27,500, 

By  the  terms  of  the  navy  act,  the  United  States 
had  to  stop  building  vessels  for  its  own  protection. 
Of  those  which  had  been  authorized,  the  frigates 
Constitution,  United  States,  and  Constellation  were 
under  way  and  were  eventually  completed.  The 
timber,  with  material  that  had  been  collected  for 


114  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

the  other  vessels,  was  sold,  except  what  was  needed 
for  the  frigate  which  was  to  be  presented  to  the 
Algerines,  and  which  was  to  be  built  at  Portsmouth, 
N.  H.  The  whole  affair  was  a  melancholy  business 
that  must  have  occasioned  Washington  deep 
chagrin.  In  his  address  to  Congress,  December 
7,  1796,  announcing  the  success  of  the  negotiations 
for  effecting  the  release  of  the  captives,  he  observed 
that  "to  secure  respect  to  a  neutral  flag  requires 
a  naval  force,  organized  and  ready  to  vindicate 
it  from  insult  or  aggression. " 


17 


CHAPTER  VI 

FRENCH  DESIGNS  ON  AMERICA 

A  FEW  months  before  France  declared  war  upon 
England,  February  1,  1793,  Edmond  Genet 
was  appointed  French  Minister  to  the  United 
States.  He  landed  at  Charleston,  April  8,  and 
at  once  began  activities  so  authoritative  as  to 
amount  to  an  erection  of  French  sovereignty 
in  the  United  States.  The  subsequent  failure  of 
his  efforts  and  the  abrupt  ending  of  his  diplomatic 
career  have  so  reacted  upon  his  reputation  that 
associations  of  boastful  arrogance  and  reckless 
incompetency  cling  to  his  name.  This  estimate 
holds  him  too  lightly  and  underrates  the  peril  to 
which  the  United  States  was  then  exposed %  Genet 
was  no  casual  rhetorician  raised  to  important 
office  by  caprice  of  events,  but  a  trained  diplomat 
ist  of  hereditary  aptitude  and  of  long  experience. 
His  father  was  chief  of  the  bureau  of  correspond 
ence  in  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs  for 

115 


118  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

flie  French  monarchy,  and  it  was  as  an  interpreter 
attached  to  that  bureau  that  the  son  began  his 
career  in  1775.  While  still  a  youth,  he  gained 
literary  distinction  by  his  translations  of  historical 
works  from  Swedish  into  French.  Genet  was 
successively  attached  to  the  French  Embassies  at 
Berlin  and  Vienna,  and  in  1781  he  succeeded  his 
father  in  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs.  In 
1788,  he  was  Secretary  of  the  French  Embassy  at 
St.  Petersburg,  where  his  zeal  for  French  Revolu 
tionary  principles  so  irritated  the  Empress  Cather 
ine  that  she  characterized  him  as  "a  furious 
demagogue,"  and  in  1792  he  was  forced  to  leave 
Russia.  In  the  same  year  he  was  named  Ambassa 
dor  to  Holland,  and  thence  was  soon  transferred  to 
the  United  States. 

It  is  obvious  that  a  man  of  such  experience 
could  not  be  ignorant  of  diplomatic  forms  and  of 
international  proprieties  of  behavior.  If  he  pur 
sued  a  course  that  has  since  seemed  to  be  a  marvel 
of  truculence,  the  explanation  should  be  sought  in 
the  circumstances  of  his  mission  more  than  in  the 
nature  of  his  personality.  When  the  matter  is 
considered  from  this  standpoint,  not  only  does  one 
find  that  Genet's  proceedings  become  consistent 
and  intelligible,  but  one  becomes  deeply  impressed 


FRENCH  DESIGNS  ON  AMERICA       117  f 

with  the  magnitude  of  the  peril  then  confronting  fc 
the  United  States.     Nothing  less  than  American, 
independence  was  at  stake.  J 

It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  France,  in  aiding 
America  against  England,  had  been  pursuing  her 
own  ends.  In  August,  1787,  the  French  govern 
ment  advised  its  American  representative  that  it 
had  observed  with  indifference  the  movements 
going  on  in  the  United  States  and  would  view  the 
break-up  of  the  Confederation  without  regret. 
"We  have  never  pretended  to  make  of  America 
useful  ally;  we  have  had  no  other  object  than  to 
deprive  Great  Britain  of  that  vast  continent.."  But, 
now  that  war  with  England  had  broken  out  again, 
it  was  worth  while  making  an  effort  to  convert 
America  into  a  useful  ally.  Jefferson,  while 
Minister  to  Paris.,  had  been  sympathetic  with  the 
Revolutionary  movement..  In  1789,  the  Engli 
Ambassador  reported  to  his  government  tha 
Jefferson  was  much  consulted  by  the  leaders  of  the 
Third  Estate.  On  the  other  hand,  Gouverneur 
Morris,  who  was  then  living  in  Paris,  sympathized 
frankly  with  the  King.  Nevertheless  he  was 
chosen  to  succeed  Jefferson  as  the  American 
Minister.  In  notifying  him  of  the  appointment, 
Washington  let  him  know  that  there  had  been 


118  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

objections.  "It  was  urged  that  in  France  you 
were  considered  as  a  favorer  of  the  aristocracy, 
and  unfriendly  to  its  Revolution. "  Washington's 
reminder  that  it  was  his  business  to  promote  the 
interest  of  his  own  country  did  not  have  any 
apparent  effect  on  Morris's  behavior.  He  became 
the  personal  agent  of  Louis  XVI,  and  he  not  only 
received  and  disbursed  large  sums  on  the  King's 
account,  but  he  also  entered  into  plans  for  the 
King's  flight  from  Paris.  During  the  Reign  of 
Terror  which  began  in  1792,  he  behaved  with  an 
energy  and  an  intrepidity  honorable  to  him  as  a 
man;  in  general,  however,  his  course  tended  to 
embroil  and  not  to  guard  American  interests. 

In  the  face  of  the  European  coalition  against 
revolutionary  France,  the  principle  of  action  was 
that  announced  by  Dan  ton,  —  "to  dare,  and  to 
dare,  and  without  end  to  dare. "  Genet  therefore 
went  on  his  mission  to  America  keyed  to  measures 
which  were  audacious  but  which  can  hardly  be 
described  as  reckless.  By  plunging  heavily  he 
might  make  a  big  winning;  if  he  failed,  he  was 
hardly  worse  off  than  if  he  had  not  made  the 
attempt.  To  draw  the  United  States  into  the  war 
as  the  ally  of  France  was  only  one  part  of  his 
mission.  He  was  also  planning  to  reestablish  the 


FRENCH  DESIGNS  ON  AMERICA       119 

French  colonial  empire,  the  loss  of  which  was  still 
an  unhealed  wound.  Canada,  Louisiana,  and  the 
Floridas  were  all  in  his  mind.  In  Louisiana, 
France  regarded  conditions  as  being  so  favorable 
that  Genet  was  instructed  to  make  special  efforts  in 
that  quarter.  Spain,  which  had  entered  the  coali 
tion  against  republican  France,  held  the  lower 
Mississippi.  Spain  was  therefore  the  common 
enemy  of  France  and  of  the  American  settlements 
west  of  the  mountains.  Ought  not  then  those 
two  republican  interests  to  work  together  to  expel 
Spain  and  to  seize  Louisiana?  Moreover,  there 
was  a  belief,  not  without  grounds,  that  the  older 
States  which  formed  the  American  union  were 
indifferent  to  the  needs  and  interests  of  the  country 
west  of  the  Alleghenies  and  would  be  more  relieved 
than  afflicted  if  it  should  take  its  destinies  into  its 
own  hands.  Such  considerations  animated  a  group 
of  Americans  in  Paris,  among  whose  prominent 
members  were  Thomas  Paine,  the  pamphleteer, 
Joel  Barlow,  the  poet,  and  Dr.  James  O'Fallon,  a 
Revolutionary  soldier  now  interested  in  Western 
land  speculation.  All  were  then  ardent  sym 
pathizers  with  the  French  Revolution,  and  they 
entered  heartily  into  the  design  of  stirring  up  the 
Western  country  against  Spain.  The  project 


120  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

attracted  some  frontier  leaders,  among  them 
George  Rogers  Clark,  famous  for  his  successful 
campaigns  against  the  hostile  Indians  and  the 
British  during  the  Revolutionary  War.  He  was 
to  lead  a  force  of  Western  riflemen  against  the 
Spanish  posts  in  Louisiana,  and  Genet  brought  with 
him  blank  brevets  of  officers  up  to  the  grade  of 
captain  for  bestowal  on  the  Indian  chiefs  who 
would  cooperate.  The  expenses  of  the  expedition 
were  to  be  met  by  collections  which  Genet  expected 
to  make  from  the  treasury  of  the  United  States  on 
account  of  sums  due  to  France. 

The  project  of  using  the  United  States  as  a 
French  base  could  claim  legal  rights  under  the 
treaties  of  1778  between  France  and  the  United 
States.  There  were  two  treaties,  both  concluded 
on  the  same  day.  One,  entitled  a  treaty  of  amity 
and  commerce,  was  a  mutual  conveyance  of  privi 
leges;  it  provided  that  the  ships  of  war  of  each 
country  should  defend  the  vessels  of  the  other 
country  against  all  attacks  that  might  occur  while 
they  were  in  company.  Besides  this  right  of  con 
voy,  each  country  had  the  right  to  use  the  ports  of 
the  other,  either  for  ships  of  war  or  for  privateers 
and  their  prizes,  "nor  shall  such  prizes  be  arrested 
or  seized  when  they  come  to  and  enter  the  ports  of 


FRENCH  DESIGNS  ON  AMERICA       121 

either  party;  nor  shall  the  searchers  or  other 
officers  of  those  places  search  the  same,  or  make  any 
examination  concerning  the  lawfulness  of  such 
prizes,  but  they  may  hoist  sail  at  any  time,  and 
depart."  All  vessels  of  either  country  had  the 
right  to  take  refuge  in  the  ports  of  the  other, 
whether  from  stress  of  weather  or  pursuit  of 
enemies,  "and  they  shall  be  permitted  to  refresh 
and  provide  themselves  at  reasonable  rates,  with 
victuals  and  all  things  needful  for  the  sustenance 
of  their  persons  or  reparation  of  their  ships,  and 
conveniency  of  their  voyage;  and  they  shall  no 
ways  be  detained  or  hindered  from  returning  out  of 
the  said  ports  or  roads,  but  may  remove  and  depart 
when  and  whither  they  please,  without  any  let  or 
hindrance."  It  was  expressly  provided  that  such 
hospitality  should  not  be  extended  to  vessels  of 
an  enemy  of  either  country.  The  accompanying 
instrument,  entitled  a  treaty  of  alliance,  was  a 
mutual  guarantee  of  territorial  possessions,  "for 
ever  against  all  other  powers."  These  broad 
rights  and  privileges  were  supplemented  by  the 
convention  of  1788  on  consular  functions,  which 
facilitated  the  organization  of  a  consular  juris 
diction  competent  to  deal  with  cases  arising  from 
the  treaties.  There  was  still  due  to  France  on 


WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

loans  contracted  during  the  Revolution  a  remain 
der  of  about  $2,300,000  payable  by  instalments, 
subject  to  the  proviso  that  "Congress  and  the 
United  States"  had  "the  liberty  of  freeing  them 
selves  by  anticipated  payments  should  the  state  of 
their  finances  admit."  It  was  planned  to  get  the 
United  States  to  reciprocate  the  past  favors  of 
France  by  favoring  her  now,  if  not  by  direct  pay 
ments  of  money,  at  least  by  acceptances  which 
Genet  could  use  in  purchasing  supplies.  The 
fact  that  whatever  in  the  way  of  money  or  accom 
modations  was  obtained  in  the  United  States 
would  be  used  in  business  in  that  country  was 
counted  upon  to  facilitate  the  transaction. 

These  facts  forni  the  background  against  which 
Genet's  activities  should  be  viewed.  He  came 
with  deliberate  intent  to  rush  the  situation,  and 
armed  with  all  needful  powers, for  that  purpose, 
so  far  as  the  French  government  could  confer  them. 
According  to  a  dispatch  from  Morris  to  the  State 
Department,  Genet  "took  with  him  three  hundred 
blank  commissions  which  he  is  to  distribute  to 
such  as  will  fit  out  cruisers  in  our  ports  to  prey  on 
the  British  commerce.." 

At  Charleston,  Genet  received  an  enthusiastic 
reception.  The  Revolutionary  commander,  Gen- 


FRENCH  DESIGNS  ON  AMERICA       123 

eral  Moultrie,  who  was  then  governor  of  South 
Carolina,  entered  so  cordially  into  Genet's  plans 
that  in  his  first  dispatch  home,  Genet  was  able  to 
say  to  his  government  that  Moultrie  had  permitted 
him  to  arm  privateers  and  had  assisted  the  various 
branches  of  his  mission  in  every  possible  way. 
Such  was  Genet's  energy  that  within  five  days 
after  his  arrival  he  had  opened  a  recruiting  station 
at  which  American  seamen  were  taken  into  the 
French  service;  he  had  commissioned  American 
vessels  as  French  privateers;  and  he  had  turned  the 
French  consul's  office  into  an  admiralty  court  for 
which  business  was  provided  by  the  prizes  that 
were  being  brought  in. 

After  seeing  under  way  all  matters  that  he  could 
attend  to  in  Charleston,  Genet  moved  on  to 
Philadelphia,  and  received  on  his  way  thither 
such  greetings  as  to  give  to  his  journey  the 
character  of  a  triumphal  progress.  Meanwhile, 
L' Ambuscade,  the  French  frigate  which  had.brought 
Genet  to  Charleston,  was  proceeding  to  Phila 
delphia,  taking  prizes  on  her  way  and  sending  them 
to  American  ports.  In  Delaware  Ba^  she  captured 
the  Grange,  an  English  merchantman  lying  there  at 
anchor,  and  took  this  vessel  with  her  to  Philadel 
phia  as  a  prize*  As  Genet  neared  Philadelphia  on 


124  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

May  16,  L' Ambuscade  gave  notice  by  firing  three 
guns,  at  which  signal  a  procession  was  formed  to 
meet  Genet  at  Gray's  Ferry  and  escort  him  to  his 
lodgings.  He  found  awaiting  him  a  letter  from 
George  Rogers  Clark,  which  gave  an  account  of  his 
plans  for  the  invasion  of  Louisiana  and  the  capture 
of  New  Orleans,  and  which  announced  his  readiness 
to  start  if  he  were  assisted  by  some  frigates  and 
provided  with  three  thousand  pounds  sterling  to 
meet  expenses.  Genet  received  reports  from  other 
agents  or  friendly  correspondents  in  the  Spanish 
territory,  and  so  active  was  he  in  forwarding  the 
objects  of  his  mission  that  on  June  19  he  was  able 
to  write  to  his  government,  "I  am  provisioning 
the  West  Indies,  I  excite  the  Canadians  to  break 
the  British  yoke,  I  arm  the  Kentukois  and  pre 
pare  a  naval  expedition  which  will  facilitate  their 
descent  on  New  Orleans. " 

These  claims  were  well  founded.  Genet  did, 
in  fact,  make  an  effective  start,  and  had  he  been 
able  to  command  funds  he  might  have  opened 
a  great  chapter  of  history.  George  Rogers  Clark 
was  the  ablest  and  most  successful  commander  that 
the  frontier  had  yet  produced,  and  such  was  the 
weakness  of  the  Spanish  defenses  that  had  his 
expedition  been  actually  launched  as  planned,  the 


FRENCH  DESIGNS  ON  AMERICA       125 

conquest  of  Louisiana  might  indeed  have  been 
accomplished.  It  was  not  any  defect  in  Genet's 
arrangements  that  frustrated  his  plans,  but  his 
inability  to  raise  money  and  the  uncertainty  of  his 
position  as  the  agent  of  a  government  which  was 
undergoing  rapid  revolutionary  change/ 

News, that  the  French  Republic  had  declared  war 
against  Great  Britain  reached  the  United  States 
early  in  April,  1793.  Washington,  who  was  then 
at  Mount  Vernon,  wrote  to  Jefferson  that  "it 
behooves  the  Government  of  this  country  to  use 
every  means  in  its  power  to  prevent  the 
citizens  thereof  from  embroiling  us  with  either 
of  those  Powers,  by  endeavoring  to  maintain 
a  strict  neutrality,"  and  he  requested  that  the 
Secretary  should  "give  the  subject  mature 
consideration,  that  such  measures  as  shall  be 
deemed  most  likely  to  effect  this  desirable  purpose 
may  be  adopted  without  delay."  On  arriving 
at  Philadelphia  a  few  days  later,  Washington 
was  met  by  a  distracted  Cabinet.  The  great 
difficulty  was  the  conflict  of  obligations.  The 
United  States  had  a  treaty  of  alliance  with  France; 
it  had  a  treaty  of  peace  with  Great  Britain.  The 
situation  had  become,  such  that  it  could  not  sus 
tain  both  relations  at  the  same  time.  If  the 


126  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

United  States  remained  neutral,  it  would  have  to 
deny  to  France  privileges  conferred  by  the  treaty 
which  had  been  negotiated  when  both  countries 
were  at  war  with  Great  Britain.  How  far  was  that 
treaty  now  binding?  It  had  been  made  with 
"the  Most  Christian  king,"  whose  head  had  been 
cut  off.  Did  not  his  engagements  fall  with  his 
head?  That  was  the  very  position  taken  by  the 
government  of  the  French  Republic,  which  had 
asserted  the  right  to  decide  what  treaties  of  the  old 
monarchy  should  be  retained  and  what  rejected. 
As  an  incident  of  the  present  case,  the  question 
was  to  be  decided  whether  the  ambassador  of  the 
French  Republic  should  be  received. 

Such  were  the  issues  that  Washington's  Adminis 
tration  had  to  face,  at  a  time  when  the  whole 
country  was  thrilling  with  enthusiasm  in  behalf  of 
the  French  Republic.  Chief  Justice  Marshall  left 
on  record  his  opinion  that  this  feeling  "was 
almost  universal, "  and  that  "  a  great  majority 
of  the  American  people  deemed  it  criminal  to 
remain  unconcerned  spectators  of  a  conflict  be 
tween  their  ancient  enemy  and  republican  France." 

Washington  acted  with  his  customary  deliber 
ation.  On  April  18,  1793,  he  submitted  to  the 
members  of  his  Cabinet  thirteen  questions.  Jeffer- 


FRENCH  DESIGNS  ON  AMERICA       127 

son,  who  held  that  the  French  treaty  was  still 
operative,  noted  that  the  questions  reached  him 
in  Washington's  own  handwriting,  "yet  it  was 
palpable  from  the  style,  their  ingenious  tissue 
and  suite,  that  they  were  not  the  President's, 
that  they  were  raised  upon  a  prepared  chain  of 
argument,  in  short,  that  the  language  was  Hamil 
ton's  and  the  doubts  his  alone."  In  Jefferson's 
opinion  they  were  designed  to  lead  "to  a  declar 
ation  of  the  ^Executive  that  our  treaty  with  France 
is  void."  Jefferson  was  right  as  to  Hamilton's 
authorship.  At  a  time  when  Jefferson  had  no  ad 
vice  to  give  save  that  it  would  be  well  to  consider 
whether  Congress  ought  not  to  be  summoned, 
Hamilton  had  ready  a  set  of  interrogatories  which 
subjected  the  whole  situation  to  close  analysis. 
The  critical  questions  were  these: 

"  Shall  a^  proclamation  issue  for  the  purpose  of 
preventing  interferences  of  the  citizens  of  the 
United  States  in  the  war  between  France  and  Great 
Britain,  &c.  ?  Shall  it  contain  a  declaration  of 
neutrality  or  not?  What  shall  it  contain E 

"  Are  the  United  States  obliged,  by  good  faith, 
to  consider  the  treaties  heretofore  made  with 

'     4 

France  as  applying  to  the  present  situation  of  the 
parties?  May  they  either  renounce  them,  or  hold 


128  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

them  suspended  till  the  government  of  France 
shall  be  established?" 

To  the  interrogatories  framed  by  Hamilton, 
Washington  added  one  which  presented  the  point 
raised  by  Jefferson  — "  Is  it  necessary  or  advisable 
to  call  together  the  two  Houses  of  Congress,  with 
a  view  to  the  present  posture  of  European  affairs? 
If  it  is,  what  shall  be  the  particular  object  of  such  a 
call?  " 

The  Cabinet  met  on  April  19.  On  the  question 
of  a  proclamation  of  neutrality  Jefferson  argued 
that  such  a  proclamation  would  be  equivalent  to  a 
declaration  that  the  United  States  would  not  take 
part  in  the  war,  and  that  this  matter  did  not  lie 
within  the  power  of  the  Executive,  since  it  was  the 
province  of  Congress  to  declare  war.  Congress 
ought  therefore  to  be  called  to  consider  the  ques 
tion.  Hamilton,  who  held  that  it  was  both  the 
right  and  the  duty  of  the  President  to  proclaim 
neutrality,  was  strongly  opposed  to  summoning 
Congress.  In  a  br\ef  record  of  the  proceedings  he 
remarked  that  "whether  this  advice  proceeded  from 
a  secret  wish  to  involve  us  in  a  war,  or  from  a 
constitutional  timidity,  certain  it  is  such  a  step 
would  have  been  fatal  to  the  peace  and  tranquillity 
of  America. "  The  matter  was  finally  compro- 


FRENCH  DESIGNS  ON  AMERICA       129 

raised  by  an  unanimous  agreement  that  a  pro 
clamation  should  be  issued  "forbidding  our  citizens 
taking  any  part  in  any  hostilities  on  the  seas  with 
or  against  any  of  the  belligerent  powers;  and  warn 
ing  them  against  carrying  to  any  such  powers  any 
of  those  articles  deemed  contraband,  according  to 
the  modern  usage  of  nations;  and  enjoining  them 
from  all  acts  and  proceedings  inconsistent  with  the 
duties  of  a  friendly  nation  toward  those  at  war." 
Jefferson's  scruples  having  been  appeased  by  avoid 
ing  the  use  of  the  term  "neutrality,"  it  was  now 
unanimously  decided  that  Congress  should  not  be 
called.  It  was  further  decided  that  the  French 
Minister  should  be  received.  Jefferson  and  Ran 
dolph,  however,  were  of  opinion  that  he  should 
be  received  without  conditions,  while  Hamilton, 
supported  by  Knox,  held  that  the  Minister  ought 
to  be  apprised  of  the  intention  to  reserve  the 
question  whether  the  treaties  were  still  operative-, 
"lest  silence  on  that  point  should  occasion  mis 
construction.  "  The  even  division  of  the  Cabinet 
on  this  point  was  in  practical  effect  a  victory  for 
Jefferson.  The  Cabinet  was  unable  to  reach  any 
decision  in  the  matter  of  treaty  obligations. 
Jefferson  held  that  they  were  still  operative; 
Hamilton,  that  they  were  "temporarily  and 


130  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

provisionally  suspended."  Knox  sided  with 
Hamilton,  and  Randolph,  although  he  at  first 
sided  with  Jefferson,  was  so  shaken  in  his  opinion 
by  Hamilton's  argument  that  he  asked  further 
time  for  consideration.  Eventually  written  opin 
ions  were  submitted  by  Hamilton,  Jefferson,  and 
Randolph,  confirming  the  views  they  had  previ 
ously  expressed,  and,  as  Knox  concurred  with 
Hamilton,  the  Cabinet  was  still  evenly  divided 
on  that  fundamental  question. 

The  proclamation,  on  the  lines  upon  which  all 
had  agreed,  was  draughted  by  Randolph  who 
showed  it  to  Jefferson  in  order  to  .assure  him  that 
"there  was  no  such  word  as  neutrality  in  it." 
Jefferson,  whose  own  account  this  is,  did  not  men 
tion  that  he  raised  any  objection  to  the  wording  of 
the  proclamation  at  the  time,  though  a  few  months 
later  he  referred  to  it  in  his  private  correspondence 
as  a  piece  of  "pusillanimity,"  because  it  omitted 
any  expression  of  the  affection  of  America  for 
France.  The  proclamation  was  issued  on  April 
22,  two  weeks  after  the  arrival  of  Genet  at  Charles 
ton.  The  procedure  that  had  been  adopted  at 
Jefferson's  instance  avoided  none  of  the  difficulties 
that  a  declaration  of  neutrality  would  have  encoun 
tered  but  rather  increased  them  by  putting  the 


FRENCH  DESIGNS  ON  AMERICA       131 

Government  in  a  false  position.  The  mere  omis 
sion  of  the  term  did  not  prevent  it  from  being 
known  as  a  neutrality  proclamation.  It  was  at 
once  so  designated  and  has  always  been  so  con 
sidered.  Jefferson  himself,  in  advising  the  Ameri 
can  foreign  representatives  of  the  policy  of  the 
Government,  said  that  it  would  be  "a  fair  neutral 
ity";  and,  in  writing  to  Madison  a  few  days  after 
the  proclamation  had  been  issued,  he  remarked, 
"I  fear  a  fair  neutrajity  will  prove  a  disagreeable 
v  pill  to  pur  friends,  though  necessary  to  keep  us  out 
of  the  calamities  of  war. " 

By  its  terms,  however,  the  proclamation  was 
simply  an  admonition  to  American  citizens  to  keep 
out  of  the  war,  with  notice  that,  if  they  got  into 
trouble  by  engaging  in  contraband  trade,  they 
would  not  receive  the  protection  of  the  United 
States,  and  would  be  liable  to  prosecution  for  the 
commission  of  acts  of  a  nature  to  "violate  the  law 
of  nations."  It  is  manifest  that  the  question 
whether  or  not  the  French,  treaty  was  still  in  oper 
ation  was  of  great  practical  importance.  If  it  was 
still  in  force,  the  treaty  formed  part  of  the  law  of 
the  land,  and  American  citizens  might  plead 
immunity  for  acts  done  in  pursuance  of  its  pro 
visions.  Hamilton  was  for  suspending  the  treaty 


132  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

since  a  situation  had  arisen  which  made  its  pro 
visions  inconsistent  with  a  policy  of  neutrality. 
His  main  contention  was  that  the  obligations 
imposed  by  the  treaty  of  '78  were  no  longer  binding 
on  the  United  States,  since  they  contemplated 
only  defensive  war.  By  her  declaration  of  war 
France  had  taken  the  offensive,  thereby  relieving 
the  United  States  of  her  reciprocal  obligations. 
Jefferson  held  that  the  treaty  was  still  operative, 
for  even  if  its  provisions  apparently  required  the 
United  States  to  engage  in  the  war,  it  did  not 
follow  that  such  action  would  be  an  actual  conse 
quence.  The  possibility  was  "not  yet  certain 
enough  to  authorize  us  in  sound  morality  to  de 
clare,  at  this  moment,  the  treaties  null. " 

Meanwhile  Genet  was  left  in  a  position  in  which 
he  had  a  perfect  right  to  claim  all  privileges 
conferred  on  France  by  the  treaty.  The  result  was 
a  curious  chapter  of  diplomatic  correspondence. 
Genet  took  an  attitude  of  indignant  remonstrance 
at  the  duplicity  of  the  American  position.  Did 
not  the  United  States  have  a  treaty  with  France? 
By  what  authority  then  did  the  Administration 
interfere  with  him  in  the  enjoyment  of  his  rights  as 
the  representative  of  France,  and  interfere  with 
American  citizens  in  their  dealings  with  him? 


FRENCH  DESIGNS  ON  AMERICA       133 

He  shrewdly  refrained  from  any  attempt  to  de 
fend  the  capture  of  the  Grange  by  L' Ambuscade 
in  Delaware  Bay.  "The  learned  conclusions  of 
the  Attorney-General  of  the  United  States,  and 
the  declarations  of  the  American  Government, 
have  been  on  this  subject  the  rulejrf  my  conduct. 
I  have  caused  the  prize  to  be  given  up. "  But  he 
stood  firm  on  rights  secured  by  the  treaty.  "As 
long  as  the  States,  assembled  in  Congress,  shall 
not  have  determined  that  this  solemn  engagement 
should  not  be  performed,  no  one  has  the  right  to 
shackle  our  operations,  and  to  annul  their  effect, 
by  hindering  those  of  our  marines  who  may  be  in 
the  American  ports,  to  take  advantage  of  the 
commissions  which  the  French  Government  has 
charged  me  to  give  to  them,  authorizing  them  to 
defend  themselves,  and  fulfill,  if  they  find  an 
opportunity,  all  the  duties  of  citizens  against  the 
enemies  of  the  State. " 

This  was  using  an  argument  borrowed  from 
Jefferson's  abundant  jstock  of  constitutional  limi 
tations.  Genet  was,  of  course,  advised  of  the 
dissensions  in  the  Cabinet.  He  was  on  such  con 
fidential  terms  with  Jefferson  that  he  talked  freely 
about  the  projected  raid  on  Louisiana.  Jefferson 
noted  in  his  diary  that  "he  communicated  these 


134  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

things  to  me,  not  as  Secretary  of  State,  but  as  Mr. 
Jefferson."  Jefferson  told  Genet  that  he  "did 
not  care  what' insurrections  should  be  excited  in 
Louisiana,"  but  that  "enticing  officers  and  soldiers 
from  Kentucky  to  go  against  Spain  was  really  put 
ting  a  halter  about  their  necks,  for  that  they  would 
assuredly  be  hung  if  they  commenced  hostilities 
against  a  nation  at  peace  with  the  United  States. " 
So  great  is  the  force  of  legal  pedantry  that  Jefferson 
was  unable  to  agree  that  the  President  should  pro 
claim  neutrality  in  clear  and  positive  terms; 
but  that  same  pedantry  was  effectively  employed 
in  covering  the  legal  flaws  of  Jefferson's  position 
in  his  notes  to  Genet.  He  attenuated  the  treaty 
obligations  by  strict  construction  and  also  by 
reservations  founded  on  the  general  principles  of 
international  law.  "By  our  treaties  with  several 
of  the  belligerent  Powers,"  he  told  Genet,  "we 
have  established  a  style  of  peace  with  them.  But 
without  appealing  to  treaties,  we  are  at  peace  with 
them  all  by  the  law  of  nature :  for,  by  nature's  law, 
man  is  at  peace  with  man."  Hence  the  propriety 
of  forbidding  acts  within  American  jurisdiction 
that  would  cause  disturbance  of  this  peace,  a  point 
on  which  he  quoted  copiously  from  Vattel.  Genet 
manifested  some  irritation  at  being  referred  to 


FRENCH  DESIGNS  ON  AMERICA       135 

treatises  on  international  law  when  he  was  resting 
his  case  on  a  treaty  the  validity  of  which  Jefferson 
acknowledged.  "Let  us  not  lower  ourselves,"  he 
wrote,  "to  the  level  of  ancient  politics  by  diplo 
matic  subtleties.  Let  us  be  frank  in  our  overtures, 
in  our  declarations,  as  our  two  nations  are  in  their 
affections,  and,  by  this  plain  and  sincere  conduct, 
arrive  at  the  object  by  the  shortest  way. " 

Logically  Jefferson's  position  was  that  of  main 
taining  the  validity  of  the  treaty  while  opposing 
the  fulfillment  of  its  obligations.  At  the  same 
time  he  had  to  carry  on  a  correspondence  with 
Hammond,  the  British  Minister,  who  was  making 
complaints  of  the  use  of  American  ports  for  French 
depredations  on  British  commerce,  and  to  him 
Jefferson  ^pleaded  entire  willingness  to  discharge 
in  good  faith  the  obligations  of  a  neutral  Power. 
It  may  seem  as  if  Jefferson  was  attempting  the 
impossible  feat  of  trying  to  ride  at  one  time  two 
horses  going  in  opposite  directions,  but  such  was 
his  dexterity  that  in  appearance  he  was  largely 
successful.  Meanwhile  he  contrived  to  throw  on 
Hamilton  and  his  adherents  the  blame  for  the 
feebleness  and  inconsistency  of  national  policy.  In 
letters  to  his  Congressional  lieutenants,  Monroe 
in  the  Senate  and  Madison  in  the  House,  he  la- 


136  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

mented  "the  anglophobia,  secret  antigallomany " 
that  have  "decided  the  complexion  of  our  disposi 
tions."  He  spoke  scornfully  of  Randolph,  whom 
he  regarded  as  so  irresolute  that  the  votes  in 
the  Cabinet  were  "generally  two  and  a  half  against 
one  and  a  half, "  by  which  he  meant  that  Hamilton 
and  Knox  stood  together  against  Jefferson,  while 
Randolph  divided  his  influence  between  the  two 
factions. 

So  inflamed  was  the  state  of  public  opinion  that 
a  rising  against  the  Government  seemed  possible. 
In  a  letter  written  twenty  years  later,  John  Adams 
described  "the  terrorism  excited  by  Genet,  in 
1793,  when  ten  thousand  people  in  the  streets  of 
Philadelphia,  day  after  day,  threatened  to  drag 
Washington  out  of  his  house,  and  effect  a  revolu 
tion  in  the  Government,  or  compel  it  to  declare  war 
in  favor  of  the  French  Revolution  and  against 
England. "  Adams  related  that  he  "judged  it  pru 
dent  and  necessary  to  order  chests  of  arms  from  the 
War  Office"  to  be,  brought  into  his  house  to  defend 
it  from  attack,  and  he  had  it  from  "the  coolest 
and  firmest  minds"  that  nothing  but  the  outbreak 
of*  yellow  fever  in  Philadelphia  that  summer 
"could  have  saved  the  United  States  from  a  fatal 
revolution  of  government."  On  the  other  hand, 


FRENCH  DESIGNS  ON  AMERICA       137 

letters  written  by  Hamilton  during  the  time  of  all 
this  excitement  show  that  he  thought  little  of  it, 
although  he  more  than  anyone  else  was  its  target. 
In  May,  1793,  he  wrote  that  the  number  of  persons 
who  went  to  meet  Genet  "would  be  stated  high  at 
a  hundred, "  and  he  did  not  believe  that  a  tenth 
part  of  the  city  participated  in  the  meetings  and 
addresses  of  Genet's  sympathizers.  "A  crowd 
will  always  draw  a  crowd,  whatever  be  the  purpose. 
Curiosity  will  supply  the  place  of  attachment  to,  or 
interest  in,  the  object. "  Washington's  own  letters 
at  this  period  show  no  trace  of  concern  about 
his  personal  safety  though  he  smarted  under  the 
attacks  on  his  motives.  An  entry  of  August  2, 
1793,  in  Jefferson's  private  diary,  forming  the  vol 
ume  since  known  as  "The  Anas,"  relates  that  at  a 
cabinet  meeting  Knox  exhibited  a  print  entitled  the 

funeral  of  George  W n,  in  which  the  President 

was  placed  on  a  guillotine.  "The  President  was 
much  inflamed;  got  into  one  of  those  passions  when 
he  cannot  command  himself;  ran  much  on  the 
personal  abuse  which  had  been  bestowed  upon  him ; 
defied  any  man  on  earth  to  produce  one  single  act 
of  his  since  he  had  been  in  the  Government  which 
was  not  done  from  the  purest  motives;  that  he -had 
never  repented  but  once  the  having  slipped  the 


138  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

moment  of  resigning  his  office,  and  that  was  every 
moment  since;  that  by  God  he  had  rather  be  in 
his  grave  than  in  his  present  situation;  that  he  had 
rather  be  on  his  farm  than  to  be  made  emperor  of 
the  world;  and  that  they  were  charging  him  with 
wanting  to  be  king;  that  that  rascal  Freneau  sent 
him  three  of  his  papers  every  day,  as  if  he  thought 
he  would  become  the  distributor  of  his  papers;  that 
he  could  see  in  this  nothing  but  an  impudent  design 
to  insult  him. " 

Freneau  was  one  of  Jefferson's  subordinates  in 
the  State  Department,  combining  with  his  duties 
there  the  editorship  of  a  newspaper  engaged  in 
spreading  the  calumny  that  the  Administration  was 
leaning  toward  monarchy  through  the  influence 
of  Hamilton  and  his  friends,  who  despised  repub 
licanism,  hated  France,  and  loved  England.  This 
journalistic  campaign  went  on  under  the  protec 
tion  of  Jefferson  to  the  disturbance  of  an  adminis 
tration  of  which  Jefferson  himself  formed  a  part. 
This  circumstance  has  given  trouble  to  Jeffer 
son's  biographers,  and  it  is  now  somewhat  difficult 
to  make  those  allowances  to  which  Jefferson  is  en 
titled  from  the  candid  historian.  Such  behavior 
at  the  present  day  would  be  regarded  as  treacher 
ous,  for  it  is  now  a  settled  doctrine  that  it  is  the 


FRENCH  DESIGNS  ON  AMERICA       139 

duty  of  a  member  of  the  President's  Cabinet  to 
give  unreserved  support  to  his  policy,  or  to  resign. 
But  at  that  period,  neither  in  England  nor  in  the 
United  States,  did  this  view  of  cabinet  solidarity 
prevail.  It  was  not  considered  against  the  rules 
of  the  game  for  a  cabinet  official  to  use  any  op 
portunities  within  reach  for  promoting  his  aims  or 
to  boast  such  behavior  as  patriotic  zeal.  Jeffer 
son,  who  wanted  to  resign  and  stayed  on  only  at 
Washington's  earnest  desire,  certainly  rendered  a 
service  to  the  Administration,  which  was  then  so 
unpopular  that  Jefferson's  connection  with  it  was 
a  political  asset  of  great  value., 

Hamilton  also  made  use  of  the  services  of  journal 
ism.  When  on  June  29, 1793,  publication  began  of 
a  series  of  eight  articles  signed  "Pacificus,"  it  was 
well  known  that  Hamilton  was  the  author.  The 
acute  analysis  and  cogent  reasoning  of  these 
articles  have  given  them  classic  rank  as  an  exposi 
tion  of  national  rights  and  duties.  Upon  minds 
open  to  reason  their  effect  was  marked.  Jefferson 
wrote  to  Madison,  "For  God's  sake,  my  dear 
Sir,  take  up  your  pen,  select  the  most  striking 
heresies,  and  cut  him  to  pieces  in  the  face  of  the 
publicr"  Madison  did  take  up'  his  pen,  but  he 
laid  it  down  again  without  attempting  to  con- 


140  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

trovert  Hamilton's  argument.  The  five  articles 
which  Madison  wrote  over  the  signature  "Helvi- 
dius"  do  not  proceed  farther  into  the  subject  than 
a  preliminary  examination  of  executive  authority, 
in  which  he  laid  down  principles  of  strict  con 
struction  of  the  Constitution  which  have  never 
been  adopted  in  practice  and  which  are  now 
interesting  only  as  specimens  of  dialectic  subtlety. 
Although  as  an  electioneering  tactician  Jefferson 
had  superior  ability,  neither  he  nor  any  of  his 
associates  was  a  match  for  Hamilton  in  debate. 
As  the  issues  were  discussed,  the  Jeffersonians  lost 
ground,  and  for  this  they  put  the  blame  on  Genet. 
By  July  7,  Jefferson  was  writing  to  Madison  that 
Genet  "renders  my  position  immensely  difficult, " 
and  thereafter  in  the  correspondence  of  Jefferson, 
Madison,  and  Monroe,  Genet  figures  as  a  rash 
man  whose  indiscretions  embarrassed  his  friends 
and  impeded  his  own  objects.  This  view  has  to  a 
large  extent  passed  over  into  history,  but  when  it  is 
considered  that  Genet  did  not  come  to  America  for 
Jefferson's  comfort  but  to  accomplish  certain  things 
for  his  own  government,  it  must  be  owned  that 
he  had  considerable  success.  Although  his  means 
were  small,  he  managed  to  engage  in  the  French 
service  an  active  American  fleet  including  such 


FRENCH  DESIGNS  ON  AMERICA       141 

vessels  as  Le  Cassius,  L'Ami  de  le  Point  a  Petre, 
L' Amour  de  la  Liberte,  La  Vengeance,  La  Montague, 
Le  Vainqueur  de  la  Bastille,  La  Carmagnole,  L'Esper- 
ance,  Le  Citoyen  Genet,  Sans  Pareil,  and  Le  Petit 
Democrate.  The  last-mentioned  vessel  was  origi 
nally  an  English  merchantman,  the  brig  Little 
Sarah,  brought  into  Philadelphia  harbor  as  a 
French  prize.  When  it  was  learned  that  this  vessel 
had  been  armed  and  equipped  for  service  as  a 
French  man-of-war,  Governor  Mifflin  of  Pennsyl 
vania  gave  orders  that  the  vessel  should  be  de 
tained.  Genet  threatened  forcible  resistance,  and 
a  clash  might  have  occurred,  had  Jefferson  not 
intervened.  He  went  to  Genet's  house  on  Sunday 
to  persuade  him  not  to  move  the  vessel  until  the 
President  could  decide  the  case.  Genet  refused  to 
give  any  promise,  but  remarked  that  the  vessel 
would  probably  not  be  ready  to  depart  for  several 
days.  Jefferson  thereupon  exerted  himself  suc 
cessfully  to  prevent  the  taking  of  any  steps  to 
detain  the  vessel. 

Washington,  hafijassed  and  confused  by  the 
dissensions  of  his  Cabinet,  now  desired  that  the 
advice  of  the  justices  of  the  Supreme  Court 
be  taken.  Hamilton  was  opposed  to  a  proceeding 
which  involved  prejudgment  by  the  Court  on 


142  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

questions  which  might  come  before  it  in  due  course 
of  law,  and  which  seemed  to  him  also  to  be  an 
avoidance  of  the  proper  responsibility  of  the  execu 
tive.  Nevertheless  he  took  part  in  preparing  the 
case,  and  of  the  twenty-nine  questions  submitted 
to  the  Supreme  Court,  Hamilton  framed  twenty- 
one,  Jefferson  seven,  and  Washington  himself  the 
last.  Jefferson  notified  Genet  of  this  consultation 
as  an  additional  reason  for  patience,  "the  object 
of  it  being  to  obtain  the  best  advice  possible  on  the 
sense  of  the  laws  and  treaties  respecting  the  several 
cases.  I  am  persuaded  you  will  think  the  delay 
well  compensated."  Genet  did  not  think  so,  and 
Le  Petit  Democrate  put  to^  sea  in  defiance  of  Ameri 
can  authority. 

The  justices  declined  to  answer  the  questions, 
and  the  Administration  had  to  face  its  responsibil 
ities  on  its  own  judgement  of  its  rights  and  duties. 
At  least  one  member  of  the  Administration  had 
clear  and  positive  ideas  on  that  subject.  Hamilton, 
who  in  his  "Pacificus"  letters  had  given  a  masterly 
exposition  of  international  obligations,  now  took 
up  the  particular  issues  raised  by  Genet's  claims, 
which  at  that  time  were  receiving  ardent  cham 
pionship.  Freneau's  National  Gazette  held  that 
Genet  had  really  acted  "too  tamely,"  had  been 


FRENCH  DESIGNS  ON  AMERICA     143 

"too  accommodating  for  the  peace  of  the  United 
States."  Hamilton  now  replied  by  a  series  of 
articles  in  the  Daily  Advertiser  over  the  signature 
"No  Jacobin,"  in  which  Genet's  behavior  was 
reviewed.  After  iive  articles  had  appeared  in 
rapid  succession,  the  series  was  abruptly  termi 
nated  because  Hamilton  was  taken  down  by  the 
yellow  fever. 

The  journalistic  war  was  almost  in  the  nature 
of  a  duel  between  the  State  and  the  Treasury 
Departments.  Genet  must  have  been  amused. 
Lack  of  funds  hindered  his  activities  more  than 
anything  else.  Jefferson  had  advised  Washington 
that,  "if  the  instalments  falling  due  in  this  year 
could  be  advanced  without  incurring  more  dan 
ger,"  it  would  be  well  to  make  the  payments,  as  he 
"thought  it  very  material  to  keep  alive  the  friendly 
sentiments  of  France."  But  this  was  a  matter 
which  pertained  to  Hamilton's  own  department, 
and  in  that  field  his  advice  controlled  Washington. 
Genet  could  do  nothing  in  this  direction,  and 
before  the  affair  of  Le  Petit  Democrate  he  had 
ceased  to  expect  financial  aid. 

Jefferson  was  now  so  angry  and  indignant  that 
he  no  longer  opposed  the  suggestions  that  had  been 
made  in  cabinet  meetings  that  Genet  should  be 


144  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

dismissed,  and  the  note  on  that  subject  which  he 
drafted  for  transmission  to  the  French  Government 
is  an  able  document.  The  French  Government, 
with  ample  reason,  conditioned  the  recall  of  Genet 
upon  the  recall  of  Morris,  who  was  succeeded  by 
James  Monroe.  Meanwhile  Genet's  situation 
had  become  perilous  through  revolution  at  home. 
On  October  16,  1793,  his  Government  issued  an 
order  for  his  arrest.  The  United  States  now 
became  his  asylum.  He  acquired  citizenship, 
married  a  daughter  of  Governor  Clinton  of  New 
York,  and  settled  down  to  a  useful  and  respected 
career  as  a  country  gentleman  devoted  to  the 
improvement  of  agriculture.  He  died  at  his  home, 
Schodak,  New  York,  in  1834,  after  having  founded 
an  American  family. 

At  the  time  when  Genet,  favored  by  the  exasper 
ated  state  of  Western  sentiment  over  the  naviga 
tion  of  the  lower  Mississippi,  was  promoting  an 
attack  upon  the  Spanish  posts,  the  Administra 
tion  had  already  been  engaged  for  a  long  time  in 
efforts  to  secure  "full  enjoyment  of  that  navi 
gation,  "  as  well  as  a  settlement  of  the  southwestern 
boundary.  In  December,  1791,  Washington  nom 
inated  William  Carmichael,  charge  d'affaires  in 
Spain,  and  William  Short,  then  charge  d'affaires 


FRENCH  DESIGNS  ON  AMERICA       145 

in  France,  commissioners  to  make  a  treaty. 
Their  efforts  proved  unsuccessful,  and  in  1794 
the  Spanish  commissioner  in  the  United  States 
gave  notice  that  they  were  not  acceptable  per 
sonally,  and  that  it  "was  hoped  that  some  other 
person  would  be  appointed,  with  full  powers, 
to  settle  this  treaty,  and  graced  with  such  a 
character  as  became  the  royalty  to  which  he 
was  accredited."  Washington  then  nominated 
Thomas  Pinckney,  at  that  time  minister  in  Lon 
don,  as  minister  plenipotentiary  in  Spain.  When 
Pinckney  arrived  on  the  scene  he  was  met  with 
the  dilatory  methods  then  characteristic  of  Span 
ish  diplomacy,  and  finally  he  had  to  bring 
matters  to  an  issue  by  demanding  his  passports. 
His  determination  so  impressed  the  Spanish  Gov 
ernment  that  it  finally  consented  to  a  treaty, 
October  27,  1795,  which  fixed  the  southern  bound 
ary  of  the  United  States  and  opened  the  Mississippi 
River  to  navigation.  The  boundary  line  was  to 
run  east  along  the  thirty-first  parallel  of  latitude 
from  the  Mississippi  to  the  'Appalachicola,  thence 
along  the  latter  river  to  its  junction  with  the  Flint, 
thence  to  the  headwaters  of  the  St.  Mary's,  and 
along  its  course  to  the  Atlantic  Ocean.  The  free 
navigation  of  the  Mississippi  was  coupled  with  the 


146  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

privilege  of  depositing  merchandise  at  New  Or 
leans  "without  paying  any  other  duty  than  a  fair 
price  for  the  hire  of  the  stores. "  This  privilege 
was  to  be  continued  after  three  years,  or  "an 
equivalent  establishment"  on  the  banks  of  the 
Mississippi  was  to  be  assigned  to  citizens  of  the 
United  States  —  a  provision  which  was  not  free 
from  ambiguities  and  which  furnished  fresh  ma 
terial  for  controversy  a  few  years  later. 


149 


CHAPTER  VII 

A   SETTLEMENT   WITH   ENGLAND 

ACCORDING  to  Jefferson,  the  President  origi 
nally  took  the  same  view  of  the  French 
treaty  that  he  did.  Jefferson  relates  that  on 
April  18,  1793,  Washington  spoke  of  having 
"never  had  a  doubt  of  the  validity  of  the  French 
treaty,"  and  he  notes  that  in  the  cabinet  dis 
putes  Washington  was  inclined  to  his  views.  As 
the  embarrassments  of  the  Administration  thick 
ened,  the  President,  it  is  true,  leaned  more  and 
more  toward  Hamilton,  but  this  inclination  was 
due  more  \o  necessity  than  to  personal  partiality. 
The  explanation  stands  out  in  Jefferson's  own 
account  of  events.  Hamilton  was  clear,  positive, 
and  decided  as  to  what  to  do  and  how  to  do  it. 
Jefferson  was  active  in  finding  objections  but  not 
in  finding  ways  and  means  of  action.  This  con 
trast  became  sharper  as  time  went  on,  and,  as 
Washington  was  in  a  position  where  he  had  to  do 

147 


14.fi 

.^SHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

TJT"1 

Something,  he  was  forced  to  rely  on  Hamilton 
more  and  more.  Jefferson  held  that  it  would  be 
inexpedient  for  the  general  government  to  assume 
the  duty  of  fortifying  the  harbors,  and  that  there 
was  no  constitutional  authority  for  establishing  a 
military  academy.  On  November  28,  1793,  there 
was  a  prolonged  wrangle  over  these  issues  at  a 
cabinet  meeting,  which  the  President  ended  by 
saying  that  he  would  recommend  the  military 
academy  to  Congress,  and  "let  them  decide  for 
themselves  whether  the  Constitution  authorized 
it  or  not. "  This  was  the  last  of  the  quarrelsome 
cabinet  sessions  recorded  by  Jefferson.  He  vacated 
the  office  of  Secretary  of  State,  December  31,  1793, 
and  thereafter  the  ascendancy  of  Hamilton  in  the 
Cabinet  was  indisputed. 

An  immediate  effect  of  the  change  was  to  give  j 
new  vigor  to  efforts  at  reaching  a  settlement  with  j 
Great  Britain.     The  old  troubles  over  her  reten-  j 
tion  of  the  western  posts  still  continued,  and  in 
addition  to  them  came  new  difficulties  arising  from 
war   measures.     On   January   30,    1793,   Thomas 
Pinckney^  then  American  minister  to  Great  Britain, 
wrote  that  war  was  about  to  begin,  "and  although 
our  claim  to  a  free  intercourse  is  founded  in  reason 
and  our  national  right,  yet,  as  we  have  no  armed 


A  SETTLEMENT  WITH  ENGLAND      149 

* 

Neutrality  the  members  whereof  this  people  have  to 
fear,  they  may  stop  our  vessels  bound  to  French 
ports  with  provisions."  What  was  feared  soon 
happened.  By  theFrench  decree  of  1793,  the 
French^olonies  we^e^^en^LJO'  American  trade 
and  West  Indian  commerce  flourished.  This 
was  now~afflicted  by  contraband  regulations  laid 
down  by  Great  Britain,  under  which  many  Ameri 
can  vessels  were  seized  for  carrying  cargoes  to 
or  from  French  ports.  Although  Genet's  activities 
and  the  extent  to  which  they  were  indulged  by 
the  United  States  did  not  tend  to  promote  friendly 
relations  with  Great  Britain,  yet  it  does  not 
appear  that  the  British  policy  was  inspired  by 
resentment.  The  regulations  as  defined  by  in 
structions  issued  on  June  8,  1793,  made  liable  to 
detention  all  vessels  carrying  "corn,  flour,  or 
meal"  to  French  ports,  with  the  proviso  that  the 
cargoes  might  be  purchased  on  behalf  of  the 
British  government  and  the  ships  might  then  be 
released  with  a  due  allowance  for  freight,  or  they 
might  be  allowed  to  dispose  of  their  cargoes  in 
the  ports  of  any  country  in  amity  with  Great 
Britain.  Vessels  attempting  to  enter  a  blockaded 
port  were  liable  to  seizure  and  condemnation,  save 
that  the  ships  of  Denmark  and  Sweden  might  be 


150  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

seized  only  if  they  should  persist  in  trying  to  enter 
after  once  having  been  turned  back. 

Conciliatory  explanations  were  made  by  Ham 
mond,  the  British  minister,  in  notifying  our  State 
Department.  He  pointed  out  that  only  corn  and 
flour  were  contraband,  that  the  regulations  did  not 
extend  to  other  provisions,  and  that  they  secured 
"to  the  proprietors,  supposing  them  neutral,  a  full 
indemnification  for  any  loss  they  may  possibly 
sustain. "  The  special  privilege  extended  to  Den 
mark  and  Sweden  was  attributed  to  treaty  require 
ments  and  therefore  could  not  be  regarded  as 
invidious.  In  reply  Jefferson  at  home  and  Pinck- 
ney  abroad  argued  in  behalf  of  the  United  States 
for  the  principle  that  free  ships  make  free  goods, 
but  Great  Britain  would  not  hearken  to  a  doctrine 
that  struck  at  the  efficacy  of  her  sea  power. 

Washington  besought  Congress  to  support  the 
efforts  of  the  Administration  by  making,  for  the 
defense  of  American  interests,  such  provision  as 
would  inspire  respect.  In  his  address  of  December 
3, 1793,  he  observed:  "There  is  a  rank  due  to  the 
United  States  among  nations  which  will  be  with 
held,  if  not  absolutely  lost,  by  the  reputation  of 
weakness.  If  we  desire  to  avoid  insult,  we  must  be 
able  to  repel  it;  if  we  desire  to  secure  peace,  one  of 


A  SETTLEMENT  WITH  ENGLAND      151 

the  most  powerful  instruments  of  our  rising  pros 
perity,  it  must  be  known  that  we  are  at  all  times 
ready  for  war."  The  answer  of  Congress  was  the 
grudging  consent  to  some  naval  preparations 
already  recounted. 

After  the  passage  of  the  navy  bill  Sedgwick  of 
Massachusetts  endeavored  to  interest  the  House  in 
the  general  subject  of  military  preparation.  On 
March  12,  1794,  he  introduced  resolutions  for 
raising  fifteen  additional  regiments  for  two  years, 
the  term  to  be  extended  for  three  years  in  case  of 
the  outbreak  of  war.  In  advocating  this  measure 
he  spoke  of  the  sorry  experience  of  the  country  in 
depending  upon  militia.  Their  "  want  of  discipline 
occasions  them  to  commit  a  great  waste  on  the 
property  of  their  fellow  citizens,  besides  a  waste  of 
public  property."  As  long  as  we  depend  upon 
militia,  "European  nations  will  not  consider  us  as 
able  to  retaliate  and  assert  our  rights. "  Nothing 
came  of  this  sensible  proposal,  but  Sedgwick 
made  an  auxiliary  suggestion  which  Congress 
did  adopt.  He  urged  that  the  sailing  of  vessels 
from  the  ports  of  the  United  States  be  prohibited. 
An  embargo  would  hold  over  foreign  nations  the 
threat  that,  unless  they  behaved  themselves, 
their  supplies  from  the  United  States  might  be 


152  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

cut  off.  Such  embargo  was  voted  for  a  month 
from  March  26,  1794,  which  was  subsequently 
extended  for  another  month,  and  the  President  was 
authorized  to  lay,  regulate,  and  revoke  embargoes 
during  the  recess  of  Congress.  Congress  regarded 
the  embargo  policy  as  a  cheap  way  out  of  a  difficult 
situation,  but  this  method  was  really  not  only  far 
more  costly  to  the  nation  than  would  have  been  the 
straightforward  course  of  arming  for  defense,  but 
at  the  same  time  accomplished  nothing.  Dayton 
of  New  Jersey  proposed  to  supplement  the  em 
bargo  by  the  sequestration  of  all  debts  due  from 
citizens  of  the  United  States  to  British  subjects. 
Clark  of  New  Jersey  outdid  his  colleague  by  pro 
posing  to  prohibit  all  commercial  intercourse 
between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain 
until  such  time  as  that  country  should  surrender 
the  western  posts  and  should  make  restitution  for 
all  losses  sustained  by  American  citizens. 

Violent  speeches  were  made  on  these  proposals 
at  the  very  time  when  the  House  was  refusing  to 
support  either  an  army  or  a  navy.  Sedgwick  intro 
duced  some  good  sense  into  a  debate  that  was 
alternating  between  blatant  vaporing  and  legal 
pedantry,  by  pointing  out  that,  under  the  Con 
stitution,  the  President  of  the  United  States  ought 


A  SETTLEMENT  WITH  ENGLAND      153 

to  be  allowed  to  have  some  say  about  the  matter. 
It  was  the  function  of  the  President  to  treat 
with  foreign  powers,  and  yet  the  House  was  now 
considering  action  which  was  in  effect  "prescribing 
the  terms  of  treaty,  and  restraining  the  constitu 
tional  power  from  treating  on  any  other  terms. " 
This  argument  was  used  effectively  by  a  number 
of  speakers.  It  turned  the  main  position  taken  by 
the  advocates  of  non-intercourse,  which  was  that 
the  real  objection  came  from  the  bondholders  who 
feared  that  the  ensuing  loss  of  revenue  might  pre 
vent  them  from  getting  their  interest.  Such 
imputations  of  sordid  motive  became  fruitless 
when  the  issue  was  raised  of  the  constitutional 
authority  of  the  President,  but  the  advocates  of 
non-intercourse  met  this  new  point  of  view  by 
pointing  out  that  the  Constitution  gave  Congress 
the  right  to  regulate  commerce.  The  feeling 
against  Great  Britain  was  so  great  that  the  House 
was  bent  on  indulging  it,  and  on  April  25,  1794, 
the  non-intercourse  bill  was  passed  by  a  vote  of 
58  to  34.  The  Senate  was  so  evenly  divided  that, 
on  the  motion  to  pass  the  bill  to  its  third  reading, 
there  was  a  tie  vote,  and  Vice-President  Adams, 
who  was  called  upon  for  a  casting  vote,  gave  it 
against  the  bill.  About  a  month  later  in  the  House 


154  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

another  attempt  was  made  to  carry  the  policy  of 
non-intercourse  by  a  joint  resolution,  but  by  this 
*  time  a  reaction  in  favor  of  the  Administration  had 
set  in  and  the  resolution  received  only  24  yeas  to 
46  nays,  James  Madison  being  among  those  who 
stuck  to  the  proposal  to  the  last. 

While  the  House  was  abandoning  itself  to  reck 
less  mischief-making,  Washington  was  striving  to 
arrange  matters  by  negotiation.  The  perplexities 
of  his  situation  were  great  and  varied.  As  a 
military  man  he  knew  that  American  jurisdiction 
was  precarious  so  long  as  Great  Britain  held 
the  interior.  The  matter  had  been  the  subject 
of  prolix  correspondence  between  Jefferson  and 
Hammond,  but  the  American  demands  that  Great 
Britain  should  surrender  the  frontier  posts  in 
accordance  with  the  treaty  of  peace  had  been  met 
by  demands  that  America,  in  accordance  with  that 
same  treaty,  should  first  satisfy  various  claims 
of  British  subjects  for  restitution,  indemnity,  and 
relief.  The  regular  diplomatic  machinery  stuck 
fast  at  this  point,  both  at  home  and  abroad.  In 
one  of  his  gossipy,  confidential  letters  Fisher 
Ames  remarked  that  Hammond  was  a  most 
"petulant,  impudent"  man,  habitually  railing 
against  the  conduct  of  our  government  "with  a 


A  SETTLEMENT  WITH  ENGLAND      155 

gabble  that  his  feelings  render  doubly  unin 
telligible."  But  Pinckney,  our  representative  in 
England,  was  equally  undiplomatic.  He  was 
"sour  and  also  Gallican";  although  calm  in  man 
ner,  "he  had  prejudices,  and  unless  a  man  has  a 
mind  above  them,  he  can  do  little  service  there." 
Washington  decided  that  it  would  be  wise  to 
send  a  special  envoy  to  deal  with  all  the  points  at 
issue.  He  thought  first  of  Hamilton,  but  was 
warned  that  the  Senate  would  not  ratify  such  an 
appointment.  Hamilton  recommended  John  Jay 
as  "the  only  man  in  whose  qualifications  for 
success  there  would  be  thorough  confidence." 
Jay  was  then  chief -justice,  but  the  crisis  was  so 
dangerous  as  to  justify  Washington  in  calling  him 
even  from  that  important  post.  He  had  match 
less  qualifications  for  the  mission.  He  had  been 
minister  to  Spain,  1778-1782;  he  had  been  one  of 
the  commissioners  who  had  negotiated  the  treaty 
of  peace  of  1783;  he  had  been  Secretary  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  1784-1789;  so  that  he  had  had  an  experi 
ence  which  familiarized  him  with  every  detail 
of  the  questions  at  issue.  As  a  negotiator  he  had 
always  gained  marked  success  by  acting  upon  his 
own  principle  that  "a  little  good-natured  wisdom 
often  does  more  in  politics  than  much  slippery 


156  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

craft."  Jay  showed  fine  patriotism  in  accepting 
the  appointment.  He  remarked  to  his  friends  that 
no  man  could  frame  a  treaty  with  Great  Britain 
without  making  himself  unpopular  and  odious, 
and  he  accepted  the  mission  under  "a  conviction 
that  to  refuse  it  would  be  to  desert  my  duty  for 
the  sake  of  my  ease  and  domestic  concerns  and 
comforts. " 

Jay  was  nominated  as  envoy  extraordinary  on 
April  16,  1794,  and,  after  three  days  of  violent 
debate,  the  appointment  was  confirmed  by  the 
Senate.  The  event  did  not  moderate  the  rage  of 
the  House  for  immediate  action.  Some  members 
urged  that  it  was  indelicate  for  the  House  to  be 
passing  reprisals  at  a  time  when  the  Executive  was 
attempting  friendly  negotiations;  but  the  reply  was 
made  that,  if  there  was  any  indelicacy,  it  was  on 
the  part  of  the  Executive,  inasmuch  as  the  House 
proceedings  had  been  already  begun  when  the 
President  decided  to  nominate  an  envoy  extra 
ordinary.  While  Congress  was  fuming  and  wran 
gling,  Jay  was  proceeding  with  his  difficult  task. 
He  sailed  on  May  12,  and  on  June  8  landed  in  Eng 
land  where  he  was  hospitably  received.  Despite 
these  personal  attentions,  the  differences  to  be 
adjusted  were  so  numerous  and  complicated  that 


A  SETTLEMENT  WITH  ENGLAND      157 

on  the  surface  the  situation  looked  almost  hope 
less.  Conditions,  however,  were  really  more 
favorable  than  they  appeared  to  be.  A  change, 
latent  but  influential,  had  taken  place  in  the 
mental  attitude  of  the  governing  class  in  England. 
There  had  been  a  notion  that  American  independ 
ence  would  not  last  long  and  that  the  country 
would  eventually  be  restored  to  the  British  Crown. 
The  drift  of  events  was  rather  in  that  direction 
until  Hamilton's  measures  gave  the  ascendancy  to 
the  forces  making  for  American  national  develop 
ment.  The  practical  statesmanship  of  Great 
Britain  perhaps  saw  more  clearly  the  significance 
of  what  was  taking  place  than  did  that  of  America 
itself,  and  it  was  prepared  to  reckon  with  this 
new  condition.  Moreover,  the  European  com 
motion  resulting  from  the  French  Revolution  had 
brought  to  the  front  a  new  set  of  interests  and 
anxieties,  for  the  free  handling  of  which  a  settle 
ment  of  differences  with  the  United  States  might 
be  advantageous.  The  effect  of  such  consider 
ations  was  at  least  to  render  the  situation  more 
manageable  than  might  have  been  expected,  and 
Jay  improved  his  opportunities  with  admirable 
tact. 

In  pursuance  of  his  principle  of  bringing  "  good- 


158  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

natured  wisdom"  to  bear,  Jay  suggested  to  Lord 
Grenville,  the  British  Secretary  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  that  they  should  dispense  with  written 
communications,  and  merely  meet  and  converse 
informally  "until  there  should  appear  a  probability 
of  coming  to  some  amicable  mutual  understand 
ing.  "  Even  after  such  understanding  should  be 
put  into  writing,  it  was  not  to  be  regarded  as 
official  or  binding,  but  simply  as  an  exchange  of 
private  memoranda.  So  strictly  was  this  informal 
method  adhered  to  that  the  regular  force  of  secre 
taries  and  copyists  had  nothing  to  do  with  the 
proceedings  until  the  treaty  was  almost  ready  for 
signing.  Jay  had  been  instructed  to  demand 
compensation  for  some  three  thousand  slaves  who 
had  followed  the  British  troops  when  they  depart 
ed,  but  Lord  Grenville  stood  firm  on  the  principle 
that  the  slave,  once  under  the  British  flag,  became 
a  free  man,  the  property  rights  of  the  former  owner 
thereupon  becoming  extinct  and  not  forming  a  sub 
ject  for  compensation.  Jay,  who  really  held  the 
same  opinion,  had  to  yield  the  point.  It  was 
agreed  that  the  western  posts  should  be  evacuated 
by  June  1,  1796,  an  arrangement  which  would 
allow  the  British  government  to  retain  them  about 
two  years  longer.  That  government  had  already 


A  SETTLEMENT  WITH  ENGLAND      159 

justified  its  retention  of  these  posts  by  averring 
that  the  United  States  had  not  complied  with  the 
articles  of  the  peace  treaty  relating  to  British 
debts.  Jay  was  not  in  a  position  to  argue  the 
point  with  any  force,  for  when  he  was  Secretary  of 
Foreign  Affairs  he  had  advised  Congress  that 
these  articles  "have  been  constantly  violated  on 
our  part  by  legislative  acts,  then  and  still  existing 
and  operating";  and  that  Great  Britain  was  there 
fore  not  to  blame  for  retaining  the  posts.  The 
British  government  was  undoubtedly  cognizant  of 
this  report,  and  Jay  could  not  make  any  effective 
opposition  to  a  proviso  which  in  effect  said  to  the 
United  States,  "before  surrendering  the  posts  we 
will  wait  and  see  whether  you  intend  to  fulfill 
your  agreements. "  The  root  of  the  trouble  — 
an  evil  often  felt  and  still  experienced  in  the 
United  States  —  was  defective  sovereignty,  an 
inability  of  the  whole  to  control  the  behavior  of 
its  parts.  Jay  could  not  deny  that  the  peace  treaty 
had  been  violated  by  state  legislation,  and  only 
by  the  humiliating  means  of  an  avowal  of  its  im 
potence  could  he  exonerate  the  national  government 
from  the  imputation  of  bad  faith.  The  matter  was 
disposed  of  by  provision  for  a  joint  commission  to 
decide  upon  all  cases  in  which  it  was  alleged  that 


160  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

unlawful  impediments  had  been  placed  in  the  way 
of  collection  of  debts  due  British  subjects,  and  by 
the  United  States  undertaking  payment  of  the 
awards.  A  similar  commission  was  to  pass  upon 
American  claims  for  British  violation  of  neutral 
rights.  This  arrangement  was  a  concession  whose 
practical  value  was  eventually  shown  by  the  fact 
that  as  a  result  American  merchants  received  some 
millions  of  dollars. 

Jay  displayed  marked  adroitness  as  a  negotiator 
in  dealing  with  the  issues  growing  out  of  past  differ 
ences,  but  he  made  an  extraordinary  slip  in  provid 
ing  for  commercial  relations  between  the  two 
countries.  In  their  general  tenor  the  articles 
displayed  broad  liberality.  Between  all  British 
dominions  in  Europe  and  the  territories  of  the 
United  States  there  was  to  be  "a  reciprocal  and 
perfect  liberty  ^f  commerce  and  navigation." 
American  vessels  were  to  "be  admitted  and  hos 
pitably  received"  in  the  ports  of  East  India, 
and,  although  participation  in  the  coasting  trade 
was  prohibited,  it  was  provided  that  this  re 
striction  should  not  prevent  ships  going  from  one 
port  of  discharge  to  another.  The  East  Indian 
trade  was  not,  however,  so  important  as  the  nearer 
West  Indian  trade,  and  with  respect  to  the  latter 


A  SETTLEMENT  WITH  ENGLAND      161 

the  treaty  provisions  were  narrow  and  exacting. 
American  vessels  were  limited  to  seventy  tons 
burden,  and  it  was  provided  that  "the  United 
States  will  prohibit  and  restrain  the  carrying 
away  of  molasses,  sugar,  coffee,  or  cotton  in 
American  vessels,  either  for  his  Majesty's  Islands 
or  the  United  States,  to  any  part  of  the  world 
except  the  United  States,  reasonable  sea-stores 
excepted. "  Jay,  in  a  letter  to  Washington,  excused 
his  acceptance  of  this  restraint  on  the  ground  that 
"the  commercial  part  of  the  treaty  may  be  ter 
minated  at  the  expiration  of  two  years  after  the 
war,  and  in  the  meantime  a  state  of  things  more 
auspicious  to  negotiation  will  probably  arise, 
especially  if  the  next  session  of  Congress  should  not 
interpose  fresh  obstacles. " 

The  treaty  was  silent  on  the  subject  of  impress 
ment,  but  Jay's  failure  on  that  point  was  just 
what  was  to  haveHbeen  expected  in  view  of  the 
unwillingness  of  the  United  States  to  defend  its 
commerce.  Impressment  was  not  abandoned  until 
many  years  afterwards,  and  then  not  through 
treaty  stipulation  but  because  the  United  States 
had  a  navy  and  could  resist  aggression  on  the  seas. 
In  its  treatment  of  the  subject  of  contraband, 
the  treaty  took  positions  in  accord  with  the 


162  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

international  law  then  received,  but  in  one  respect 
it  made  a  distinct  advance.  Provision  was  made 
that  war  between  the  two  countries  should  never 
become  the  pretext  for  confiscation  of  debts  or 
annulment  of  contracts.  This  position  involves 
the  noble  principle  that  war  should  never  supersede 
justice  but  should  be  the  servant  of  justice.  Great 
practical  advantage  was  experienced  from  it  in  the 
War  of  1812,  when  the  United  States  was  a  creditor 
nation. 

On  the  whole,  Jay's  diplomacy  was  as  enlight 
ened  as  it  was  shrewd,  but  at  the  time  it  exposed 
him  to  furious  denunciation  which  he  disdained 
to  notice.  "I  had  read  the  history  of  Greece," 
he  wrote  to  a  friend,  "and  was  apprised  of  the 
politics  and  proceedings  of  more  recent  date." 
The  philosophic  composure  which  he  drew  from  his 
knowledge  of  history  enabled  him  to  behave  with 
calm  dignity  while  he  was  being  burned  in  effigy, 
and  while  mob  orators  were  heaping  insult  and 
calumny  on  his  name.  After  a  struggle  that  shook 
the  Government,  the  treaty  was  ratified  by  the 
Senate  on  June  24,  1795,  with  the  exception  of  the 
article  about  the  West  Indian  trade,  an  omission 
to  which  Great  Britain  made  no  objection.  The 
treaty  was  extremely  unpopular,  chiefly  because 


A  SETTLEMENT  WITH  ENGLAND      163 

unreasonable  expectations  of  its  provisions  had 
been  entertained.  People  had  yet  to  learn  that 
national  independence  has  its  defects  as  well  as  its 
advantages,  and  that  the  traditional  intimacy 
between  the  West  Indies  and  America  was  now  on 
a  footing  of  privilege  and  not  of  right.  The  great 
benefits  conferred  by  the  treaty  were  therefore  not 
appreciated,  and  so  violent  was  the  fury  its  terms 
excited  that  it  was  perhaps  fortunate  that  Jay  did 
not  resume  his  seat  on  the  Supreme  Bench.  Before 
his  return  from  England  and  before  the  details  of 
the  treaty  had  been  made  public,  he  had  been 
elected  governor  of  New  York,  and  to  accept  this 
office  he  resigned  the  chief -justiceship. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

PARTY   VIOLENCE 

WHEN,  in  July,  1793,  Jefferson  notified  the  Presi 
dent  of  his  wish  to  resign  from  the  Cabinet, 
Hamilton's  resignation  had  already  been  before 
the  President  for  several  weeks.  Ever  since  the 
removal  of  Congress  to  Philadelphia,  Hamilton's 
circumstances  had  become  less  and  less  able 
to  endure  the  strain  of  maintaining  his  official 
position  on  a  salary  of  $3500  a  year.  He  had  fully 
experienced  the  truth  of  the  warnings  he  had 
received  that,  if  he  gave  himself  to  the  public 
service,  he  might  spend  his  time  and  substance 
without  receiving  gratitude  for  his  efforts  or  credit 
for  his  motives.  His  vocation  for  statesmanship, 
however,  was  too  genuine  and  his  courage  too  high 
for  such  results  to  dishearten  him.  He  had  now 
accomplished  what  he  had  set  out  to  do  in  securing 
the  adoption  of  the  measures  which  established  the 
new  government,  and  he  no  longer  regarded  his 

164 


PARTY  VIOLENCE  165 

administrative  position  as  essential  to  the  success 
of  his  policy.  Meanwhile  the  need  had  become 
urgent  that  he  should  resume  the  practice  of  his 
profession  to  provide  for  his  family.  It  was  not 
in  his  nature,  however,  to  leave  the  front  when  a 
battle  was  coming  on,  and,  although  he  gave  early 
notice  of  his  intention  so  that  Washington  should 
have  ample  time  to  look  about  for  his  successor, 
the  resignation  was  not  to  become  effective  until 
Congress  had  met  and  shown  its  temper.  Accord 
ing  to  Jefferson,  Washington  once  remarked  to 
him  that  he  supposed  Hamilton  "had  fixed  on  the 
latter  part  of  next  session  to  give  an  opportunity  to 
Congress  to  examine  into  his  conduct. "  Although 
Hamilton  had  made  up  his  mind  to  retire,  he  in 
tended  to  march  out  with  flying  colors,  as  became 
the  victor  on  a  hard-fought  field.  So  far,  he  had 
met  and  beaten  all  enemies  who  had  dared  to 
assail  his  honor;  he  meant  to  beat  them  again  if 
they  renewed  the  attack,  and  he  had  word  that 
one  encounter  was  coming  more  formidable  than 
any  before. 

Hamilton's  success  in  carrying  his  measures 
through  Congress,  by  sheer  dexterity  of  manage 
ment  when  numbers  were  against  him,  added 
intense  bitterness  to  the  natural  chagrin  felt  by 


166  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

the  defeated  faction.  Men  like  Jefferson  and 
Madison  were  subject  to  traditions  of  behavior 
that  required  them  to  maintain  a  certain  style  of 
public  decorum  no  matter  how  they  might  rage 
in  private.  But  new  men  with  new  manners  were 
coming  on  the  scene,  and  among  them  the  opposi 
tion  to  Hamilton  had  found  a  new  leader  — 
William  Branch  Giles  of  Virginia.  He  was  a 
Princeton  graduate  of  the  class  of  1781,  had  stud 
ied  for  the  bar,  and  had  been  admitted  to  practice 
in  1786.  To  the  full  legal  equipment  of  the  period 
.  he  added  an  energy  and  an  audacity  that  speedily 
brought  him  legal  and  political  distinction.  He 
was  '  active  and  outspoken  in  advocating  the 
adoption  of  the  new  Constitution,  at  a  time  when 
popular  sentiment  in  Virginia  was  strongly  inclined 
to  be  adverse.  He  had  no  hesitation  about 
undertaking  unpopular  causes,  and  hence  British 
debt  cases  became  a  marked  feature  of  his  practice. 
Virginia  State  law  had  suspended  the  recovery  of 
debts  due  British  subjects  until  reparation  had 
been  made  for  the  loss  of  negro  slaves  taken  away 
by  the  British  during  the  war,  and  until  the 
western  posts  had  been  surrendered.  But  the 
peace  treaty  of  1783  stipulated  that  creditors  on 
neither  side  should  meet  with  lawful  impediment 


PARTY  VIOLENCE  167 

in  the  recovery  of  debts,  and  by  the  new  Constitu 
tion  treaties  had  become  part  of  the  law  of  the 
land.  On  the  basis  of  a  national  jurisdiction  in 
conflict  with  the  Virginia  statutes,  Giles  acted  so 
energetically,  that  he  himself  related  that  by  1792 
he  had  been  employed  in  at  least  one  hundred 
British  debt  cases,  and  was  "as  successful  in 
collecting  monies  under  judgments  as  is  usually 
the  case  with  citizens." 

Comprehension  of  the  true  nature  of  the  struggle 
in  which  Giles  became  conspicuous  must  start 
with  the  fact  that  the  Constitution  was  reluctantly 
accepted  and  with  great  uneasiness  as  to  possible 
consequences.  In  the  Virginia  convention  of 
1788,  it  was  declared  that  the  new  Constitution 
was  essentially  a  scheme  of  the  military  men  to 
subject  the  people  to  their  rule.  This  argument 
was  not  so  much  met  as  avoided  by  the  declaration 
that  there  could  be  no  tyranny  while  Washington 
lived.  The  rejoinder  was  obvious:  what  if  he 
should  not  be  able  to  withstand  military  influence? 
What  if,  in  spite  of  him,  the  government  should  be 
given  a  dangerous  character  that  would  develop 
after  he  passed  away?  Jefferson  had  felt  misgiv 
ings  on  this  score  from  the  first,  and  Madison 
experienced  them  as  soon  as  differences  on  practical 


168  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

measures  arose  between  himself  and  Hamilton. 
Jefferson  and  Madison  wanted  the  government 
to  be  made  respectable  but  not  strong.  Hamilton 
saw  what  they  could  not  see  —  and  indeed  what 
few  at  that  time  could  see  —  that  a  government 
cannot  be  made  respectable  without  being  made 
strong. 

Washington  was  probably  without  any  clear 
views  of  his  own  on  constitutional  questions,  and 
what  evidence  there  is  on  this  point  supports 
Jefferson's  claim  that  Washington  was  more  dis 
posed  to  confide  in  him  and  in  Madison  than  in 
Hamilton.  When  Jefferson  relinquished  the  State 
Department, Washington  proposed  to  give  Madison 
the  post,  but  was  told  he  would  not  think  of  taking 
it.  Washington  then  transferred  Randolph  to 
the  position  because  he  could  not  get  anybody  else 
of  suitable  capacity.  Whatever  Washington's 
personal  inclinations  may  have  been,  he  was  in  a 
position  in  which  he  had  to  act.  Hamilton  was  the 
only  one  whom  he  could  find  to  show  him  the  way, 
and  thus  circumstances  more  and  more  compelled 
Washington  to  accept  Hamilton's  guidance,  while 
at  the  same  time  it  seemed  increasingly  clear  to  the 
opposition  that  it  was  above  all  things  necessary 
to  crush  Hamilton.  This  state  of  sentiment  must 


PARTY  VIOLENCE  169 

be  kept  in  mind  in  order  to  make  intelligible  the 
rabid  violence  of  the  party  warfare  which  had  long 
been  going  on  against  Hamilton,  and  which  —  now 
that  Jefferson  had  left  the  Cabinet  —  was  soon 
to  be  extended  to  Washington  himself. 

When  Giles  went  to  the  front  in  this  war,  both 
Jefferson  and  Madison  were  busy  behind  the  fir 
ing  line  supplying  munitions.  Giles  was  elected 
in  1790  to  fill  a  vacancy  caused  by  the  death  of 
Theodorick  Bland,  and  took  his  seat  in  the  third 
session  of  the  First  Congress.  The  assumption 
bill  had  been  passed,  but  that  was  only  the  first  of 
the  series  of  financial  measures  proposed  by 
Hamilton,  and  Giles  followed  Madison's  lead  in 
unsuccessful  resistance  to  the  excise  and  to  the 
national  bank.  Giles  was  re-elected  to  the  Second 
Congress,  which  opened  on  October  24,  1791. 
In  the  course  of  this  session  he  became  the  leader 
of  the  opposition,  not  by  supplanting  Madison 
but  through  willingness  to  take  responsibilities 
from  which  Madison,  like  Jefferson,  shrank,  because 
he,  too,  preferred  activity  behind  the  scenes. 
This  situation  has  often  occurred  in  parliamentary 
history  —  a  zealous  party  champion  scouting  the 
scruples  and  restraints  that  hampered  the  official 
leadership,  and  assuming  an  independent  line  of 


170  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

attack  with  the  covert  favor  and  assistance  of  that 
leadership.  In  the  effort  to  crush  Hamilton  a 
series  of  raids  was  led  by  Giles,  whose  appetite  for 
fighting  could  never  be  extinguished  no  matter 
how  severe  might  be  his  defeat. 

After  much  preliminary  skirmishing  which  put 
heavy  tasks  on  Hamilton  in  the  way  of  getting  up 
reports  and  documents,  a  grand  attack  was  made 
on  January  23,  1793.  A  series  of  resolutions,  in 
drafting  which  Madison  and  Jefferson  took  part, 
was  presented,  calling  for  minute  particulars  of 
all  loans,  names  of  all  persons  to  whom  payments 
had  been  made,  statements  of  semi-monthly  bal 
ances  between  the  Treasury  and  the  Bank,  and  an 
account  of  the  sinking  fund  and  of  unexpended 
appropriations,  —  all  from  the  beginning  of  the 
government  until  the  end  of  1792.  The  resolution 
required  Hamilton  to  complete  and  state  all  the 
accounts  of  the  Treasury  Department  up  to  a  period 
only  a  little  over  three  weeks  before  the  resolutions 
were  presented,  and  to  give  a  detailed  transcript 
of  particulars.  But  the  Treasury  accounts  were  in 
such  perfect  order,  and  so  great  was  Hamilton's 
capacity  for  work,  that  the  information  called 
for  was  promptly  transmitted  in  reports  dated 
February  4,  February  13,  and  February  14.  At 


PARTY  VIOLENCE  171 

the  same  time  Hamilton  hit  back  by  observing  that 
the  resolutions  "were  not  moved  without  a  pretty 
copious  display  of  the  reasons  on  which  they  were 
founded,"  which  "were  of  a  nature  to  excite 
attention,  to  beget  alarm,  to  inspire  doubts." 

Giles  was  soon  able  to  renew  the  attack.  Jeffer 
son  and  Madison  helped  him  to  prepare  a  series 
of  nine  resolutions  which  were  presented  on  Febru 
ary  27.  They  specifically  charged  Hamilton  with 
violation  of  law,  neglect  of  duty,  transgression  of 
the  proper  limits  of  his  authority,  and  indecorum 
in  his  attitude  towards  the  House.  The  series 
ended  with  a  resolution  that  a  copy  should  be 
transmitted  to  the  President.  The  proceeding 
was  a  sort  of  impeachment,  framed  with  the  pur 
pose  not  of  bringing  Hamilton  to  trial  but  of  forc 
ing  him  out  of  the  Cabinet.  The  charges  against 
him  were  purely  technical  and  were  actuated  by 
malevolence.  Hamilton,  though  not  allowed  to 
come  into  the  House  to  defend  himself,  neverthe 
less  participated  in  the  debate  indirectly  by  writing 
the  speech  delivered  by  William  Smith  and  credited 
to  him  in  the  Annals  of  Congress.  It  was  so  gener 
ally  felt  in  Congress  that  the  resolutions  were 
founded  on  nothing  more  substantial  than  spite 
that  Giles  could  not  hold  his  forces  together,  and 


172  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

as  the  debate  proceeded  the  number  of  his  adher 
ents  dwindled.  The  House  began  voting  at  a 
night  session  on  March  1st.  After  the  third 
resolution  had  been  defeated  by  a  vote  of  40  to  12, 
an  attempt  was  made  to  withdraw  the  others,  but 
such  action  was  refused,  and  one  by  one  the 
remaining  resolutions  were  defeated  by  increasing 
numbers  until  only  seven  voted  with  Giles  at 
the  last,  among  them  James  Madison.  It  was  a 
signal  triumph  for  Hamilton.  But  his  enemies 
were  not  disposed  to  accept  the  decision  as  final, 
and  Jefferson  thought  it  might  be  revised  at  the 
next  session. 

It  was  not  until  the  Second  Congress  that  the  old 
factions  finally  disappeared  and  the  formation  of 
national  parties  began  .  The  issue  over  the 
adoption  of  the  Constitution  had  produced  Federal 
ists  and  Anti-Federalists,  but  with  its  adoption 
Anti-Federalism  as  such  became  a  thing  of  the  past. 
Opposition  to  the  Government  had  to  betake  itself 
to  the  political  platform  provided  by  the  successful 
introduction  of  the  new  system  of  government,  and 
was_  obliged  to  distinguish  itself  from  official 
Federalism  by  attacking  not  the  Constitution  but 
ijQBgwJn£li  thgConstitution  was  being 


construed  and  applied.     The  suspicion,  jealousy, 


PARTY  VIOLENCE  173 

and  dislike  with  which  the  new  government  was 
regarded  in  many  quarters  were  reflected  from  the 
beginning  in  the  behavior  of  Congress.  There 
was  from  the  first  a  disposition  to  find  fault  and  to 
antagonize,  and  as  time  went  on  this  disposition 
was  aggravated  by  the  great  scope  allowed  to 
misunderstanding  and  calumny  from  the  lack  of 
direct  contact  between  Congress  and  the  Adminis 
tration.  In  founding  a  new  partv7  Jfifferapp  nr>ly 
organized  forces  that  were  demanding  leadership. 
He  consolidated  the  existing  opposition,  and  gave 
it  the  name  " Republican  Party,"  implying  that 
its  purpose  was  to  resist  the  rise  of  monarchy  and 
the  growth  of  royal  prerogative  in  the  system  of 
government  which  was  introduced  by  the  adoption 
of  the  Constitution.  It  is  clear  enough  now  that 
the  implication  was  mere  calumny;  the  notion  that 
Washington  was  either  aiming  at  monarchy  or  was 
conniving  at  it  through  ignorance  was  a  grotesque 
travesty  of  the  shameful  situation  that  actually 
existed;  but  fictions,  pretenses,  slanders,  and 
calumnies  that  would  never  have  been  allowed 
utterance  if  the  Administration  and  Congress  had 
stood  face  to  face  now  had  opportunity  to  spread 
and  infect  public  opinion.  Hence  the  tone  of  ex 
treme  rage  that  dishonors  the  political  contention 


174  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

of  the  period  and  the  malice  that  stains  the  cor 
respondence  of  the  faction  chiefs. 

Although  a  distinct  party  opposition  appeared 
and  assumed  a  name  during  the  Second  Congress, 
it  disavowed  as  yet  any  opposition  to  Washington 
and  represented  its  actual  attempts  to  thwart 
the  measures  of  the  Administration  as  efforts  to 
counteract  Washington's  evil  advisers.  The  old 
constitutional  tradition  that  the  king  can  do  no 
wrong,  which  still  lingered  in  American  politics, 
tended  to  an  analogous  elevation  of  the  presidential 
office  above  the  field  of  party  strife,  while  leaving 
the  President's  Cabinet  advisers  fully  exposed  to  it, 
just  as  in  the  case  of  the  ministers  of  the  Crown  in 
England.  Allowance  must  be  made  for  the  effect 
of  this  tradition  when  judgment  is  passed  on  the 
political  activities  of  the  period.  Considered  with 
regard  to  present  standards  of  political  behavior, 
the  course  of  Jefferson  in  fomenting  opposition 
to  the  Administration  of  which  he  was  a  part  wears 
the  appearance  of  despicable  intrigue.  There  was 
nothing  mean  or  low  about  it,  however,  in  the 
opinion  of  himself  and  his  friends,  and  even  his 
enemies  would  have  allowed  it  to  be  within  the 
rules  of  the  game.  Jefferson  did  his  best  to  defeat 
in  Congress  measures  adopted  by  Washington 


PARTY  VIOLENCE  175 

on  the  advice  of  Hamilton,  and  he  also  did  his 
best  to  undermine  Washington's  confidence  in 
Hamilton.  In  his  personal  dealings  with  Washing 
ton,  Jefferson  had  every  advantage,  for  he  had 
Washington's  ear  and  could,  more  readily  than 
Hamilton,  direct  the  currents  of  unconscious  in 
fluence  that  produce  the  will  to  believe.  But 
Jefferson's  animosity  kept  tempting  him  to  over 
play  his  hand  in  a  way  that  was  fatal  in  the  face 
of  an  antagonist  so  keen  and  so  dexterous  as 
Hamilton. 

In  a  letter  of  May  23,  1792,  Jefferson  presented 
to  Washington  an  elaborate  indictment  of  Hamil 
ton's  policy  as  a  justification  of  his  own  behavior 
in  organizing  an  opposition  party  in  Congress.  He 
charged  Hamilton  with  subverting  the  character  of 
the  Government  by  his  financial  measures,  the  logi 
cal  consequence  of  which  would  be  "a  change  from 
the  present  republican  form  of  government  to  that 
of  a  monarchy."  Hence  the  need  for  organizing 
"the  Republican  party  who  wish  to  preserve  the 
government  in  its  present  form."  Washington 
thought  over  the  matter,  and  —  according  to 
Jefferson  —  reopened  the  subject  in  a  personal 
interview  on  July  10.  Being  now  fully  apprised 
of  Jefferson's  case,  Washington  himself  prepared  a 


176  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

brief  of  it,  divided  into  numbered  sections,  and 
applied  to  Hamilton  for  a  statement  of  his  ideas 
upon  the  "enumerated  discontents,"  framed  so 
"  that  those  ideas  may  be  applied  to  the  correspond 
ent  numbers. "  The  proceeding  is  a  fine  instance 
of  the  care  which  Washington  exercised  in  forming 
his  opinions.  Of  course,  as  soon  as  charges  of 
corruption  and  misdemeanor  were  reduced  to  exact 
statement  the  matter  was  put  just  where  Hamilton 
wanted  to  get  it,  and  in  the  grasp  of  his  powerful 
hands  its  trashy  character  was  promptly  displayed. 
It  is  needless  to  go  into  details,  now  that  public 
loans,  the  funding  of  floating  indebtedness  in 
excess  of  current  income,  and  the  maintenance  of  a 
national  banking  system  to  supply  machinery 
of  credit,  are  such  well  recognized  functions  that 
the  wonder  is  how  any  statesman  could  have  ever 
thought  otherwise.  Jefferson's  arguments,  when 
read  with  the  prepossessions  of  the  present  day, 
are  so  apt  to  leave  an  impression  of  absurdity  that 
they  constitute  a  troublesome  episode  for  his 
biographers. 

Jefferson's  maneuvering  utterly  failed  to  injure 
Hamilton  in  Washington's  esteem,  but  it  did  have 
the  effect  of  so  thoroughly  disgusting  Washington 
with  public  life  that  at  one  time  he  was  determined 


PARTY  VIOLENCE  177 

to  refuse  a  reelection,  and  even  went  so  far 
as  to  ask  Madison  to  prepare  a  valedictory  address 
for  him.  He  consented  to  serve  another  term 
most  reluctantly,  and  not  until  he  had  been  be 
sought  to  do  so  by  the  leaders  on  both  sides. 
Jefferson  was  as  urgent  as  was  Hamilton.  While 
Washington  was  still  wavering,  he  received  a 
strong  letter  from  Edmund  Randolph  that  doubt 
less  touched  his  soldierly  pride.  The  letter 
closed  with  this  sharp  argument: 

"You  suffered  yourself  to  yield  when  the  voice 
of  your  country  summoned  you  to  the  Adminis 
tration.  Should  a  civil  war  arise,  you  cannot  stay 
at  home.  And  how  much  easier  will  it  be  to 
disperse  the  factions,  which  are  rushing  to  this 
catastrophe,  than  to  subdue  them  after  they  shall 
appear  in  arms?  It  is  the  fixed  opinion  of  the 
world,  that  you  surrender  nothing  incomplete. " 

An  appeal  of  this  character  was  the  most  effect 
ive  that  could  possibly  be  addressed  to  Washing 
ton,  but  in  consenting  he  grumbled  over  the 
hardship  of  having  to  keep  in  active  service  at  his 
time  of  life  after  already  having  served  for  so  long 
a  time.  He  complained  that  his  hearing  was  get 
ting  bad  and  that  "perhaps  his  other  faculties 
might  fall  off  and  he  not  be  sensible  of  it." 


178  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

Acquiescence  in  Washington's  candidacy  made 
it  practically  impossible  for  the  Republican  party 
to  manifest  its  true  strength.  The  compliment 
of  Republican  support  was  awarded  to  Governor 
Clinton  of  New  York,  who  together  with  Washing 
ton  received  all  the  electoral  votes  of  Virginia, 
New  York,  North  Carolina,  and  Georgia.  A  stray 
electoral  vote  from  Pennsylvania  brought  Clinton's 
total  up  to  50,  whereas  John  Adams  received  77 
votes  which  re-elected  him  as  vice-president. 
Jefferson  received  only  four  electoral  votes,  all 
from  Kentucky,  but  his  poor  showing  in  this 
election  was  wholly  due  to  the  intricacy  of  the 
electoral  system,  and  his  party  meanwhile  de 
veloped  so  much  strength  that  when  the  Third 
Congress  met  on  December  2,  1793,  the  Republi 
cans  were  strong  enough  to  elect  the  speaker. 

Undeterred  by  this  circumstance,  Hamilton 
forced  the  fighting.  The  Jeffersonians  had  been 
excusing  the  defeat  they  had  received  in  attacking 
Hamilton  in  the  previous  Congress  on  the  ground 
that  the  House  had  acted  without  allowing  suf 
ficient  time  for  due  examination  of  the  evidence. 
This  plea  supplied  to  Hamilton  an  occasion  for~~ 
prompt  action.  Exactly  two  weeks  after  the 
meeting  of  Congress  he  addressed  a  letter  to  the 


PARTY  VIOLENCE  179 

Speaker,  in  which  he  declared:  "Unwilling  to  leave 
the  matter  on  such  a  footing,  I  have  concluded  to 
request  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  as  I  now 
do,  that  a  new  inquiry  may  be,  without  delay,  in 
stituted  in  some  mode,  most  effectual  for  an  ac 
curate  and  thorough  investigation;  and  I  will 
add,  that  the  more  comprehensive  it  is,  the  more 
agreeable  it  will  be  to  me. " 

Giles  promptly  took  up  the  challenge,  and 
moved  the  appointment  of  a  committee  to  examine 
the  state  of  the  Treasury  Department  in  all  its 
particulars.  Pending  action  by  the  House,  a  new 
complication  was  introduced,  which,  though  meant 
as  a  blow  at  Hamilton,  resulted  in  a  signal  triumph 
for  him.  His  enemies  got  hold  of  a  discharged 
clerk  of  the  Treasury  Department  by  means  of 
whom  they  now  tried  to  counteract  the  effect  of 
Hamilton's  challenge.  Two  days  after  Hamilton's 
letter  to  the  Speaker,  a  memorial  from  Andrew  G. 
Fraunces  was  laid  before  the  House  making  charges 
which  amounted  to  this:  that  there  was  a  com 
bination  between  Hamilton  and  other  officers  of 
the  Treasury  Department  to  evade  payment  of 
warrants  so  that  they  could  be  bought  up  for 
speculative  purposes.  Hamilton's  request  for  an 
investigation  was  allowed  to  lie  on  the  table,  but 


180  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

the  memorial  from  Fraunces  was  referred  to  a  select 
committee  of  which  Giles  was  a  member.  This 
circumstance  turned  out  to  be  much  to  Hamilton's 
advantage.  Giles  was  an  erect,  bold,  manly  foe; 
he  could  not  stomach  the  sort  of  testimony  upon 
which  depended  the  charges  against  Hamilton's 
personal  integrity,  and  he  concurred  in  a  report  on 
Hamilton  finding  that  the  evidence  was  "fully 
sufficient  to  justify  his  conduct;  and  that  in  the 
whole  course  of  this  transaction  the  Secretary  and 
other  officers  of  the  Treasury  have  acted  a  merito 
rious  part  towards  the  public. " 

Giles,  while  exonerating  Hamilton  of  the  charge 
of  dishonesty,  did  not  desist  from  pressing  his 
motion  for  further  investigation  of  the  Treasury 
Department.  But  he  admitted  that  imputations 
upon  the  Secretary's  integrity  had  been  quite 
removed,  and  he  now  urged  that  "the  primary 
object  of  the  resolution  is  to  ascertain  the  bound 
aries  of  discretion  and  authority  between  the 
Legislature  and  the  Treasury  Department."  In 
thus  shifting  his  ground  he  presented  a  new  issue 
in  which  the  House  —  and  indeed  Giles's  own 
party  associates  —  took  little  interest.  The  fact 
was  that  the  attack  on  Hamilton  had  failed,  that 
the  purpose  of  showing  him  to  be  unworthy  of 


PARTY  VIOLENCE  181 

Washington's  confidence  had  been  abandoned  as 
impracticable,  and  that  all  that  remained  was  a 
proposal  that  the  House  should  again  engage  in  a 
laborious  investigation  of  the  desirability  of 
attempting  a  new  delimitation  of  the  functions  of 
the  Treasury  Department  and  of  Congress.  But 
this,  of  course,  did  not  concern  Hamilton.  He 
had  acted  under  existing  laws  and  with  responsi 
bilities  which  were  defined  by  them.  If  Congress 
saw  fit  to  make  new  laws,  the  consequences  would 
fall  upon  his  successor  in  office,  not  upon  him  since 
he  was  about  to  retire.  If  Congress  made  fetters 
for  the  Secretary,  it  might  even  be  that  some 
member  of  Giles's  own  party  would  have  to  wear 
them.  Thus,  however  Giles's  latest  proposal 
might  be  viewed,  it  was  not  attractive.  Moreover, 
it  was  presented  at  a  time  when  the  House  had 
much  more  urgent  matters  to  consider.  The 
country  was  wild  with  excitement  over  the  retali 
ating  orders  and  decrees  of  Great  Britain  and 
France,  which  subjected  American  interests  to 
injury  from  both  sides.  Giles  and  Page  appear  to 
have  been  the  only  speakers  on  the  resolution  when 
it  was  taken  up  for  consideration  on  February  24, 
1794,  and  both  disclaimed  any  intention  of  reflect 
ing  upon  Hamilton.  The  resolution  received 


182  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

decent  interment  by  reference  to  a  committee,  with 
no  one  objecting.  The  practical  conclusion  of  the 
matter  was  that  Hamilton  had  beaten  his  enemies 
once  more  and  beaten  them  thoroughly. 

Before  resigning  his  office,  Hamilton  added  still 
another  great  achievement  to  his  record  of  illus 
trious  service  in  establishing  public  authority, 
The  violent  agitation  against  the  excise  act  pro 
moted  by  the  Jeffersonians  naturally  tended  to 
forcible  resistance.  One  of  the  counts  of  Jeffer 
son's  indictment  of  Hamilton's  policy  which  had 
been  presented  to  Washington  was  that  the  excise 
law  was  "of  odious  character  .  .  .  committing 
the  authority  of  the  Government  in  parts  where 
resistance  is  most  probable  and  coercion  least 
practicable. "  The  parts  thus  referred  to  were  the 
mountains  of  western  Pennsylvania.  The  popular 
discontent  which  arose  there  from  the  imposi 
tion  of  taxes  upon  their  principal  staple  —  distilled 
spirits  —  naturally  coalesced  with  the  agita 
tion  carried  on  against  Washington's  neutrality 
policy.  At  a  meeting  of  delegates  from  the  elec 
tion  districts  of  Allegheny  county  held  at  Pitts 
burgh,  resolutions  were  adopted  attributing  the 
policy  of  the  Government  "to  the  pernicious 
influence  of  stockholders."  This  was  an  echo  of 


PARTY  VIOLENCE  183 

Jefferson's  views.  But  the  resolutions  went  on  to 
declare:  "  Our  minds  feel  this  with  so  much 
indignancy,  that  we  are  almost  ready  to  wish 
for  a  state  of  revolution  and  the  guillotine  of 
France,  for  a  short  space,  in  order  to  inflict  punish 
ment  on  the  miscreants  that  enervate  and  disgrace 
our  Government. "  This  was  an  echo  of  the  talk 
in  the  political  clubs  that  had  been  formed  through 
out  the  country.  The  original  model  was  appar 
ently  the  Jacobin  club  of  Paris.  The  Philadelphia 
club  with  which  the  movement  started,  soon  after 
Genet's  arrival,  adopted  the  Jacobin  style  of  utter 
ance.  It  declared  its  object  to  be  the  preser 
vation  of  a  freedom  whose  existence  was  menaced 
by  a  "European  confederacy  transcendent  in 
power  and  unparalleled  in  iniquity,"  and  also  by 
"  the  pride  of  wealth  and  arrogance  of  power" 
displayed  in  the  United  States.  Writing  to  Gov 
ernor  Lee  of  Virginia,  Washington  said  that  he 
considered  "this  insurrection  as  the  first  formidable 
fruit  of  the  Democratic  Societies. " 

Hamilton  moved  warily,  doing  whatever  lay  in 
his  power  to  smooth  the  practical  working  of  the 
system  in  the  hope  of  "attaining  the  object  of 
the  laws  by  means  short  of  force. "  But  such  was 
the  inflamed  state  of  feeling  in  western  Penn- 


184  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

sylvania  that  no  course  was  acceptable  short  of 
abandonment  by  the  Government  of  efforts  to  en 
force  the  internal  revenue  laws.  During  1793,  there 
were  several  outrageous  attacks  on  agents  of  the 
Government,  and  the  execution  of  warrants  for  the 
arrest  of  rioters  was  refused  by  local  authority. 
People  who  showed  a  disposition  to  side  with  the 
Government  had  their  barns  burned.  A  revenue 
inspector  was  tarred  and  feathered,  and  was  run 
out  of  the  district.  The  patience  with  which  the 
Government  endured  insults  to  its  authority 
encouraged  the  mob  spirit.  On  July  16,  1794, 
the  house  of  Inspector  Neville  was  attacked  by  a 
mob,  and,  when  he  appealed  to  the  local  authori 
ties  for  protection,  he  was  notified  that  there  was 
such  a  general  combination  of  the  people  that  the 
laws  could  not  be  executed.  Neville,  a  revolution 
ary  veteran  of  tried  valor,  was  able  to  obtain  the 
help  of  an  officer  and  eleven  soldiers  from  Fort 
Pitt,  but  the  mob  was  too  numerous  and  too  well 
armed  to  be  withstood  by  so  weak  a  force.  After  a 
skirmish  in  which  the  mob  fired  the  buildings  and 
the  place  became  untenable,  the  troops  had  to 
surrender.  Soon  after  this  affair,  a  convention  of 
delegates  from  the  four  western  counties  of  Penn 
sylvania  was  called  to  meet  on  August  14  to  concert 


PARTY  VIOLENCE  185 

measures  for  united  action.  Organized  insurrec 
tion  had,  in  fact,  begun. 

"The  Government,"  said  Washington,  "could 
no  longer  remain  a  passive  spectator  of  the  con 
tempt  with  which  the  laws  were  treated."  But 
when  he  called  for  Cabinet  opinions,  the  old 
variance  at  once  showed  itself.  Randolph  thought 
that  calm  consideration  of  the  situation  "banishes 
every  idea  of  calling  the  militia  into  immediate 
action."  He  pointed  out  that  the  disaffected  region 
had  more  than  fifteen  thousand  white  males  above 
the  age  of  sixteen,  and  that  sympathy  with  the  in 
surgents  was  active  in  "  several  counties  in  Virginia 
having  a  strong  militia. "  There  was  also  the  risk 
that  the  insurgents  might  seek  British  aid,  in  which 
case  a  severance  of  the  Union  might  result.  Ran 
dolph  also  enlarged  upon  the  expense  that  would 
attend  military  operations  and  questioned  whether 
the  funds  could  be  obtained.  He  advised  a  pro 
clamation  and  the  appointment  of  commissioners 
to  treat  with  the  insurgents.  Should  such  means 
fail,  and  should  it  appear  that  the  judiciary 
authority  was  withstood,  then  at  last  military  force 
might  be  employed. 

Hamilton  held  that  "a  competent  force  of  militia 
should  be  called  forth  and  employed  to  suppress 


186  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

the  insurrection,  and  support  the  civil  authority. " 
It  appeared  to  him  that  "the  very  existence  of  the 
Government  demands  this  course. "  He  urged  that 
the  force  employed  ought  "to  be  an  imposing  one, 
such,  if  practicable,  as  will  deter  from  opposition, 
save  the  effusion  of  the  blood  of  the  citizens,  and 
serve  the  object  to  be  accomplished."  He  pro 
posed  a  force  of  twelve  thousand  men,  of  whom 
three  thousand  were  to  be  cavalry,  and  he  advised 
that,  in  addition  to  the  Pennsylvania  militia, 
New  Jersey,  Maryland,  and  Virginia  should  each 
contribute  a  quota. 

All  the  members  of  the  Cabinet  except  Randolph 
concurred  in  Hamilton's  opinion.  The  practical 
execution  of  the  measures  was  entrusted  to 
Hamilton,  who  acted  with  great  sagacity.  Some 
appearance  of  timidity  and  inertia  in  Pennsylvania 
state  authority  was  indirectly  but  effectually  coun 
teracted  by  measures  which  showed  that  the  mili 
tary  expedition  would  move  even  if  Pennsylvania 
held  back.  Although  some  troops  were  to  gather 
at  Carlisle,  Pennsylvania,  others  were  to  meet  at 
Cumberland  Fort,  Virginia.  The  business  was  so 
shrewdly  managed  that  Pennsylvania  state  author 
ity  fell  obediently  into  line,  and  the  insurgents 
were  so  cowed  by  the  determined  action  of  the  Gov- 


PARTY  VIOLENCE  187 

ernment  that  they  submitted  without  a  struggle. 
Washington  thought  that  this  event  would  react 
upon  the  clubs  and  "effectuate  their  annihilation 
sooner  than  it  might  otherwise  have  happened." 
A  general  collapse  among  them  certainly  followed, 
and  they  disappeared  from  the  political  scene. 

It  is  in  the  nature  of  precaution  that  the  more 
successful  it  is  the  less  necessary  it  appears  to  have 
been,  and  thus  the  complete  success  of  Hamilton's 
management  furnished  his  enemies  with  a  new 
argument  against  him  of  which  they  afterwards 
made  great  use.  The  costly  military  expedition 
that  had  no  fighting  to  do  was  continually  held  up 
to  public  ridicule.  That  the  expense  was  trifling 
in  comparison  with  the  objects  achieved  must 
deeply  impress  any  one  who  examines  the  records 
of  the  times.  A  mistake  might  have  been  fatal 
to  the  existence  of  the  Government.  It  has 
become  so  powerful  and  massive  since  that  time, 
that  we  can  hardly  realize  what  a  rickety  structure 
it  then  was,  and  how  readily,  in  less  capable  hands, 
it  might  have  collapsed. 

Randolph,  then  Secretary  of  State,  seems  to 
have  been  in  a  panic.  Fauchet,  the  French 
minister  at  that  time,  reported  to  his  government 
that  Randolph  called  upon  him  and  with  a  grief- 


188  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

stricken  countenance  declared,  "It  is  all  over;  a 
civil  war  is  about  to  ravage  our  unhappy  country. " 
He  represented  to  Fauchet  that  there  were  four 
men  whose  talents,  influence,  and  energy  might 
save  it.  "But  debtors  of  English  merchants,  they 
will  be  deprived  of  their  liberty  if  they  take  the 
smallest  step."  He  wanted  to  know  whether 
Fauchet  could  lend  "funds  sufficient  to  shelter 
them  from  English  persecution."  Fauchet's 
letter  was  captured  by  the  British  and  made 
public.  Randolph's  explanations  did  not  clear  up 
the  obscurity  that  surrounds  the  affair.  His 
version  was  that  the  four  men  were  flour  mer 
chants  who  were  being  pressed  by  their  creditors 
"and  that  the  money  was  wanted  only  for  the 
purpose  of  paying  them  what  was  actually  due  to 
them  in  virtue  of  existing  contracts. "  Even  on 
his  own  showing  it  was  a  shady  transaction,  and 
he  retired  from  Washington's  Cabinet  under  a 
cloud. 

Washington  always  had  difficulty  about  the 
composition  of  his  Cabinet.  A  capable  man  had 
been  found  to  succeed  Randolph  as  Attorney- 
General  in  the  person  of  William  Bradford,  an  able 
Pennsylvania  lawyer,  but  he  died  in  1795,  and  was 
succeeded  by  Charles  Lee  of  Virginia.  When 


PARTY  VIOLENCE  189 

Knox  resigned  in  1794,  the  vacancy  was  filled 
by  transferring  to  the  War  Department  Timothy 
Pickering  of  Massachusetts,  who  had  previously 
served  as  Postmaster- General.  When  Hamilton 
retired,  January,  1795,  he  was  succeeded  by  Oliver 
Wolcott  of  Connecticut,  who  had  been  Comptrol 
ler  of  the  Treasury.  After  Randolph  has  been 
discredited  by  the  Fauchet  letter,  the  office  of  Secre 
tary  of  State  went  a-begging.  It  was  offered  to 
William  Patterson  of  New  Jersey,  to  Thomas  John 
son  of  Maryland,  to  Charles  Cotesworth  Pinckney 
of  South  Carolina,  but  all  these  men  declined. 
Washington  got  word  that  Patrick  Henry,  the  old 
antagonist  of  the  Constitution,  was  showing 
Federalist  leanings  in  opposition  to  Jefferson  and 
Madison,  and  Henry  was  then  tendered  the  ap 
pointment,  but  he  too  declined.  Others  were 
approached  but  all  refused,  and  meanwhile  Picker 
ing,  though  Secretary  of  War,  also  attended  to  the 
work  of  the  State  Department.  The  matter  was 
finally  settled  by  permanently  attaching  Pickering 
to  the  State  Department,  while  the  vacancy  thus 
created  at  the  head  of  the  War  Department  was 
filled  by  James  McHenry,  an  appointment  which 
Washington  himself  described  as  "Hobson's 
choice. " 


190  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

Hamilton,  although  out  of  the  Cabinet,  still 
remained  a  trusted  adviser,  and  he  rendered  splen 
did  service  at  a  dangerous  crisis.  In  spite  of  the 
fact  that  the  Jay  treaty  had  been  ratified  by  the 
Senate  in  June,  1795,  it  was  an  issue  in  the  Fall 
elections  that  year.  Jefferson  held  that  the  treaty 
was  an  "execrable  thing,"  an  "infamous  act, 
which  is  really  nothing  more  than  a  treaty  of  alli 
ance  between  England  and  the  Anglo-men  of  this 
country  against  the  Legislature  and  the  people  of 
the  United  States. "  Giles,  who  had  been  in  close 
consultation  with  Jefferson,  moved  with  character 
istic  energy  to  translate  Jefferson's  views  into 
congressional  action. 

The  Fourth  Congress  met  on  December  7,  1795, 
and  although  a  Federalist,  Jonathan  Dayton  of 
New  Jersey  was  elected  Speaker,  the  Republicans 
were  strong  enough  to  tone  down  the  reply  to  the 
President's  address  by  substituting  for  an  expres 
sion  of  "undiminished  confidence"  an  acknowledg 
ment  of  "zealous  and  faithful  services,"  which 
expressed  "approval  of  his  course."  On  March 
24, 1796,  the  House  by  a  vote  of  62  to  37  adopted  a 
resolution  calling  upon  the  President  to  lay  before 
it  his  instructions  to  Jay,  "together  with  the  cor 
respondence  and  the  other  documents  relative  to 


PARTY  VIOLENCE  191 

said   treaty."    Advised   by   Hamilton   and   sus 
tained  by  his  whole  Cabinet,  Washington  replied 
on  March  30,   by  declining  to  comply  because 
concurrence  of  the  House  was  not  necessary  to  give 
validity  to  the  treaty,  and  "because  of  the  neces 
sity  of  maintaining  the  boundaries  fixed  by  the 
Constitution  between  the  different  departments." 
The  House  retorted  by  a  resolution  declaring  its 
right  to  judge  the  merits  of  the  case  when  appli 
cation  was  made  for  an  appropriation  to  give  effect 
to  a  treaty.     Debate  on  this  issue,  which  is  still 
an  open  one  in  our  constitutional  system,  began 
on  April  14  and  continued  for  sixteen  days.     Madi 
son  opposed  the  execution  of  the  treaty,  but  the 
principal  speech  was  made  by  Giles,  whose  argu 
ment  covers  twenty-eight  columns  in  the  Annals. 
As    the    struggle    proceeded,    the    Jeffersonians 
lost  ground.     It  became  evident  that  weighty  ele 
ments  of  public  opinion  were  veering  around  to  the 
support  of  the  treaty  as  the  best  arrangement 
attainable    in    the    circumstances.     The    balance 
of  strength  became  so  close  that  the  scales  were 
probably  turned  by  a  speech  of  wonderful  power 
and  eloquence  delivered  by  Fisher  Ames.     A  deci 
sion  was  reached  on  April  30,  the  test  question 
being  on  declaring  the  treaty  "highly  objection- 


192  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

able."  Forty-eight  votes  were  cast  on  each  side 
and  the  Speaker  gave  his  decision  for  the  negative. 
In  the  end,  the  House  stood  51  to  48  in  favor  of 
carrying  the  treaty  into  effect.  Only  four  votes 
for  the  treaty  came  from  the  section  south  of 
Mason  and  Dixon's  line. 

During  the  agitation  over  the  Jay  treaty  the 
rage  of  party  spirit  turned  full  against  Washington 
himself.  He  was  blackguarded  and  abused  in 
every  possible  way.  He  was  accused  of  having 
shown  incapacity  while  General  and  of  having 
embezzled  public  funds  while  President.  He  was 
nicknamed  "the  Step-Father  of  his  country." 
The  imputation  on  his  honor  stung  so  keenly  that 
he  declared  "he  would  rather  be  in  his  grave  than 
in  the  Presidency, "  and  in  private  correspondence 
he  complained  that  he  had  been  assailed  "in  terms 
so  exaggerated  and  indecent  as  could  scarcely 
be  applied  to  a  Nero,  a  notorious  defaulter,  or 
even  to  a  common  pickpocket."  The  only  re 
joinder  which  his  dignity  permitted  him  to  make  is 
that  contained  in  his  Farewell  Address,  dated 
September  17,  1796,  in  which  he  made  a  modest 
estimate  of  his  services  and  made  a  last  affectionate 
appeal  to  the  people  whom  he  had  so  faithfully 
served. 


PARTY  VIOLENCE  193 

The  Farewell  Address  was  not  a  communication 
to  Congress.  It  was  issued  in  view  of  the  approach 
ing  presidential  election,  to  give  public  notice  that 
he  declined  "being  considered  among  the  number 
of  those  out  of  whom  a  choice  is  to  be  made. "  The 
usual  address  to  Congress  was  delivered  by 
Washington  on  December  7,  1796,  shortly  after 
the  opening  of  the  second  session  of  the  Fourth 
Congress.  The  occasion  was  connected  in  the 
public  mind  with  his  recent  valedictory,  and  Con 
gress  was  ready  to  vote  a  reply  of  particularly 
cordial  tenor.  Giles  stood  to  his  guns  to  the  last, 
speaking  and  voting  against  complimentary  resolu 
tions.  "He  hoped  gentlemen  would  compliment 
the  President  privately,  as  individuals;  at  the  same 
time,  he  hoped  such  adulation  would  never  pervade 
the  House."  He  held  that  "the  Administration 
has  been  neither  wise  nor  firm, "  and  he  acknowl 
edged  that  he  was  "one  of  those  who  do  not  think 
so  much  of  the  President  as  some  others  do. "  On 
this  issue  Madison  forsook  him,  and  Giles  was  voted 
down,  67  to  12.  Among  the  eleven  who  stood 
by  Giles  was  a  new  member  who  made  his  first 
appearance  that  session  —  Andrew  Jackson  of 
Tennessee.  In  later  years,  when  Giles's  opinions 
had  been  modified  by  experience  and  reflection, 

13 


194  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

he  regretted  his  attitude  towards  Washington.  It 
is  due  to  Giles  to  say  that  he  did  not  stab  in  the 
dark.  He  had  qualities  of  character  that  under 
better  constitutional  arrangements  would  have 
invigorated  the  functions  of  the  House  as  an  or 
gan  of  control,  but  at  that  time,  with  the  separa 
tion  that  had  been  introduced  between  the  House 
and  the  Administration,  his  energy  was  mischievous 
and  his  intrepidity  was  a  misfortune  to  himself  and 
to  his  party. 

Washington's  term  dragged  to  its  close  like  so 
much  slow  torture.  Others  might  resign,  but  he 
had  to  stand  at  his  post  until  the  end,  and  it  was  a 
happy  day  for  him  when  he  got  his  discharge.  His 
elation  was  so  manifest  that  it  was  noticed  by  John 
Adams.  Writing  to  his  wife  about  the  ceremony 
the  day  after  the  inauguration,  Adams  remarked 
that  Washington  "seemed  to  me  to  enjoy  a  triumph 
over  me.  Methought  I  heard  him  say,  'Ay!  I 
am  fairly  out,  and  you  fairly  in!  See  which  of 
us  will  be  the  happiest.'"  ) 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE  PERSONAL  RULE  OF  JOHN  ADAMS 

THE  narrow  majority  by  which  John  Adams 
was  elected  did  not  accurately  reflect  the  exist 
ing  state  of  party  strength.  The  electoral  college 
system,  by  its  nature,  was  apt  to  distort  the 
situation.  Originally  the  electors  voted  for  two 
persons  without  designating  their  preference  for 
President.  There  was  no  inconvenience  on  that 
account  while  Washington  was  a  candidate,  since 
he  was  the  first  choice  of  all  the  electors;  but  in 
1796,  with  Washington  out  of  the  field,  both  parties 
were  in  the  dilemma  that,  if  they  voted  solidly  for 
two  candidates,  the  vote  of  the  electoral  college 
would  not  determine  who  should  be  President.  To 
avert  this  situation,  the  adherents  of  a  presidential 
candidate  would  have  to  scatter  votes  meant  to 
have  only  vice-presidential  significance.  This 
explains  the  wide  distribution  of  votes  that  char 
acterized  the  working  of  the  system  until  it  was 

195 


>6  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

changed  by  the  Twelfth  Amendment  adopted  in 
1804. 

In  1796,  the  electoral  college  gave  votes  to  thir 
teen  candidates.  The  Federalist  ticket  was  John 
Adams  and  Thomas  Pinckney  of  South  Carolina. 
Hamilton  urged  equal  support  of  both  as  the  surest 
way  to  defeat  Jefferson;  but  eighteen  Adams  elec 
tors  in  New  England  withheld  votes  from  Pinckney 
to  make  sure  that  he  should  not  slip  in  ahead  of 
Adams.  Had  they  not  done  so,  Pinckney  would 
have  been  chosen  President,  a  possibility  which 
Hamilton  foresaw  because  of  Pinckney's  popu 
larity  in  the  South.  New  York,  New  Jersey,  and 
Delaware  voted  solidly  for  Adams  and  Pinckney 
as  Hamilton  had  recommended,  but  South  Caro 
lina  voted  solidly  for  both  Jefferson  and  Pinckney, 
and  moreover  Pinckney  received  scattering  votes 
elsewhere  in  the  South.  The  action  of  the  Adams 
electors  in  New  England  defeated  Pinckney,  and 
gave  Jefferson  the  vice-presidency,  the  vote  for 
the  leading  candidates  being  71  for  Adams,  68  for 
Jefferson,  and  59  for  Pinckney.  The  tendency  of 
such  conditions  to  inspire  political  feuds  and  to 
foster  factional  animosity  is  quite  obvious.  This 
situation  must  be  borne  in  mind,  in  order  to  make 
intelligible  the  course  of  Adams's  administration. 


THE  PERSONAL  RULE  OF  JOHN  ADAMS  197 

Adams  had  an  inheritance  of  trouble  from  the 
same  source  which  had  plagued  Washington's 
administration,  —  the  efforts  of  revolutionary 
France  to  rule  the  United  States.  In  selecting 
Monroe  to  succeed  Morris,  Washington  knew 
that  the  former  was  as  friendly  to  the  French 
Revolution  as  Morris  had  been  opposed  to  it, 
and  hence  he  hoped  that  Monroe  would  be  able 
to  impart  a  more  friendly  feeling  to  the  relations 
of  the  two  countries.  Monroe  arrived  in  Paris 
just  after  the  fall  of  Robespierre.  The  Commit 
tee  of  Public  Safety  then  in  possession  of  the 
executive  authority  hesitated  to  receive  him. 
Monroe  wrote  to  the  President  of  the  National 
Convention  then  sitting,  and  a  decree  was  at  once 
passed  that  the  Minister  of  the  United  States 
should  "be  introduced  in  the  bosom  of  the  Con 
vention."  Monroe  presented  himself  on  August 
15,  1794,  and  made  a  glowing  address.  He  des 
canted  upon  the  trials  by  which  America  had  won 
her  independence  and  declared  that  "France,  our 
ally  and  friend,  and  who  aided  in  the  contest,  has 
now  embarked  in  the  same  noble  career."  The 
address  was  received  with  enthusiasm,  the  Presi 
dent  of  the  Convention  drew  Monroe  to  his  bosom 
in  a  fraternal  embrace;  and  it  was  decreed  that 


198  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

"the  flags  of  the  United  States  of  America  shall  be 
joined  to  those  of  France,  and  displayed  in  the  hall 
of  the  sittings  of  the  Convention,  in  sign  of  the 
union  and  eternal  fraternity  of  the  two  peoples." 
In  compliance  with  this  decree  Monroe  soon  after 
presented  an  American  flag  to  the  Convention. 

When  the  news  of  these  proceedings  reached  the 
State  Department,  a  sharp  note  was  sent  to  Monroe 
"to  recommend  caution  lest  we  be  obliged  at  some 
time  or  other  to  explain  away  or  disavow  an  excess 
of  fervor,  so  as  to  reduce  it  down  to  the  cool  system 
of  neutrality. "  The  French  Government  regarded 
the  Jay  treaty  as  an  affront  and  as  a  violation  of 
our  treaties  with  France.  Many  American  vessels 
were  seized  and  confiscated  with  their  cargoes,  and 
hundreds  of  American  citizens  were  imprisoned. 
Washington  thought  that  Monroe  was  entirely  too 
submissive  to  such  proceedings;  therefore,  on 
August  22,  1796,  Monroe  was  recalled  and  soon 
after  Charles  Cotesworth  Pinckney  was  appointed 
in  his  stead. 

The  representation  of  France  in  the  United 
States  had  been  as  mutable  as  her  politics.  Fau- 
chet,  who  succeeded  Genet,  retired  in  June,  1795, 
and  was  succeeded  by  Adet,  who  like  his  predeces 
sors,  carried  on  active  interference  with  American 


THE  PERSONAL  RULE  OF  JOHN  ADAMS  199 

politics,  and  even  attempted  to  affect  the  presi 
dential  election  by  making  public  a  note  addressed 
to  the  Secretary  of  State  complaining  of  the  be 
havior  of  the  Administration.  In  Adams's  opinion 
this  note  had  some  adverse  effect  in  Pennsylvania 
but  no  other  serious  consequences,  since  it  was 
generally  resented.  Meanwhile  Pinckney  arrived 
in  France  in  December,  1796,  and  the  Directory 
refused  to  receive  him.  He  was  not  even  per 
mitted  to  remain  in  Paris;  but  honors  were 
showered  upon  Monroe  as  he  took  his  leave.  In 
March,  1797,  Adet  withdrew,  and  diplomatic 
relations  between  the  two  countries  were  entirely 
suspended.  By  a  decree  made  two  days  before 
Adams  took  office,  the  Directory  proclaimed  as 
pirates,  to  be  treated  without  mercy,  all  Americans 
found  serving  on  board  British  vessels,  and  ordered 
the  seizure  of  all  American  vessels  not  provided 
with  lists  of  their  crews  in  proper  form.  Though 
made  under  cover  of  the  treaty  of  1778,  this  latter 
provision  ran  counter  to  its  spirit  and  purpose. 
Captures  of  American  ships  began  at  once.  As 
Joel  Barlow  wrote,  the  decree  of  March  2,  1797, 
"was  meant  to  be  little  short  of  a  declaration  of 


war.'3 


The  curious  situation  which  ensued  from  the 


200  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

efforts  made  by  Adams  to  deal  with  this  emergency 
cannot  be  understood  without  reference  to  his 
personal  peculiarities.  He  was  vain,  learned,  and 
self-sufficient,  and  he  had  the  characteristic  defect 
of  pedantry:  he  overrated  intelligence  and  he  un 
derrated  character.  Hence  he  was  inclined  to  re 
sent  Washington's  eminence  as  being  due  more 
to  fortune  than  to  merit,  and  he  had  for  Hamilton 
an  active  hatred  compounded  of  wounded  vanity 
and  a  sense  of  positive  injury.  He  knew  that 
Hamilton  thought  slightingly  of  his  political 
capacity  and  had  worked  against  his  political 
advancement,  and  he  was  too  lacking  in  magna 
nimity  to  do  justice  to  Hamilton's  motives.  His 
state  of  mind  was  well  known  to  the  Republican 
leaders,  who  hoped  to  be  able  to  use  him.  Jeffer 
son  wrote  to  Madison  suggesting  that  "it  would 
be  worthy  of  consideration  whether  it  would  not 
be  for  the  public  good  to  come  to  a  good  under 
standing  with  him  as  to  his  future  elections." 
Jefferson  himself  called  on  Adams  and  showed  him 
self  desirous  of  cordial  relations.  Mrs.  Adams 
responded  by  expressions  of  pleasure  at  the  suc 
cess  of  Jefferson,  between  whom  and  her  husband, 
she  said,  there  had  never  been  "any  public  or 
private  animosity."  Such  rejoicing  over  the 


THE  PERSONAL  RULE  OF  JOHN  ADAMS  201 

defeat  of  the  Federalist  candidate  for  Vice-Presi 
dent  did  not  promote  good  feeling  between  the 
President  and  the  Federalist  leaders. 

The  morning  before  the  inauguration,  Adams 
called  on  Jefferson  and  discussed  with  him  the 
policy  to  be  pursued  toward  France.  The  idea 
had  occurred  to  Adams  that  a  good  impression 
might  be  made  by  sending  out  a  mission  of  extra 
ordinary  weight  and  dignity,  and  he  wanted  to 
know  whether  Jefferson  himself  would  not  be 
willing  to  head  such  a  mission.  Without  checking 
Adams's  friendly  overtures,  Jefferson  soon  brought 
him  to  agree  that  it  would  not  be  proper  for  the 
Vice-President  to  accept  such  a  post.  Adams  then 
proposed  that  Madison  should  go.  On  March  6, 
Jefferson  reported  to  Adams  that  Madison  would 
not  accept.  Then  for  the  first  time,  according 
to  Adams's  own  account,  he  consulted  a  member  of 
his  Cabinet,  supposed  to  be  Wolcott  although  the 
name  is  not  mentioned. 

Adams  took  over  Washington's  Cabinet  as  it  was 
finally  constituted  after  the  retirement  of  Jefferson 
and  Hamilton  and  the  virtual  expulsion  of  Ran 
dolph.  The  process  of  change  had  made  it  entirely 
Federalist  in  its  political  complexion,  and  entirely 
devoted  to  Washington  and  Hamilton  in  its  per- 


202  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

sonal  sympathies.  That  Adams  should  have 
adopted  it  as  his  own  Cabinet  has  been  generally 
regarded  as  a  blunder,  but  it  was  a  natural  step  for 
him  to  take.  To  get  as  capable  men  to  accept 
the  portfolios  as  those  then  holding  them  would 
have  been  difficult,  so  averse  had  prominent  men 
become  to  putting  themselves  in  a  position  to  be 
harried  by  Congress,  with  no  effective  means  of 
explaining  and  justifying  their  cpnduct.  Congress 
then  had  a  prestige  which  it  does  not  now  possess, 
and  its  utterances  then  received  consideration  not 
now  accorded.  Whenever  presidential  electors  were 
voted  for  directly  by  the  people,  the  poll  was  small 
compared  with  the  vote  for  members  of  Congress. 
Moreover,  there  was  then  a  feeling  that  the  Cabi 
net  should  be  regarded  as  a  bureaucracy,  and  for  a 
long  period  this  conception  tended  to  give  remark 
able  permanence  to  its  composition. 

When  the  personal  attachments  of  the  Cabinet 
chiefs  are  considered,  it  is  easy  to  imagine  the  dis 
may  and  consternation  produced  by  the  dealings 
of  Adams  with  Jefferson.  By  the  time  Adams 
consulted  the  members  of  his  Cabinet,  they  had 
become  suspicious  of  his  motives  and  distrustful 
of  his  character.  Before  long  they  were  writing 
to  Washington  and  Hamilton  for  advice,  and  were 


THE  PERSONAL  RULE  OF  JOHN  ADAMS  203 

endeavoring  to  manage  Adams  by  concerted  action. 
In  this  course  they  had  the  cordial  approval  of 
leading  Federalists,  who  would  write  privately  to 
members  of  the  Cabinet  and  give  counsel  as  to 
procedure.  Wolcott,  a  Federalist  leader  in  Con 
necticut,  warned  his  son,  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  that  Adams  was  "a  man  of  great 
vanity,  pretty  capricious,  of  a  very  moderate 
share  of  prudence,  and  of  far  less  real  abilities 
than  he  believes  himself  to  possess,"  so  that  "it 
will  require  a  deal  of  address  to  render  him 
the  service  which  it  will  be  essential  for  him  to 
receive. " 

The  policy  to  be  pursued  was  still  unsettled  when 
news  came  of  the  insulting  rejection  of  Pinckney 
and  the  domineering  attitude  assumed  by  France. 
On  March  25,  Adams  issued  a  call  for  the  meeting 
of  Congress  on  May  15,  and  then  set  about  getting 
the  advice  of  his  Cabinet.  He  presented  a  schedule 
of  interrogatories  to  which  he  asked  written 
answers.  The  attitude  of  the  Cabinet  was  at  first 
hostile  to  Adams's  favorite  notion  of  a  special 
mission,  but  as  Hamilton  counseled  deference  to 
the  President's  views,  the  Cabinet  finally  approved 
the  project.  Adams  appointed  John  Marshall 
of  Virginia  and  Elbridge  Gerry  of  Massachusetts 


204  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

to  serve  in  conjunction  with  Pinckney,  who  had 
taken  refuge  in  Holland. 

Strong  support  for  the  Government  in  taking  a 
firm  stand  against  France  was  manifested  in  both 
Houses  of  Congress.  Hamilton  aided  Secretary 
Wolcott  in  preparing  a  scheme  of  taxation  by 
which  the  revenue  could  be  increased  to  provide  for 
national  defense.  With  the  singular  fatality  that 
characterized  Federalist  party  behavior  through 
out  Adams's  Administration,  however,  all  the  items 
proposed  were  abandoned  except  one  for  stamp 
taxes.  What  had  been  offered  as  a  scheme  whose 
particulars  were  justifiable  by  their  relation  to  the 
whole  was  converted  into  a  measure  which  was 
traditionally  obnoxious  in  itself,  and  was  now  made 
freshly  odious  by  an  appearance  of  discrimination 
and  partiality.  The  Federalists  did  improve 
their  opportunity  in  the  way  of  general  legislation : 
much  needed  laws  were  passed  to  stop  privateer 
ing,  to  protect  the  ports,  and  to  increase  the  naval 
armament;  and  Adams  was  placed  in  a  much  better 
position  to  maintain  neutrality  than  Washington 
had  been.  Fear  of  another  outbreak  of  yellow 
fever  accelerated  the  work  of  Congress,  and  the 
extra  session  lasted  only  a  little  over  three  weeks. 

Such  was  the  slowness  of  communication  in  those 


THE  PERSONAL  RULE  OF  JOHN  ADAMS  205 

days  that,  when  Congress  reassembled  at  the  regu 
lar  session  in  November,  no  decisive  news  had 
arrived  of  the  fate  of  the  special  mission.  Adams 
with  proper  prudence  thought  it  would  be  wise  to 
consider  what  should  be  done  in  case  of  failure. 
On  January  24,  1798,  he  addressed  to  the  members 
of  his  Cabinet  a  letter  requesting  their  views. 
No  record  is  preserved  of  the  replies  of  the  Secre 
taries  of  State  and  of  the  Treasury.  Lee,  the  At 
torney-General,  recommended  a  declaration  of 
war.  McHenry,  the  Secretary  of  War,  offered  a 
series  of  seven  propositions  to  be  recommended  to 
Congress:  1.  Permission  to  merchant  ships  to 
arm ;  2.  The  construction  of  twenty  sloops  of  war ; 

3.  The  completion  of  frigates  already  authorized; 

4.  Grant  to  the  President  of  authority  to  provide 
ships  of  the  line,  not  exceeding  ten,  "by  such  means 
as  he  may  judge  best."     5.     Suspension  of  the 
treaties    with    France;    6.     An    army    of    sixteen 
thousand  men,  with  provision  for  twenty  thousand 
more  should  occasion  demand;    7.     A  loan  and  an 
adequate  system  of  taxation. 

These  recommendations  are  substantially  identi 
cal  with  those  made  by  Hamilton  in  a  letter  to 
Pickering,  and  the  presumption  is  strong  that 
McHenry's  paper  is  a  product  of  Hamilton's 


206  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

influence,  and  that  it  had  the  concurrence  of  Picker 
ing  and  Wolcott.  The  suggestion  that  the  Presi 
dent  should  be  given  discretionary  authority  in 
the  matter  of  procuring  ships  of  the  line  contem 
plated  the  possibility  of  obtaining  them  by  trans 
fer  from  England,  not  through  formal  alliance  but 
as  an  incident  of  a  cooperation  to  be  arranged  by 
negotiation,  whose  objects  would  also  include  aid 
in  placing  a  loan  and  permission  for  American  ships 
to  join  British  convoys.  This  feature  of  Mc- 
Henry's  recommendations  could  not  be  carried  out. 
Pickering  soon  informed  Hamilton  that  the  old 
animosities  were  still  so  active  "in  some  breasts" 
that  the  plan  of  cooperation  was  impracticable. 

Meanwhile  the  composite  mission  had  accom 
plished  nothing  except  to  make  clear  the  actual 
character  of  French  policy.  When  the  envoys 
arrived  in  France,  the  Directory  had  found  in  Na 
poleon  Bonaparte  an  instrument  of  power  that  was 
stunning  Europe  by  its  tremendous  blows.  That 
instrument  had  not  yet  turned  to  the  reorgani 
zation  of  France  herself,  and  at  the  time  it  served 
the  rapacious  designs  of  the  Directory.  Europe 
was  looted  wherever  the  arms  of  France  prevailed, 
and  the  levying  of  tribute  both  on  public  and  on 
private  account  was  the  order  of  the  day.  Talley- 


THE  PERSONAL  RULE  OF  JOHN  ADAMS  207 

rand  was  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  he 
treated  the  envoys  with  a  mixture  of  menace  and 
cajolery.  It  was  a  part  of  his  tactics  to  sever  the 
Republican  member,  Gerry,  from  his  Federalist 
colleagues.  Gerry  was  weak  enough  to  be  caught 
by  Talleyrand's  snare,  and  he  was  foolish  enough 
to  attribute  the  remonstrances  of  his  colleagues  to 
vanity.  "They  were  wounded,"  he  wrote,  "by 
the  manner  in  which  they  had  been  treated  by  the 
Government  of  France,  and  the  difference  which 
had  been  used  in  respect  to  me. "  Gerry's  conduct 
served  to  weaken  and  delay  the  negotiations,  but 
he  eventually  united  with  his  colleagues  in  a  de 
tailed  report  to  the  State  Department,  which  was 
transmitted  to  Congress  by  the  President  on  April 
3,  1798.  In  the  original  the  names  of  the  French 
officials  concerned  were  written  at  full  length 
in  the  Department  cipher.  In  making  a  copy  for 
Congress,  Secretary  Pickering  substituted  for  the 
names  the  terminal  letters  of  the  alphabet,  and 
hence  the  report  has  passed  into  history  as  the 
X.  Y.  Z.  dispatches. 

The  story,  in  brief,  was  that  on  arriving  in  Paris 
the  envoys  called  on  Talleyrand,  who  said  that  he 
was  busy  at  that  very  time  on  a  report  to  the 
Directory  on  American  affairs,  and  in  a  few  days 


208  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

would  let  them  know  how  matters  stood.  A  few 
days  later  they  received  notice  through  Talley 
rand's  secretary  that  the  Directory  was  greatly 
exasperated  by  expressions  used  in  President 
Adams's  address  to  Congress,  that  the  envoys 
would  probably  not  be  received  until  further 
conference,  and  that  persons  might  be  appointed  to 
treat  with  them.  A  few  more  days  elapsed,  and 
then  three  persons  presented  themselves  as  com- 
ing  from  Talleyrand.  They  were  Hottinguer, 
Bellamy,  and  Hauteval,  designated  as  X.  Y.  Z.  in 
the  communication  to  Congress.  They  said  that  a 
friendly  reception  by  the  Directory  could  not  be 
obtained  unless  the  United  States  would  assist 
France  by  a  loan,  and  that  "a  sum  of  money  was 
required  for  the  pocket  of  the  Directory  and 
Ministers,  which  would  be  at  the  disposal  of  M. 
Talleyrand."  This  "douceur  to  the  Directory ," 
amounting  to  approximately  $240,000,  was  urged 
with  great  persistence  as  an  indispensable  condi 
tion  of  friendly  relations.  The  envoys  temporized 
and  pointed  out  that  their  Government  would  have 
to  be  consulted  on  the 'matter  of  the  loan.  The 
wariness  of  the  envoys  made  Talleyrand's  agents 
the  more  insistent  about  getting  the  "  douceur. "  At 
one  of  the  interviews  Hottinguer  exclaimed: — 


THE  PERSONAL  RULE  OF  JOHN  ADAMS  209 

"Gentlemen,  you  do  not  speak  to  the  point; it  is 
money;  it  is  expected  that  you  will  offer  money." 
The  envoys  replied  that  on  this  point  their  answer 
had  already  been  given.  "  'No, '  said  he,  'you  have 
not:  what  is  your  answer?'  We  replied,  'It  is  no; 
no;  not  a  sixpence."  This  part  of  the  envoys' 
report  soon  received  legendary  embellishment,  and 
in  innumerable  stump  speeches  it  rang  out  as, 
"Not  one  cent  for  tribute;  millions  for  defense!" 
The  publication  of  the  X.  Y.  Z.  dispatches 
sent  rolling  through  the  country  a  wave  of  patri 
otic  feeling  before  which  the  Republican  leaders 
quailed  and  which  swept  away  many  of  their 
followers.  Jefferson  held  that  the  French  Govern 
ment  ought  not  to  be  held  responsible  for  "the 
turpitude  of  swindlers,"  and  he  steadfastly  op 
posed  any  action  looking  to  the  use  of  force  to 
maintain  American  rights.  Some  of  the  Republican, 
members  of  Congress,  however,  went  over  to  the 
Federalist  side,  and  Jefferson's  party  was  pres 
ently  reduced  to  a  feeble  and  dispirited  minority. 
Loyal  addresses  rained  upon  Adams.  There 
appeared  a  new  national  song,  Hail  Columbia, 
which  was  sung  all  over  the  land  and  which  was 
established  in  lasting  popularity.  Among  its 
well-known  lines  is  an  exulting  stanza  beginning: 


210  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

"Behold  the  chief  who  now  commands, 
Once  more  to  serve  his  country  stands. " 

This  is  an  allusion  to  the  fact  that  Washington 
had  left  his  retirement  to  take  charge  of  the 
national  forces.  The  envoys  had  been  threatened 
that,  unless  they  submitted  to  the  French  demands, 
the  American  Republic  might  share  the  fate  of  the 
Republic  of  Venice.  The  response  of  Congress 
was  to  vote  money  to  complete  the  frigates, 
the  United  States,  the  Constitution,  and  the  Con 
stellation,  work  on  which  had  been  suspended 
when  the  Algerine  troubles  subsided;  and  further, 
to  authorize  the  construction  or  purchase  of  twelve 
additional  vessels.  For  the  management  of  this 
force,  the  Navy  Department  was  created  by  the 
Act  of  April  30,  1798.  '  By  an  Act  of  May  28,  the 
President  was  authorized  to  raise  a  military  force 
of  ten  thousand  men,  the  commander  of  which 
should  have  the  services  of  "a  suitable  number 
of  major-generals. "  On  July  7,  the  treaties  with 
France  that  had  so  long  vexed  the  United  States 
were  abrogated. 

The  operations  of  the  Navy  Department  soon 
showed  that  American  sailors  were  quite  able  and 
willing  to  defend  the  nation  if  they  were  allowed 
the  opportunity.  In  December,  1798,  the  Navy 


THE  PERSONAL  RULE  OF  JOHN  ADAMS  211 

Department  worked  out  a  plan  of  operations  in  the 
enemy's  waters.  To  repress  the  depredations  of 
the  French  privateers  in  the  West  Indies,  a  squad 
ron  commanded  by  Captain  John  Barry  was  sent 
to  cruise  to  the  windward  of  St.  Kitts  as  far  south 
as  Barbados,  and  it  made  numerous  captures. 
A  squadron  under  Captain  Thomas  Truxtun 
cruised  in  the  vicinity  of  Porto  Rico.  The  flag 
ship  was  the  frigate  Constellation,  which  on  Febru 
ary  9,  1799,  encountered  the  French  frigate, 
L'Insurgente,  and  made  it  strike  its  flag  after  an 
action  lasting  only  an  hour  and  seventeen  minutes. 
The  French  captain  fought  well,  but  he  was  put  at 
a  disadvantage  by  losing  his  topmast  at  the  open 
ing  of  the  engagement,  so  that  Captain  Truxtun 
was  able  to  take  a  raking  position.  The  American 
loss  was  only  one  killed  and  three  wounded,  while 
L'Insurgente  had  twenty -nine  killed  and  forty-one 
wounded.  On  February  1,  1800,  the  Constellation 
fought  the  heavy  French  frigate  Vengeance  from 
about  eight  o'clock  in  the  evening  until  after 
midnight,  when  the  Vengeance  lay  completely 
silenced  and  apparently  helpless.  But  the  rigging 
and  spars  of  the  Constellation  had  been  so  badly  cut 
up  that  the  mainmast  fell,  and  before  the  wreck 
could  be  cleared  away  the  Vengeance  was  able  to 


212  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

make  her  escape.  During  the  two  years  and  a 
half  in  which  hostilities  continued,  the  little  navy 
of  the  United  States  captured  eighty-five  armed 
French  vessels,  nearly  all  privateers.  Only  one 
American  war  vessel  was  taken  by  the  enemy,  and 
that  one  had  been  originally  a  captured  French 
vessel.  The  value  of  the  protection  thus  extended 
to  American  trade  is  attested  by  the  increase  of 
exports  from  $57,000,000  in  1797  to  $78,665,528  in 
1799.  Revenue  from  imports  increased  from 
$6,000,000  in  1797  to  $9,080,932  in  1800. 

The  creation  of  an  army,  however,  was  attended 
by  personal  disagreements  that  eventually  wrecked 
the  Administration.  Without  waiting  to  hear  from 
Washington  as  to  his  views,  Adams  nominated  him 
for  the  command  and  then  tried  to  overrule  his 
arrangements.  The  notion  that  Washington  could 
be  hustled  into  a  false  position  was  a  strange 
blunder  to  be  made  by  anyone  who  knew  him. 
He  set  forth  his  views  and  made  his  stipulations 
with  his  customary  precision,  in  letters  to  Secretary 
McHenry,  who  had  been  instructed  by  Adams  to 
obtain  Washington's  advice  as  to  the  list  of 
officers.  Washington  recommended  as  major- 
generals,  Hamilton,  C.  C.  Pinckney,  and  Knox,  in 
that  order  of  rank.  Adams  made  some  demur  to 


THE  PERSONAL  RULE  OF  JOHN  ADAMS  213 

the  preference  shown  for  Hamilton,  but  McHenry 
showed  him  Washington's  letter  and  argued  the 
matter  so  persistently  that  Adams  finally  sent  the 
nominations  to  the  Senate  in  the  same  order 
as  Washington  had  requested.  Confirmation 
promptly  followed,  and  a  few  days  later  Adams 
departed  for  his  home  at  Quincy,  Massachusetts, 
without  notice  to  his  Cabinet.  It  soon  appeared 
that  he  was  in  the  sulks.  When  McHenry  wrote 
to  him  about  proceeding  with  the  organization  of 
the  army,  he  replied  that  he  was  willing  provided 
Knox's  precedence  was  acknowledged,  and  "he 
added  that  the  five  New  England  States  would  not 
patiently  submit  to  the  humiliation  of  having 
Knox's  claim  disregarded. 

From  August  4  to  October  13,  wrangling  over 
this  matter  went  on.  The  members  of  the  Cabinet 
were  in  a  difficult  position.  It  was  their  under 
standing  that  Washington's  stipulations  had  been 
accepted,  but  the  President  now  proposed  a  differ 
ent  arrangement.  Pickering  and  McHenry  wrote 
to  Washington  explaining  the  situation  in  detail. 
News  of  the  differences  between  Adams  and 
Washington  of  course  soon  got  about  and  caused 
a  great  buzz  in  political  circles.  Adams  became 
angry  over  the  opposition  he  was  meeting,  and  on 


214  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

August  29  he  wrote  to  McHenry  that  "there  has 
been  too  much  intrigue  in  this  business,  both  with 
General  Washington  and  with  me";  that  it  might 
as  well  be  understood  that  in  any  event  he  would 
have  the  last  say,  "and  I  shall  then  determine  it 
exactly  as  I  should  now,  Knox,  Pinckney,  and 
Hamilton. "  Washington  stood  firm  and,  on  Sep 
tember  25,  wrote  to  the  President  demanding  "that 
he  might  know  at  once  and  precisely  what  he  had  to 
expect. "  In  reply  Adams  said  that  he  had  signed 
the  three  commissions  on  the  same  day  in  the  hope 
"that  an  amicable  adjustment  or  acquiescence 
might  take  place  among  the  gentlemen  them 
selves."  But  should  this  hope  be  disappointed, 
"and  controversies  shall  arise,  they  will  of  course 
be  submitted  to  you  as  commander-in-chief . " 

Adams,  of  course,  knew  quite  well  that  such 
matters  did  not  settle  themselves,  but  he  seems  to 
have  imagined  that  all  he  had  to  do  was  to  sit 
tight  and  that  matters  would  have  to  come  his  way. 
The  tricky  and  shuffling  behavior  to  which  he 
descended  would  be  unbelievable  of  a  man  of  his 
standing  were  there  not  an  authentic  record  made 
by  himself.  The  suspense  finally  became  so  intol 
erable  that  the  Cabinet  acted  without  consulting  the 
President  any  longer  on  the  point.  The  Secretary 


THE  PERSONAL  RULE  OF  JOHN  ADAMS  215 

of  War  submitted  to  his  colleagues  all  the  cor 
respondence  in  the  case  and  asked  their  advice. 
The  Secretaries  of  State,  of  the  Treasury,  and  of 
the  Navy  made  a  joint  reply  declaring  "the  only 
inference  which  we  can  draw  from  the  facts  before 
stated,  is,  that  the  President  consents  to  the 
arrangement  of  rank  as  proposed  by  General 
Washington,"  and  that  therefore  "the  Secretary 
of  War  ought  to  transmit  the  commissions,  and 
inform  the  generals  that  in  his  opinion  the  rank  is 
definitely  settled  according  to  the  original  arrange 
ment."  This  was  done;  but  Knox  declined  an 
appointment  ranking  him  below  Hamilton  and 
Pinckney.  Thus,  Adams  despite  his  obstinacy, 
was  completely  baffled,  and  a  bitter  feud  between 
him  and  his  Cabinet  was  added  to  the  causes  now 
at  work  to  destroy  the  Federalist  party. 

The  Federalist  military  measures  were  sound 
and  judicious,  and  the  expense,  although  a  subject 
of  bitter  denunciation,  was  really  trivial  in  com 
parison  with  the  national  value  of  the  enhanced 
respect  and  consideration  obtained  for  American 
interests.  But  these  measures  were  followed  by 
imprudent  acts  for  regulating  domestic  politics. 
By  the  Act  of  June  18, 1798,  the  period  of  residence 
required  before  an  alien  could  be  admitted  to 


216  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

American  citizenship  was  raised  from  five  years  to 
fourteen.  By  the  Act  of  June  25,  1798,  the 
efficacy  of  which  was  limited  to  two  years,  the 
President  might  send  out  of  the  country  "such 
aliens  as  he  shall  judge  dangerous  to  the  peace  and 
safety  of  the  United  States,  or  shall  have  reasonable 
grounds  to  suspect  are  concerned  in  any  treason 
able  or  secret  machinations  against  the  govern 
ment  thereof. "  The  state  of  public  opinion  might 
then  have  sanctioned  these  measures  had  they 
stood  alone,  but  they  were  connected  with  another 
which  proved  to  be  the  weight  that  pulled  them  all 
down.  By  the  Act  of  July  14,  1798,  it  was  made  a 
crime  to  write  or  publish  "any  false,  scandalous, 
and  malicious"  statements  about  the  President  or 
either  House  of  Congress,  to  bring  them  "into 
contempt  or  disrepute,"  or  to  "stir  up  sedition 
within  the  United  States. " 

There   were   plenty   of   precedents   in   English 
history  for  legislation  of  such  character.     Robust, 
examples  of  it  were  supplied  in  England  at  that 
very  time.     There  were  also  strong  colonial  pre-* 
cedents.     According    to    Secretary    Wolcott,    thex 
sedition  law  was  "merely  a  copy  from  a  statute  of  ' 
Virginia  in  October,  1776."     But  a  revolutionary 
Whig  measure  aimed  at  Tories  was  a  very  different 


THE  PERSONAL  RULE  OF  JOHN  ADAMS  217 

thing  in  its  practical  aspect  from  the  same  measure 
used  by  a  national  party  against  a  constitutional 
opposition.  Hamilton  regarded  such  legislation 
as  impolitic,  and,  on  hearing  of  the  sedition  bill, 
he  wrote  a  protesting  letter,  saying,  "Let  us  not 
establish  tyranny.  Energy  is  a  very  different  thing 
from  violence. " 

But  in  general  the  Federalist  leader-1  were  so 
carried  away  by  the  excitement  of  the  tifries  that 
they  could  not  practice  moderation.  Their  zeal 
otry  was  sustained  by  political  theories  which  made 
no  distinction  between  partisanship  and  sedition. 
The  constitutional  function  of  partisanship  was 
discerned  and  stated  by  Burke  in  1770,  but  his 
definition  of  it,  as  a  joint  endeavor  to  promote  the 
national  interest  upon  some  particular  principle, 
was  scouted  at  the  time  and  was  not  allowed 
until  long  after.  The  prevailing  idea  in  Washing 
ton's  time,  both  in  England  and  America,  was  that 
partisanship  was  inherently  pernicious  and  ought 
to  be  suppressed.  Washington's  Farewell  Address 
warned  the  people  "  in  the  most  solemn  manner 
against  the  baneful  effects  of  the  spirit  of  party. " 
The  idea  then  was  that  government  was  wholly 
the  affair  of  constituted  authority,  and  that  it  was 
improper  for  political  activity  to  surpass  the  ap- 


218  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

pointed  bounds.  Newspaper  criticism  and  parti 
san  oratory  were  among  the  things  in  Washington's 
mind  when  he  censured  all  attempts  "to  direct, 
control,  counteract,  or  awe  the  regular  deliberation 
and  action  of  the  constituted  authorities. "  Hence 
judges  thought  it  within  their  province  to  denounce 
political  agitators  when  charging  a  grand  jury. 
Chief  Justice  Ellsworth,  in  a  charge  delivered  in 
Massachusetts,  denounced  "the  French  sys 
tem-mongers,  from  the  quintumvirate  at  Paris  to 
the  Vice-President  and  minority  in  Congress,  as 
apostles  of  atheism  and  anarchy,  bloodshed,  and 
plunder."  In  charges  delivered  in  western 
Pennsylvania,  Judge  Addison  dealt  with  such  sub 
jects  as  Jealousy  of  Administration  and  Govern 
ment,  and  the  Horrors  of  Revolution.  Washington, 
then  in  private  life,  was  so  pleased  with  the  series 
that  he  sent  a  copy  to  friends  for  circulation. 

Convictions  under  the  sedition  law  were  few,  but 
there  were  enough  of  them  to  cause  great  alarm. 
A  Jerseyman,  who  had  expressed  a  wish  that  the^ 
wad  of  a  cannon,  fired  as  a  salute  to  the  President, 
had  hit  him  on  the  rear  bulge  of  his  breeches,  was 
fined  $100.     Matthew  Lyon  of   Vermont,  while 
canvassing  for  reelection  to  Congress,  charged  the ' 
President  with  "unbounded  thirst  for  ridiculous 


THE  PERSONAL  RULE  OF  JOHN  ADAMS  219 

pomp,  foolish  adulation,  and  a  selfish  avarice." 
This  language  cost  him  four  months  in  jail  and  a 
fine  of  $1000.  But  in  general  the  law  did  not 
repress  the  tendencies  at  which  it  was  aimed  but 
merely  increased  them. 

The  Republicans,  too  weak  to  make  an  effective 
stand  in  Congress,  tried  to  interpose  state  author 
ity.  Jefferson  drafted  the  Kentucky  Resolutions, 
adopted  by  the  state  legislature  in  November, 
1 798 .  They  hold  that  the  Constitution  is  a  compact 
to  which  the  States  are  parties,  and  that  "each 
party  has  an  equal  right  to  judge  for  itself  as  well  of 
infractions  as  of  the  mode  and  measure  of  redress. " 
The  alien  and  sedition  laws  were  denounced,  and 
steps  were  proposed  by  which  protesting  States 
"will  concur  in  declaring  these  Acts  void  and  of  no 
force,  and  will  each  take  measures  of  its  own  for 
providing  that  neither  these  Acts,  nor  any  others 
of  the  general  Government,  not  plainly  and  in 
tentionally  authorized  by  the  Constitution,  shall 
be  exercised  within  their  respective  territories." 
The  Virginia  Resolutions,  adopted  in  December, 
1798,  were  drafted  by  Madison.  They  view  "the 
powers  of  the  federal  Government  as  resulting  from 
the  compact  to  which  the  States  are  parties, "  and 
declare  that,  if  those  powers  are  exceeded,  the 


220  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

States  "have  the  right  and  are  in  duty  bound  to 
interpose."  This  doctrine  was  a  vial  of  woe  to 
American  politics  until  it  was  cast  down  and 
shattered  on  the  battlefield  of  civil  war.  It  was 
invented  for  a  partisan  purpose,  and  yet  was 
entirely  unnecessary  for  that  purpose. 

The  Federalist  party  as  then  conducted  was  the 
exponent  of  a  theory  of  government  that  was 
everywhere  decaying.  The  alien  and  sedition  laws 
were  condemned  and  discarded  by  the  forces  of 
national  politics,  and  state  action  was  as  futile  in 
effect  as  it  was  mischievous  in  principle.  It  di 
verted  the  issue  in  a  way  that  might  have  ulti 
mately  turned  to  the  advantage  of  the  Federalist 
party,  had  it  possessed  the  usual  power  of  adapta 
tion  to  circumstances.  After  all,  there  was  no 
reason  inherent  in  the  nature  of  that  party  why  it 
should  not  have  perpetuated  its  organization  and 
repaired  its  fortunes  by  learning  how  to  derive 
authority  from  public  opinion.  The  needed  trans 
formation  of  character  would  have  been  no  greater 
than  has  often  been  accomplished  in  party  history. 
Indeed,  there  is  something  abnormal  in  the  complete^ 
prostration  and  eventual  extinction  of  the  Federal 
ist  party;  and  the  explanation  is  to  be  found  in  the 
extraordinary  character  of  Adams's  administration. 


THE  PERSONAL  RULE  OF  JOHN  ADAMS  221 

It  gave  such  prominence  and  energy  to  individual 
aims  and  interests  that  the  party  was  rent  to  pieces 
by  them. 

In  communicating  the  X.  Y.  Z.  dispatches  to  Con 
gress,  Adams  declared:  "I  will  never  send  another 
Minister  to  France  without  assurance  that  he  will  be 
received,  respected,  and  honored,  as  the  representa 
tive  of  a  great,  free,  powerful,  and  independent 
nation."  But  on  receiving  an  authentic  though 
roundabout  intimation  that  a  new  mission  would 
have  a  friendly  reception,  he  concluded  to  dispense 
with  direct  assurances,  and,  without  consulting  his 
Cabinet,  sent  a  message  to  the  Senate  on  February 
18,  1799,  nominating  Murray,  then  American 
Minister  to  Holland,  to  be  Minister  to  France. 
This  unexpected  action  stunned  the  Federalists 
and  delighted  the  Republicans  as  it  endorsed  the 
position  they  had  always  taken  that  war  talk  was 
folly  and  that  France  was  ready  to  be  friendly  if 
America  would  treat  her  fairlv^,  "Had  the  foulest 
heart  and  the  ablest  head  in  the  world,"  wrote 
Senator  Sedgwick  to  Hamilton,  "been  permitted 
to  select  the  most  embarrassing  and  ruinous  meas 
ure,  perhaps  it  would  have  been  precisely  the  one 
which  has  been  adopted. "  Hamilton  advised  that 
"the  measure  must  go  into  effect  with  the  addi- 


222  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

tional  idea  of  a  commission  of  three. "  The  com 
mittee  of  the  Senate  to  whom  the  nomination  was 
referred  made  a  call  upon  Adams  to  inquire  his 
reasons.  According  to  Adams's  own  account, 
they  informed  him  that  a  commission  would 
be  more  satisfactory  to  the  Senate  and  to  the 
public.  According  to  Secretary  Pickering,  Adams 
was  asked  to  withdraw  the  nomination  and  refused, 
but  a  few  days  later,  on  hearing  that  the  committee 
intended  to  report  against  confirmation,  he  sent  in 
a  message  nominating  Chief  Justice  Ellsworth  and 
Patrick  Henry,  together  with  Murray,  as  envoys 
extraordinary.  The  Senate,  much  to  Adams's 
satisfaction,  promptly  confirmed  the  nominations, 
but  this  was  because  Hamilton's  influence  had 
smoothed  the  way.  Patrick  Henry  declined, 
and  Governor  Davie  of  North  Carolina  was  substi 
tuted.  By  the  time  this  mission  reached  France, 
Napoleon  Bonaparte  was  in  power  and  the  envoys 
were  able  to  make  an  acceptable  settlement  of 
the  questions  at  issue  between  the  two  countries. 
The  event  came  too  late  to  be  of  service  to  Adams 
in  his  campaign  for  reelection,  but  it  was  intensely 
gratifying  to  his  self-esteem. 

Some  feelers  were  put  forth  to  ascertain  whether 
Washington  could  not  be  induced  to  be  a  candidate 


THE  PERSONAL  RULE  OF  JOHN  ADAMS  223 

again,  but  the  idea  had  hardly  developed  before  all 
hopes  in  that  quarter  were  abruptly  dashed  by  his 
death  on  December  14,  1799,  from  a  badly  treated 
attack  of  quinsy.  Efforts  to  substitute  some 
other  candidate  for  Adams  proved  unavailing,  as 
New  England  still  clung  to  him  on  sectional 
grounds.  News  of  these  efforts  of  course  reached 
Adams  and  increased  his  bitterness  against  Hamil 
ton,  whom  he  regarded  as  chiefly  responsible  for 
them.  Adams  had  a  deep  spite  against  members  of 
his  Cabinet  for  the  way  in  which  they  had  foiled 
him  about  Hamilton's  commission,  but  for  his  own 
convenience  in  routine  matters  he  had  retained 
them,  although  debarring  them  from  his  confidence. 
In  the  spring  of  1800  he  decided  to  rid  himself  of 
men  whom  he  regarded  as  "Hamilton's  spies." 
The  first  to  fall  was  McHenry,  whose  resignation 
was  demanded  on  May  5,  1800,  after  an  interview 
in  which  —  according  to  McHenry  —  Adams 
reproached  him  with  having  "biased  General 
Washington  to  place  Hamilton  in  his  list  of  major- 
generals  before  Knox."  Pickering  refused  to 
.'  resign,  and  he  was  dismissed  from  office  on  May  12. 
John  Marshall  became  the  Secretary  of  State,  and 
Samuel  Dexter  of  Massachusetts,  Secretary  of 
War.  Wolcott  retained  the  Treasury  portfolio 


224  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

until  the  end  of  the  year,  when  he  resigned  of  his 
own  motion. 

The  events  of  the  summer  of  1800  completed  the 
ruin  of  the  Federalist  party.  That  Adams  should 
have  been  so  indifferent  to  the  good  will  of  his 
party  at  a  time  when  he  was  a  candidate  for  re 
election  is  a  remarkable  circumstance.  A  common 
report  among  the  Federalists  was  that  he  was  no 
longer  entirely  sane.  A  more  likely  supposition 
was  that  he  was  influenced  by  some  of  the  Republi 
can  leaders  and  counted  on  their  political  support. 
In  biographies  of  Gerry  it  is  claimed  that  he  was 
able  to  accomplish  important  results  through 
his  influence  with  Adams.  At  any  rate,  Adams 
gave  unrestrained  expression  to  his  feelings  against 
Hamilton,  and  finally  Hamilton  was  aroused 
to  action.  On  August  1,  1800,  he  wrote  to  Adams 
demanding  whether  it  was  true  that  Adams  had 
"asserted  the  existence  of  a  British  faction  in  this 
country"  of  which  Hamilton  himself  was  said  to  be 
a  leader.  Adams  did  not  reply.  Hamilton  waited 
until  October  1,  and  then  wrote  again,  affirming 
"that  by  whomsoever  a  charge  of  the  kind  men 
tioned  in  my  former  letter,  may,  at  any  time, 
have  been  made  or  insinuated  against  me,  it  is 
a  base,  wicked,  and  cruel  calumny;  destitute  even 


THE  PERSONAL  RULE  OF  JOHN  ADAMS  225 

of  a  plausible  pretext,  to  excuse  the  folly,  or  mask 
the  depravity  which  must  have  dictated  it. " 

Hamilton,  always  sensitive  to  imputations  upon 
his  honor,  was  not  satisfied  to  allow  the  matter  to 
rest  there.  He  wrote  a  detailed  account  of  his 
relations  with  Adams,  involving  an  examination 
of  Adams's  public  conduct  and  character,  which  he 
privately  circulated  among  leading  Federalists. 
It  is  an  able  paper,  fully  displaying  Hamilton's 
power  of  combining  force  of  argument  with  dignity 
of  language,  but  although  exhibiting  Adams  as 
unfit  for  his  office  it  advised  support  of  his  candi 
dacy.  Burr  obtained  a  copy  and  made  such  use  of 
parts  of  it  that  Hamilton  himself  had  to  publish  it 
in  full. 

In  this  election  the  candidate  associated  with 
Adams  by  the  Federalists  was  Charles  Cotesworth 
Pinckney  of  South  Carolina.  Though  one  Adams 
elector  in  Rhode  Island  cut  Pinckney,  he  would 
still  have  been  elected  had  the  electoral  votes  of  his 
own  State  been  cast  for  him  as  they  had  been  for 
Thomas  Pinckney,  four  years  before;  but  South 
Carolina  now  voted  solidly  for  both  Republican 
candidates.  The  result  of  the  election  was  a  tie 
between  Jefferson  and  Burr,  each  receiving  73 
votes,  while  Adams  received  65  and  Pinckney  64. 


226  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES 

The  election  was  thus  thrown  into  the  House, 
where  some  of  the  Federalists  entered  into  an 
intrigue  to  give  Burr  the  Presidency  instead  of 
Jefferson,  but  this  scheme  was  defeated  largely 
through  Hamilton's  influence.  He  wrote:  "If 
there  be  a  man  in  this  world  I  ought  to  hate,  it  is 
Jefferson.  With  Burr  I  have  always  been  person 
ally  well.  But  the  public  good  must  be  paramount 
to  every  private  consideration." 

The  result  of  the  election  was  a  terrible  blow  to 
Adams.  His  vanity  was  so  hurt  that  he  could  not 
bear  to  be  present  at  the  installation  of  his  suc 
cessor,  and  after  working  almost  to  the  stroke  of 
midnight  signing  appointments  to  office  for  the 
defeated  Federalists,  he  drove  away  from  Washing 
ton  in  the  early  morning  before  the  inauguration 
ceremonies  began.  Eventually  he  soothed  his 
self-esteem  by  associating  his  own  trials  and 
misfortunes  with  those  endured  by  classical  heroes. 
He  wrote  that  Washington,  Hamilton,  and  Pinck- 
ney  formed  a  triumvirate  like  that  of  Antony, 
Octavius,  and  Lepidus,  and  "that  Cicero  was  not 
sacrificed  to  the  vengeance  of  Antony  more 
egregiously  than  John  Adams  was  to  the  unbridled 
and  unbounded  ambition  of  Alexander  Hamilton 
in  the  American  triumvirate. " 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

ABUNDANT  materials  are  available  for  the  period 
covered  by  this  work.  Chief  among  them  are  the 
Annals  of  Congress,  the  State  Papers,  and  the  writings 
of  statesmen  to  be  found  in  any  library  index  under 
their  names.  The  style  maintained  by  Washington 
early  became  a  subject  of  party  controversy  and  to  this 
may  be  attributed  a  noticeable  variation  in  accounts 
given  by  different  authors.  For  instance,  Washington 
Irving,  who  as  a  child  witnessed  the  first  inauguration 
parade,  says  in  his  Life  of  Washington  that  the  Presi 
dent's  coach  "was  drawn  by  a  single  pair  of  horses." 
But  the  detailed  account  given  in  the  New  York  Packet 
of  May  1,  1789,  the  day  after  the  ceremony,  says  that 
"the  President  joined  the  procession  in  his  carriage  and 
four."  The  following  authorities  may  be  consulted 
on  the  point: 

B.  J.  LOSSING,  article  in  The  Independent,  vol.  xli,  April 
25,  1889. 

MARTHA  J.  LAMB,  article  in  Magazine  of  American  His 
tory,  vol.  xx,  December,  1888. 

227 


228  BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

For  details  of  official  etiquette  during  Washington's 
administration,  the  following  may  be  consulted: 

GEORGE    WASHINGTON,    Diary,    from    1789    to    1791. 

Edited  by  B.  J.  Lossing  (1860). 
WILLIAM  MACLAY,  Journal,  1789-1791  (1890). 
GEORGE  W.  P.  CUSTIS,  Memoirs  of  Washington  (1859). 
JAMES  G.  WILSON,  The  Memorial  History  of  New  York 

(1893). 
ANNE  HOLLINGSWORTH  WHARTON,  Martha  Washington 

(1897). 

Works  of  special  importance  for  their  documentary 
matter  and  for  their  exhibition  of  the  personal  aspect 
of  events  are: 

J.  C.  HAMILTON,  History  of  the  Republic  of  the  United 

Stales,  7  vols.  (1860). 

H.  S.  RANDALL,  Life  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  3  vols.  (1858). 
GEORGE  GIBBS,  Administrations  of  Washington  and  John 

Adams,  2  vols.  (1846). 

Some  economic  aspects  of  the  struggle  over  Hamil 
ton's  financial  measures  are  exhibited  by: 

CHARLES  A.  BEARD,  Economic  Origins  of  Jeffersonian 
Democracy  (1915). 

New  light  has  been  cast  upon  Genet's  mission,  causing 
a  great  change  in  estimates  of  his  character  and  activi- 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE  229 

ties,  by  materials  drawn  from  the  French  archives  by 
Professor  F.  J.  Turner,  and  presented  in  the  following 
articles : 

"The  Origin  of  Genet's  Projected  Attack  on  Louisiana 

and  the  Floridas,"  American  Historical  Review, 

vol.  iii. 
"The  Policy  of  France  toward  the  Mississippi  Valley," 

American  Historical  Review,  vol.  x. 
"The  Diplomatic  Contest  for  the  Mississippi  Valley," 

Atlantic  Monthly,  vol.  xciii. 

Further  references  will  be  found  appended  to  the 
articles  on  Washington,  Hamilton,  Jefferson,  Madison, 
Jay,  and  John  Adams  in  The  Encyclopaedia  Britannica, 
llth  Edition. 


INDEX 


Adams,  John,  favors  making  gov 
ernment  impressive  through 
ceremony,  8-9;  attitude  to 
ward  Genet  affair,  136;  re- 
elected  Vice-president,  178; 
elected  President,  195-96;  per 
sonal  characteristics,  200;  re 
lations  with  Jefferson,  200-01 ; 
Cabinet,  201-03;  defeat  at 
election  of  1800,  226 

Addison,  Alexander,  Judge,  218 

Algiers,  relations  with,  104  et 
seq.;  treaty  with,  112-13 

Alien  and  Sedition  laws,  215  et 
seq. 

Ames,  Fisher,  of  Massachusetts, 
32-33,  43-44,  55,  62,  81,  90, 
101,  110,  154,  191 

Bacri,  the  Jew,  113 

Barclay,  Thomas,  107 

Baldwin,  Abraham,  of  Georgia, 
110 

Barlow,  Joel,  119,  199 

Barry,  John,  Captain,  211 

Beard,  C.  A.,  Economic  Origins 
of  Jeffersonian  Democracy,  76- 
77 

Benson,  Egbert,  of  New  York, 
55,66 

Boudinot,  Elias,  of  New  Jersey, 
33,  38,  55,  65-66 

Bradford,  William,  of  Rhode 
Island,  188 

Burke,  Edanus,  of  South  Caro 
lina,  67,  68 

Burr,  Aaron,  226 

Butler,  Pierce,  of  South  Caro 
lina,  29 


Cabinet,  President's,  a  develop 
ment  after  Washington's  ad 
ministration,  24-25;  status  of, 
50 

Campbell,  William,  Major,  102- 
103 

Carmichael,  William,  144 

Church,  Edward,  U.  S.  consul  at 
Lisbon,  108 

Clark,  Abraham,  of  New  Jersey, 
110,  152 

Clark,  George  Rogers,  120,  124 

Clinton,  George,  of  New  York, 
178 

Constellation,  The,  ship,  113,  210, 
211 

Constitution,  The,  ship,  113,  210 

Constitutional  amendments 
adopted,  32 

Daily  Advertizer,  143 
Dauphin,  The,  ship,  106 
Dayton,  Jonathan,  of  New  Jer 
sey,  152,  190 

Dexter,  Samuel,  of  Massachu 
setts,  223 

District  of  Columbia,  exact  site 
to  be  selected  by  the  President, 
74 

Ellsworth,  Oliver,  of  Connecti 
cut,  51,  218 

Federal  Hall,  12-13 

Federalist,  70 

Federalist  party,  224 

Finance,  National,  Tariff  bill, 
26-31;  debt  of  United  States 
(1790),  57  Assumption  bill,  67 


231 


INDEX 


Finance — Continued 

et  seq.,  169;  national  bank  es 
tablished,  77;  mint  established, 
77 

Fishbourn,  Benjamin,  90-91 

Fitzsimmons,  Thomas,  of  Penn 
sylvania,  45-46,  47,  49,  110 

France,  relations  with  United 
States,  115  et  seq.',  treaties  of 
1778, 120-21;  representation  in 
United  States,  198-99;  special 
mission  to,  201  et  seq.;  treaties 
abrogated  (1798),  210;  mari 
time  troubles  with,  210-12; 
second  mission  to,  222 

Fraunces,  A.  G.,  179 

Freneau,  Philip,  editor  of  Na- 
tional  Gazette,  138 

Genet,  Edmond,  appointed 
French  minister  to  United 
States,  115;  a  trained  diplomat 
ist,  115-16;  audacious  mission, 
118-22;  reception  in  United 
States,  122-24;  policy  toward 
Louisiana,  124;  argues  for 
treaty  rights,  132-33;  public 
opinion  for,  136-37;  arrest  by 
French  Government,  144;  suc 
cess,  140-41;  United  States 
becomes  his  asylum,  144; 
bibliography,  228-29 

Germantown,  Proposal  to  place 
capital  at,  72 

Gerry,  Elbridge,  of  Massachu 
setts,  33  et  seq.,  55,  203,  207, 
224 

Giles,  W.  B.,  of  Virginia,  110-12, 
166  et  seq.,  179-81,  191,  193- 
94 

Grange,  The,  ship,  123,  133 

Gray  son,  William,  of  Virginia,  51 

Great  Britain,  lays  down  con 
traband  regulations,  149-50; 
retains  Western  posts  in 
America,  154,  158-59;  treaty 
with  (1795),  158-62 

Greenville,  Treaty  of  (1795),  102 

Gwinnett,  Button,  91 


Hail  Columbia,  209-10 

Hamilton,  Alexander,  personal 
appearance,  3;  aid  in  finance 
sought  by  Washington,  4; 
advises  Washington  as  to 
deportment,  7-8,  10;  ap 
pointed  Secretary  of  Treasury, 
22-23;  rivalry  between  Madi 
son  and,  48;  opinion  as  to 
establishment  of  courts,  52; 
report  to  Congress  (1790),  54 
et  seq.',  stand  on  the  question 
of  security  of  transfer,  64; 
interest  in  site  for  national 
capital,  71-72;  report  on  manu- 
factures,  77;  appreciation  of, 
78-79;  author  of  interrogator 
ies  to  the  cabinet  (1793),  126- 
128;  opinion  on  French  treaty 
obligations,  131-32;  stands 
against  Jefferson,  136;  calm 
ness  in  regard  to  Genet  affair, 
137;  "Pacificus,"  139;  "No 
Jacobin,"  143;  resigns  as  Sec 
retary  of  Treasury  (1793),  164- 
65;  party  warfare  against,  168 
et  seq. ;  requests  a  Treasury  in 
vestigation,  179;  opinion  as  to 
enforcing  law,  185-86;  remains 
trusted  adviser,  190-91;  aids 
Wolcott  in  preparing  scheme  of 
taxation,  204;  appointed  ma 
jor-general,  212-13;  relations 
with  Adams,  224-25;  bibli 
ography,  228 

Hammond,  George,  British  min 
ister  to  United  States,  150, 
154 

Hancock,  John,  92 

Harmar,  Josiah,  Lieutenant- 
Colonel,  93,  97 

Hazard,  Ebenezer,  Postmaster- 
General,  21-22 

Henry,  Patrick,  189 

Humphreys,  David,  Colonel, 
107-08 

Indian  troubles  in  the  West,  83- 
87,  93-96,  97-98,  101-02 


INDEX 


233 


Jackson,  Andrew,  193 

Jackson,  James,  of  Georgia,  53, 
60 

Jay,  John,  Secretary  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  21;  appointed  envoy 
extraordinary  to  Great  Bri 
tain  (1794),  155-56;  mission 
to  England,  158  et  seq.;  elected 
Governor  of  New  York,  163 

Jay  treaty,  terms  of,  158-63; 
agitation  over,  190-92;  French 
attitude  toward,  198 

Jefferson,  Thomas,  appointed 
Secretary  of  State,  23;  attitude 
on  question  of  assumption  of 
state  debts,  73-74;  importance 
of  public  service,  74;  report  on 
the  Algerine  question,  105-06; 
as  minister  to  Paris,  117;  opin 
ion  o'n  French  treaty  obliga 
tions,  129-31,  134-37;  "The 
Anas,"  137;  disturbs  the  ad 
ministration,  138-39;  resigns 
as  Secretary  of  State  (1793), 
148;  for  the  principle  "free 
ships,  free  goods,"  150;  op 
ponent  of  Hamilton,  174-76; 
drafts  Kentucky  Resolutions 
(1798),  219;  elected  President, 
225-26;  bibliography,  228 

Johnson,  Thomas,  of  Maryland, 
189 

Jones,  John  Paul,  Admiral,  107 

Judiciary,  Establishment  of  the, 
51-53 


Kentucky  Resolutions,  219 
Knox,  Henry,  Secretary  of  War 
since  1785,  21;  Secretary  of 
War  and  of  the  Navy,  23; 
submits  plan  for  militia,  82; 
supports  Hamilton  in  question 
of  treaty  obligations,  129-30, 
136;  recommended  as  major- 
general  by  Washington,  212; 
question  of  precedence  of  rank, 
213-14;  declines  appointment, 
215 


La  Carmagnole,  ship,  141 

V  Ambuscade,  ship,  123-24,  133 

L'Ami  de  la  Point  a  Petre,  ship, 

141 

La  Montagne,  ship,  141 
L'  Amour  de  la  Liberte,  ship,  141 
La  Vengeance,  ship,  141 
Le  Cassius,  ship,  141 
Le  Citoyen  Genet,  ship,  141 
Lee,  Arthur,  22 

Lee,  Charles,  of  Virginia,  188,  205 
Lee,  R.  H.,  of  Virginia,  51 
1'Enfant,  P.  C.,  12 
Le  Petit  Democrate,  ship,  141, 142. 

143 

L'Esperance,  ship,  141 
Le  Vainqueur  de  Bastille,  ship,  141 
Little  Sarah,  ship,  141 
Livermore,     Samuel,     of     New 

Hampshire,  43,  61,  67-68 
Livingston,  Walter,  22 
Louisiana  territory,  119,  124 

McGillivray,  Alexander,  Head 
chief  of  the  Creeks,  83-87 

McHenry,  James,  of  Maryland, 
189,  205,  223 

Mclntosh,  Lachlan,  91 

Maclay,  William,  of  Pennsylvan 
ia,  Diary  of,  19-20,  60,  69. 
70-71,  72,  88-89,  107 

Madison,  James,  cooperates 
with  Hamilton  in  government 
organization,  2;  personal  ap 
pearance,  3;  introduces  scheme 
for  raising  revenue,  26-31; 
upholds  President's  power  of 
removal,  40-41;  acts  as  ad 
visor  to  Washington,  47;  opin 
ion  as  to  system  of  federal 
courts,  52;  stand  on  question 
of  security  of  transfer,  65,  66- 
67;  opinion  on  creation  of  a 
navy,  109-10;  "Helvidius," 
140;  attitude  toward  non- 
intercourse,  154;  drafts  Vir 
ginia  Resolutions  (1798),  219 

Marshall,  John,  opinion  on  neu 
trality  of  United  States  (1793), 


234 


INDEX 


Marshall— Continued 

126;  appointed  commissioner 
to  France,  203;  becomes  Sec 
retary  of  State,  223 
Military  preparedness,  Policy 
of,  81-83,  96-97,  100-01,  151- 
52 

Monroe,  James,  197-98 
Morris,  Gouverneur,  117-18 
Morris,  Robert,  4,  29,  35,  72 
Moultrie,  William,  General,  122- 

23 

Murray,  W.  V.,  Minister  to 
Holland,  221 

Napoleon  Bonaparte,  206 
National  Gazette,  142-43 
Naval  policy  of  the  United  States, 

109  et  seq. 
Neutrality,  Question  of   (1793), 

125  et  seq. 
New  York,  desires  to  be  capital 

of   nation,    12;    Washington's 

home  in,  15 

Nicholas,  W.  C.,  of  Virginia,  110 
Non-intercourse  bill,  153-54 
North  Carolina  admitted  to  the 

Union  (1789),  93 

O'Brien  Richard,  Captain,  106, 

108,  109 

O'Fallon,  James,  Dr.,  119 
Osgood,     Samuel,     Postmaster- 
General,  22,  23 

Page,  John,  of  Virginia,  42,  61-62 

Paine,  Thomas,  119 

Patterson,  William,  of  New 
Jersey,  189 

Philadelphia  club,  183 

Pickering,  Timothy  of  Massa 
chusetts,  189,  223 

Pinckney,  C.  C.,  189,  198-99, 
212-13,  225 

Pinckney,  Thomas,  145, 148, 150, 
155,  196 

President  of  the  United  States, 
social  position  and  duties, 


5-10;     official     title,     10-11; 
power  of  removal  by,  34,  39- 
42,  89 
Putnam,  Rufus,  General  81 

Randolph,  Edmund,  appointed 
Attorney-General,  23;  opinion 
on  question  of  French  treaty 
obligations,  129-30;  divides 
influence  between  factions  in 
cabinet,  136;  transferred  to 
State  Department,  168;  letter 
to  Washington,  177;  opinion 
as  to  enforcing  law,  185;  ap 
plies  to  French  minister  for 
funds,  187-88;  retires,  188 

Republican  party,  173 

Residence  act,  74 

Rhode  Island  admitted  to  the 
Union  (1790),  93 

St.  Clair,  Arthur,  General,  97. 
98,  100 

Sans  Pareil,  ship,  141 

Sedgwick,  Theodore,  of  Massa 
chusetts,  45,  151,  152 

Senate,  privy  council  function  of, 
87-89 

Short,  William,  144 

Smith,  Samuel,  of  Maryland,  110 

Smith,  William,  of  South  Caro 
lina,  112 

Spain,  Treaty  with  (1795), 
145-46 

Stone,  M.  J.,  of  Maryland,  68 

Story,  Joseph,  Justice,  50 

Talleyrand,  206-09 

Tariff,  see  Finance. 

Taylor,  John,  76 

Treasury  Department,  estab 
lished  by  Congress,  34-39; 
rights  and  duties  of  Secretary 
defined,  42-51;  Secretary's 
report,  55-56 

Trenton,  proposal  to  place  capi 
tal  at,  72 

Truxtun,  Thomas,  Captain,  211 


INDEX 


235 


United   States,   The,   ship,    113, 
210 


Virginia  Resolutions,  219-20 

Wadsworth,  Jeremiah,  of  Con 
necticut,  37 

War  Department,  Opposition  to, 
81 

Washington,  George,  reluctant 
to  reassume  public  responsibil 
ities,  1;  installed  as  President 
(1789),  2;  personal  characteris 
tics,  5;  his  magnificence,  13- 
14;  his  levees,  18;  first  message 
to  Congress,  20-21;  first  cab 
inet,  22-23;  message  to  Senate 
(1789),  81-82;  differences  with 
the  Senate,  87-91;  tours,  91- 
93;  church-going  habits,  92- 
93;  receives  news  of  St.  Clair's 
defeat,  98-100;  concern  about 
Genet  affair,  137-38;  opinion 


as  to  validity  of  French  treaty, 
147;  dependence  upon  Hamil 
ton,  147-48;  address  of  Dec. 
3,  1793,  150-51;  reelected 
President,  177-78;  party  spirit 
against,  192;  Farewell  Address 
(1796),  192-93;  death  (1799), 
223;  bibliography,  227-28 

Washington,  Martha,  arrival  in 
New  York,  16-17;  her  enter 
tainments,  18-19 

Wayne,  Anthony,  General,  101, 
102-03 

West  Indies,  trade  with,  160-61, 
162-63 

Whiskey  insurrection,  182  et  seq. 

White,  Alexander-  of  Virginia, 
39 

Willett,  Marinus,  Colonel,  85 

Wolcott,  Oliver,  of  Connecticut, 
189,  203,  223-24 

"X.  Y.  Z."  dispatches,  207-09, 
221 


AN  OUTLINE  OF  THE  PLAN  OF 
THE  CHRONICLES  OF  AMERICA 


The  fifty  tides  of  the  Series  fall  into  eight  topical  sequences  or  groups, 
each  with  a  dominant  theme  of  its  own— 


I.  The  Morning  of  America 
TIME:  1492-1763 

THE  theme  of  the  first  sequence  is  the  struggle  of  nations  for  the 
possession  of  the  New  World.  The  mariners  of  four  European  king- 
doms — Spain,  Portugal,  France,  and  England— are  intent  upon  the 
discovery  of  a  new  route  to  Asia.  They  come  upon  the  American  continent 
which  blocks  the  way.  Spain  plants  colonies  in  the  south,  lured  by  gold. 
France,  in  pursuit  of  the  fur  trade,  plants  colonies  in  the  north.  Englishmen, 
in  search  of  homes  and  of  a  wider  freedom,  occupy  the  Atlantic  seaboard. 
These  Englishmen  come  in  time  to  need  the  land  into  which  the  French 
have  penetrated  by  way  of  the  St.  Lawrence  and  the  Great  Lakes,  and  a 
mighty  struggle  between  the  two  nations  takes  place  in  the  wilderness, 
ending  in  the  expulsion  of  the  French.  This  sequence  comprises  ten  volumes: 

1.  THE  RED  MAN'S  CONTINENT,  by  Ellsworth  Huntington 

2.  THE  SPANISH  CONQUERORS,  by  Irving  Eerdine  Richman 

3.  ELIZABETHAN  SEA-DOGS,  by  William  Wood 

4.  CRUSADERS  OF  NEW  FRANCE,  by  William  Bennett  Munro 

5.  PIONEERS  OF  THE  OLD  SOUTH,  by  Mary  Johnston 

6.  THE  FATHERS  OF  NEW  ENGLAND,  by  Charles  M.  Andrei** 

7.  DUTCH  AND  ENGLISH  ON  THE  HUDSON,  by  Maud  Wilder  Goodwin 

8.  THE  QUAKER  COLONIES,  by  Sydney  G.  Fisher 

9.  COLONIAL  FOLKWAYS,  by  Charles  M.  Andrews 

IO.  THE  CONQUEST  OF  NEW  FRANCE,  by  George  M.  Wrong 


II.   The  Winning  of  Independence 
TIME:  1763-1815 

The  French  peril  has  passed,  and  the  great  territory  between  the  Alle- 
ghanies  and  the  Mississippi  is  now  open  to  the  Englishmen  on  the  seaboard, 
with  no  enemy  to  contest  their  right  of  way  except  the  Indian.  But  the 
question  arises  whether  these  Englishmen  in  the  New  World  shall  submit 
to  political  dictation  from  the  King  and  Parliament  of  England.  To  decide 
this  question  the  War  of  the  Revolution  is  fought;  the  Union  is  born: 
and  the  second  war  with  England  follows.  Seven  volumes: 

11.  THE  EVE  OF  THE  REVOLUTION,  by  Carl  Becker 

12.  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COMRADES  IN  ARMS,  by  George  M,  Wrong 

13.  THE  FATHERS  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION,  by  Max  Farrand 

14.  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES,  by  Henry  Jones  Ford 

15.  JEFFERSON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES,  by  Allen  Johnson 

16.  JOHN  MARSHALL  AND  THE  CONSTITUTION,  by  Edward  S.  CorWttl 

17.  THE  FIGHT  FOR  A  FREE  SEA,  by  Ralph  D.  Paine 

III.   The  Vision  of  the  West 
TIME:  1750-1890 

The  theme  of  the  third  sequence  is  the  American  frontier — the  conquest 
of  the  continent  from  the  Alleghanies  to  the  Pacific  Ocean.  The  story  covers 
nearly  a  century  and  a  half,  from  the  first  crossing  of  the  Alleghanies  by 
the  backwoodsmen  of  Pennsylvania,  Virginia,  and  the  Carolinas  (about 
1750)  to  the  heyday  of  the  cowboy  on  the  Great  Plains  in  the  latter  part 
of  the  nineteenth  century.  This  is  the  marvelous  tale  of  the  greatest  migra 
tions  in  history,  told  in  nine  volumes  as  follows: 

18.  PIONEERS  OF  THE  OLD  SOUTHWEST,  by  Constance  Lindsay  Skinnet 

19.  THE  OLD  NORTHWEST,  by  Frederic  Austin  Ogg 

20.  THE  REIGN  OF  ANDREW  JACKSON,  by  Frederic  Austin  Ogg 

21.  THE  PATHS  OF  INLAND  COMMERCE,  by  Archer  B.  Hulbert 

22.  ADVENTURERS  OF  OREGON,  by  Constance  Lindsay  Skinner 

23.  THE  SPANISH  BORDERLANDS,  by  Herbert  E.  Bo/ton 

24.  TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR,  by  Nathaniel  W.  Stephenson 

25.  THE  FORTY-NINERS,  by  Stewart  Edward  White 

26.  THE  PASSING  OF  THE  FRONTIER,  by  EmfTSOn  Hough 


IV.   The  Storm  of  Secession 
TIME:  1830-1876 

The  curtain  rises  on  the  gathering  storm  of  secession.  The  theme  of  the 
fourth  sequence  is  the  preservation  of  the  Union,  which  carries  with  it  the 
extermination  of  slavery.  Six  volumes  as  follows: 

27.  THE  COTTON  KINGDOM,  by  William  E.  Dodd 

28.  THE  ANTI-SLAVERY  CRUSADE,  by  JeSSC  Macy 

29.  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN  AND  THE  UNION,  by  Nathaniel  W.  Stephenson 

30.  THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY,  by  Nathaniel  W.  Stephenson 

31.  CAPTAINS  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR,  by  William  Wood 

32.  THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX,  by  Walter  Lynwood  Fleming 

V.   The  Intellectual  Life 

Two  volumes  follow  on  the  higher  national  life,  telling  of  the  nation's  great 
teachers  and  interpreters: 

33.  THE  AMJERICAN  SPIRIT  IN  EDUCATION,  by  Edwin  E.  SloSSOrt 

34.  THE  AMERICAN  SPIRIT  IN  LITERATURE,  by  BHsS  Perry 

VI .   The  Epic  of  Commerce  and  Industry 

The  sixth  sequence  is  devoted  to  the  romance  of  industry  and  business, 
and  the  dominant  theme  is  the  transformation  caused  by  the  inflow  of 
immigrants  and  the  development  and  utilization  of  mechanics  on  a  great 
scale.  The  long  age  of  muscular  power  has  passed,  and  the  era  of  mechanical 
power  has  brought  with  it  a  new  kind  of  civilization.  Eight  volumes: 

35.  OUR  FOREIGNERS,  by  Samuel  P.  Orth 

36.  THE  OLD  MERCHANT  MARINE,  by  Ralph  D.  Paine 

37.  THE  AGE  OF  INVENTION,  by  Holland  Thompson 

38.  THE  RAILROAD  BUILDERS,  by  John  Moody 

39.  THE  AGE  OF  BIG  BUSINESS,  by  Burton  J.  Hendrick 

40.  THE  ARMIES  OF  LABOR,  by  Samuel  P.  Orth 

41.  THE  MASTERS  OF  CAPITAL,  by  John  Moody 

42.  THE  NEW  SOUTH,  by  Holland  Thompson 


VII.   The  Era  of  World  Power 

The  seventh  sequence  carries  on  the  story  of  government  and  diplomacy 
and  political  expansion  from  the  Reconstruction  (1876)  to  the  present  day, 
in  six  volumes: 

43.  THE  BOSS  AND  THE  MACHINE,  by  Samuel  P.  Or/A 

44.  THE  CLEVELAND  ERA,  by  Henry  Jones  Ford 

45.  THE  AGRARIAN  CRUSADE,  by  Solon  J.  Buck 

46.  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE,  by  Ca rl  Ru ssell  Fish 

47.  THEODORE  ROOSEVELT  AND  HIS  TIMES,  by  Harold  Howland 

48.  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR,  by  Charles  Seymour 

VIII.   Our  Neighbor s 

Now  to  round  out  the  story  of  the  continent,  the  Hispanic  peoples  on 
the  south  and  the  Canadians  on  the  north  are  taken  up  where  they  were 
dropped  further  back  in  the  Series,  and  these  peoples  are  followed  down 
to  the  present  day: 

49.  THE  CANADIAN  DOMINION,  by  Oscar  D.  Skelton 

50.  THE  HISPANIC  NATIONS  OF  THE  NEW  WORLD,  by  William  R.  Shepherd 

The  Chronicles  of  America  is  thus  a  great  synthesis,  giving  a  new  projec 
tion  and  a  new  interpretation  of  American  History.  These  narratives  are 
works  of  real  scholarship,  for  every  one  is  written  after  an  exhaustive 
examination  of  the  sources.  Many  of  them  contain  new  facts;  some  of  them 
— such  as  those  by  Howland,  Seymour,  and  Hough — are  founded  on  inti 
mate  personal  knowledge.  But  the  originality  of  the  Series  lies,  not  chiefly 
in  new  facts,  but  rather  in  new  ideas  and  new  combinations  of  old  facts. 

The  General  Editor  of  the  Series  is  Dr.  Allen  Johnson,  Chairman  of  the 
Department  of  History  of  Yale  University,  and  the  entire  work  has  been 
planned,  prepared,  and  published  under  the  control  of  the  Council's 
Committee  on  Publications  of  Yale  University. 

YALE  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

143  ELM  STREET,  NEW  HAVEN 
522  FIFTH  AVENUE,  NEW  YORK 


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